SUIT NO.1150 of 2011

CMA No.613 of 2013.




Plaintiff             :           Mr. Khalid Ansari,

                                      through Mr. Murtaza Wahab, Advocate.



Defendants       :           Independent Newspapers Corporation Pvt. Ltd. & others.

      through Mr. Abid Naseem, Advocate.



Date of hearing :            3rd April 2015.

Date of announcement:  15th April 2015






                   Through instant application (CMA No.613 of 2013) defendant No.3 seeks rejection of plaint on following grounds, in particular:-

i)             suit is hit by Section 11 of the CPC

ii)           Suit is hit by Order 2 r 2 CPC

2.         Succinctly, the facts of the case are that plaintiff claimed himself to be a respectable citizen and a chartered accountant by profession so also a fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan since 1985. He had a personal and professional association with above named defendants which spanned over 18 years. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 are private limited companies, duly incorporated under the laws of Pakistan having their registered offices at Printing House, I.I Chundrigar Road, Karachi. Defendants are leading media and news companies of Pakistan and are referred to by the general public as the ‘Jang/Geo Group’. Defendant No.3 is actual controller of the above mentioned group and exercises substantial control over the same. The said defendant is the sole decision maker in the above mentioned group and is jointly and severally liable for the loss incurred by the plaintiff. Defendant No.4 is the Chief Executive Officer of Defendant No.2 and is jointly and severally liable for the loss incurred by the plaintiff. Plaintiff has had a personal and professional relationship with the defendants for the last 18 years and was working as an auditor for all companies falling under the Jang/ Geo Group, before he was forcibly asked to resign on false and truncated charges. Besides, the defendants No.3 and 4 requested the plaintiff to write for their newspapers and the articles written by the plaintiff were published in the newspapers several times. Per plaintiff, the Defendants No.3 and 4 found plaintiff potential and capable of completing multiple tasks in addition to his work as a professional auditor, therefore requested to become the head of the documentaries department in the Jang/Geo Group, which plaintiff entertained as well he continued his work as a professional auditor for the Jang/Geo Group and defendants No.3 and 4 requested the plaintiff to create a documentary series comprising of 12 episodes. He claims that documentary, being on a comparative study of various non-Muslim nation states including Israel, with Muslim states, was specially entrusted to him to produce and host. The plaintiff traveled to various locations of the world, spent infinite time, energy and resources and completed all the research work himself and even wrote the script for the said documentary. Only for the first episode as many as 21 prominent personalities were interviewed. He claimed that at request of defendants No.3 and 4 he incurred all expenses from his own pocket as the Jang/Geo Group was suffering financial crises due to the ban imposed by the regime of General Pervaiz Musharraf and the defendants No.3 and 4 had promised that all expenses, incurred by the plaintiff in respect of the documentary, would be reimbursed. During the said tours he hired producers, camera men and other staff from his own pocket. He also exchanged several emails with the defendants No.3 and 4 on the said documentary clearly reflecting the will of the defendants. He also requested for execution of a formal contract but defendants No.3 and 4 failed, however, assured plaintiff to continue. The plaintiff claimed contractual relationship between the parties while referring to reimbursement of a small part of the expenses by defendants. Plaintiff claimed documentary as his sole and/or primary creation hence asserted copyright thereon (documentary). He claimed that he was not compensated for the same. Defendants saw the business potential in the said documentary and wanted to hoard all the proceeds to the exclusion of the plaintiff. On 13th August, 2009 the defendant No.3 emailed the plaintiff demanding to provide him all the material related to the documentary. Plaintiff further asserted that the defendants later on false and truncated charges asked the plaintiff to resign. Plaintiff sent legal notices to the defendants dated 28.5.2010 praying therein that his personal belongings may be returned to him alongwith all the material relating to the documentary, however, the defendants did not pay heed to the request of the plaintiff despite the defendant No.3, in several emails, promised to ensure that all personal belongings will be returned to the plaintiff. Prior to above mentioned legal notice, the plaintiff had a meeting with defendant No.3 in Dubai on 17.4.2010 in order to settle the entire dispute and per plaintiff the Defendant No.3 agreed to sign an agreement with the plaintiff formalizing the rights of the plaintiff over the documentary and all its material.

In such back ground, the plaintiff seeks following relief(s):-

a)    Declaration that the plaintiff is has the Copyright for the entire documentary and the work done on the same is the work of the plaintiff;


b)   Direct the defendants not to destroy, tamper, amend, change, alienate, transfer, sell, copy , deface and interfere with the personal belongings of the plaintiff in addition to all the material relating to the documentary and deposit the same with the Nazir of this Hon’ble Court;


c)    Direct the defendants to return all the personal  belongings of the plaintiff in addition to all the material relating to the documentary;


d)   Grant an injunction restraining the defendants from airing and/or showing the documentary, in full or part, on television or any other medium;


e)    Grant an injunction restraining the Defendants from sharing and/or selling any of the material of the documentary with third parties, including but not restricted to footage, script, music and research;


f)     Decree in the sum of Rs.37,208,000/- as enumerated above;


g)    Cost of the suit;

h)   Grant any other or better relief as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of this case;


3.         Learned counsel for defendants, inter alia, argued that suit of the plaintiff is barred within meaning, object and purpose of the Section 11 of the Code so also Under Order 2 rule 2 CPC, earlier suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed, hence the same is not sustainable under the law. Reliance has been placed on the case laws, reported as ABDUL HAKIM AND 2 others v.  SAADULLAH KHAN AND 2 others [PLD 1970 SC 63], MUHAMMAD QASIM ALI v. Mst. SURAYYA MASOOD [2013 CLC 553], ABDUL HABIB v. ANWAR SULTAN [1987 CLC 895] and MUHAMMAD BACHAL v. PROVINCE OF SINDH through Home Secretary [2011 CLC 1450].

4.         Conversely, learned counsel for plaintiff while refuting the above contention has argued that earlier order was not on merits but was purely on technical grounds hence fresh suit cannot be legally held to be barred by Section 11 of the Code. To strengthen this reliance was placed on 2007 SCMR 945. It was argued that doctrine of Order II Rule II and Res judicata is only applicable if earlier suit was between same parties. Reliance was placed on the decisions in the cases of MRS. IRENE WAHAB v LAHORE DIOCESAN TRUST ASSOCIATION [2002 SCMR 300], BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (OVERSEAS) LTD. v BANKING TRIBUNAL FOR SINDH AND BALOCHISTAN [1990 MLD 309], MAHNDI  v. MUHAMMAD RAMZAN [1994 MLD 686]. It was lasted with submissions that case laws, relied by defendants’ side are not applicable hence application for rejection of plaint be dismissed.

5.         Since the instant application for rejection of the plaint of the plaintiff has been sought on two folds i.e ‘res judicata’ and that of bar, created by Order-II Rule-2 CPC.

6.         To properly appreciate the applicability of the question of ‘resjudicata’ it would be just and proper to refer the provision of Section 11 of the Code which reads as :-

“11. No Court shall try suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.”


The provision in its nature is one of ‘restrictive’ and ‘penal’ in nature which per its plain meaning restrains a Court to try a suit or an issue, even, which directly and substantially was raised and decided in a former suit between the same parties or parties claiming under them. Since the law to interpret a ‘penal statute’ is that it has to be construed strictly. The principle of the ‘res judicata’ is nothing but to bring a full stop over an attempt of ‘same parties’ or those claiming ‘under same parties’ to seek adjudication of a suit or an issue which was directly or substantially ‘heard & decided’ in a former suit. The phrase ‘has been heard and finally decided by such Court’, used in the said provision, should always be given due weight and interpretation thereof must be made in plain meaning thereof. In short, before seeking application of ‘res judicata’ it must be established or found that suit or issue, involved in a former suit, was not only ‘heard’ but was ‘finally decided’ by a ‘competent Court’. Needless to add here that ‘final decision/determination’ is one which qualifies the meaning of ‘decree’ as is evident from Section 2(2) of the Code i.e:

"decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties which regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint [the determination of any question within section 144 and an order under rule 60, 98, 99, 101, or 103 of Order XXI] But shall not include;


Although, the above specifically includes a rejection of plaint to be falling within meaning of a ‘decree’ but if the provision of Section 11 of the Code is read with that of Order 7 Rule 13 of the Code, it would make clear that a rejection of the plaint shall not qualify the meaning of the ‘res judicata’. For sake of convenience the Order 7 rule 13 of the Code is reproduced hereunder:-

13. Where rejection of plaint does preclude presentation of fresh plaint. The rejection of the plaint on any of the grounds hereinbefore mentioned shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action.


7.         Thus, in view of above, it is pertinent to mention that where an issue of fact or law, including one of mixed question of fact and law, was not ‘finally decided/determined’ after hearing (trial) in an earlier suit then the principle of res judicata will not come into play to bring the penal action, depriving a party from seeking ‘legal determination’ of his rights or status, would not be within spirit of ‘administration of justice’. I am also clear in my view with reference to provision of Order VII Rule XIII of the Code that a rejection of the plaint shall not operate as ‘res judicata’. Reference can be made to the case of ‘Muhammad Saleem Ullah & Ors v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala & Ors’ (PLD 2005 SC 511) wherein ‘res judicata’ was explained as :-

‘7.      The rule of res judicata is based on the consideration that same cause should not be tried for the second time between the same parties and there must be an end to the litigation between the parties. The principle is that since the cause of action in a suit merges in the judgment, therefore, no second suit can be filed on the basis of same cause of action unless it is shown that it was recurring in nature, thus, the essential condition required to be fulfilled to establish the plea of res judicata would be that the matter in issue and the material point in dispute between the parties in the earlier litigation was directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent litigation. This is settled law that if matter in issue in the subsequent litigation was not substantially decided in the earlier litigation, it would not be res judicata actually or constructively because for res judicata, it is essential to show that earlier decision in the matter was based on proper adjudication on the relevant issue either of law or fact or mixed issue of law and fact. The decision on an issue of fact based on evidence and decision on issue of law on the basis of set of facts, directly and substantially by a competent Court, is certainly res judicata and the verdict given by the superior Courts in Constitutional jurisdiction, on a point of law or on a question of fact based on proved facts and admissible evidence would operate as res judicata inter se parties but decision on a disputed question of fact in Constitutional jurisdiction, without any evidence would not operate as res judicata to the adjudication of such question of fact in the subsequent litigation. In nutshell, there can be no cavil to the proposition of law that the adjudication on question of law or fact or mixed question of law and fact on the basis of established set of facts and the determination of such questions in the judgment, would essentially be res judicata if the facts were found to have satisfied the requirement of law but the finding or mere observation on a question of fact without proper adjudication and any evidence would not operate as res judicata. In the light of this rule even in the matter of application of general principle of res judicata at least the condition of final decision on merits of the dispute between the parties must exist.”

(underlining has been supplied for emphasis)


Further, the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of ‘FECTO BELARUS TRACTOR Ltd. v. GOVT. of PAKISTAN [PLD 2005 SC 605] held as under:-

            26.    In this context it is to be noted that this Court in the case of Province of Punjab v. Ibrahim and Sons (2000 SCMR 1172), while examining the question of constructive res judicata in accordance with section 11, CPC. had laid down the following five principles:--


1.   The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue either actually or constructively in the former suit;


2.   The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or anyone of them claim;


3.   The parties as aforesaid must have litigated under the same title in the former suit;


4.   The Court which decided the former suit must have been a Court competent to try the subsequent suit in which such issue is subsequently raised;


5.   The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit;


Let me add that all above conditions must co-exist. The principle of res judicata shall not come into play even all first four conditions are in existing but fifth one is missing because ‘hearing and final decision’ though listing below but this has to be seen/examined first.

            While putting the instant case onto above touch-stone, It is manifest that earlier suit of the plaintiff was rejected under Order 7 R 11 CPC. On discussed criterion and within object of Order 7 rule 13 CPC, a rejection of the plaint Under Order VII Rule XI of the Code does not preclude the plaintiff from filing the plaintiff to present fresh suit on ‘same cause of action’. Even otherwise, earlier decision of rejection of the plaint of the plaintiff did not ‘finally decide’ any issue, involved in between the parties rather rejection of the plaint was only with reference to:

i)             non-maintainability of defamation suit before this Court (civil court) with reference to defamation Ordinance;


ii)           maintainability of suit on account of mis-joinder i.e seeking relief against a firm but suing one of the partner (s) in its independent capacity;


With due respect to earlier order of rejection of the suit, worth to add that such rejection of the plaint shall not operate as ‘res judicata’ as the issues, involved or likely to arise were neither ‘heard’ nor ‘finally decided’. In absence thereof a suit even against the same party or even under same cause of action shall not operate as ‘res judicata’ in a later suit because this will come into play only if previous suit was decided on merits regarding the same issues which were directly and substantially in issue in the later suit.

8.         The second question, involved in the instant matter, is that of application of Order-II Rule (2) of the Code. For convenience, understanding and appreciation of the Order, it would be in all fairness to refer the same first which is reproduced hereunder:-

2. (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action, but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.

(2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.

(3) A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.

Explanation: For the purposes of this rule an obligation and collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action.


9.         From plain reading of the above, it should no more be confusing that this provision insists that ‘every suit should include the whole claim which one (plaintiff) is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action’. In short, it must appear that both the suits (former and later) are in respect of ‘a (same) cause of action’. Not only this, but it must also be established that subsequently sought/prayed reliefs were available at the time of filing of ‘former suit’ but were ‘omitted’ or ‘deliberately relinquished’. It would be germane to state that for ‘omitting’ or ‘relinquishing’ is always necessary to have/possess that which is being ‘omitted’ or ‘relinquished’. At this juncture, let me highlight the legal position that the Order-2 Rule-I is followed by Rule-II hence the subsequent/following ‘rule’ is always to be taken ‘explanatory’ to earlier ‘rule’. The position, being so, compels me to take into consideration the phrase, used in the Order-II Rule 1 CPC i.e “to bring the suit within jurisdiction of any Court’ , into consideration. Since, I am quite conscious of the very basic principle of interpretation that every single word is result of ‘deliberation’ on part of the legislature and is always to be taken as having some ‘wisdom’ behind it. The term ‘any Court’ should not be taken in isolation but if the Rules 1 & 2 of Order-II of the Code are read as a whole/ jointly, as is the requirement of interpretation, it would make it clear that availability of reliefs arising from a cause of action should be of such nature that plaintiff could competently ‘include whole of the claim’ in a suit hence this provision shall have no application where the cause of action is ‘one and same’ but because of legal restrictions of whole of the claim cannot be competently brought in a single suit. If the inclusion of two available claims can result in making the suit incompetent then omission or relinquishing a claim cannot be termed to be result of deliberation of the plaintiff hence the bar, provided under Order-II rule 2 CPC, will not be applicable. Strength to such conclusion is based on the case law, reported as   2002 SCMR 1877 wherein while responding to the applicability of Order II Rule 2 CPC, it is held that:

‘…it is well settled that the previous suit being not competent in law then the said bar is not attracted’.

This view is also supported with the objective of the provision, so explained by Apex Court, as :

The main object of the above provisions is to avoid splitting of claim and restrict multiplicity of litigation in the matter”


To avoid splitting of claim can only be examined where the choice was lying within competence of the plaintiff and not where it is the requirement of law and procedure. Moreover, if a cause of action gives the plaintiff a right to claim two independent reliefs which, per legal restrictions, cannot be sought in a single suit then plaintiff can competently file two separate suits before two different courts. If one claiming two independent claims arising out of a single transaction i.e issuance of a cheques (negotiable instrument) he can competently file a suit Under Order XXXVII rule 1 CPC for recovery and simultaneously he can file separate suit (before Ordinary Civil Court) for damages or other claims, if any, even if arising out of ‘a cause of action’. Let me add that this view also finds support from the test to be employed for purpose of determining the claim or relief arising out of the same cause of action or otherwise which was laid by Honourable Supreme Court in case of ‘Abdul Hakim & 2 other v Saadullah Khan & Ors’ (PLD 1970 SC 63) wherein it is held that:

“………A rough test, although not a conclusive one, is to see whether the same evidence will sustain both suits which would be the case if both the suits are founded on continuous and inseparable incidents in the same transaction. The question, however, is to be examined in substance and not merely on form as the cause of action in the two suits may be found to be the same, in spite of the facts alleged not being exactly identical in the two cases.

(underlining has been supplied for emphasis)


10.       Thus, for application of Order II rule 2 CPC judicial conscious must be satisfied that :

i)             the cause (s) of action in former and later suit (s) are one and same;


ii)           the claim, sought in later suit, were available at time of filing of filing of former suit;


iii)          the former court was competent to entertain the omitted or relinquished claim;


11.     In the above proposition ratio decidendi is observed in series of discussion, which are as under:-

‘Abdul Hakim & 2 other v Saadullah Khan & Ors’                   (PLD 1970 SC 63)

‘The expression “cause of action” in Order II rule 2 C.P.C means the cause of action for which a suit is brought. In order that the cause of action for the two suits may be the same, it is necessary not only that the facts which would entitle the plaintiff to the right claimed must be the same but also that the infringement of his right at the hands of the defendants complained against in the two suits, must have arisen in substance out of the same transaction. In considering the application of this bar, regard is to be had to the allegations in the two suits without reference to the defence that may be set up by the defendants. As laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Muhammad Khalil Khan and others v. Mahbub Ali Mian and others (1) “the bar under Order II, rule 2 refers entirely to the grounds set out in the plaint as the cause of action or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour’. “A rough test, although not a conclusive one is to see whether the same evidence will sustain both suits which would be the case if both the suits are founded on continuous and inseparable incidents in the same transaction. The question, however, is to be examined in substance and not merely on form as the cause of action in the two suits may be found to be the same, in spite of the facts alleged not being exactly identical in the two cases. It is not open to the plaintiff to split up the parts really constituting the same cause of action and file different suits in respect of them. In other words, a plaintiff must ask for all his reliefs which flow from the grievances caused to him by the infringement of his rights by the defendant in the course of the same transaction, but he cannot and is under no obligation to add to his grievances which did not occur in that transaction. If two trespasses are alleged against a defendant, both in the course of the same transaction, a plaintiff must seek his remedy in one suit against both and he cannot split up his cause of action to sue for one trespass in one suit and for the other in a subsequent suit. But where the two trespasses allegedly have taken place on different occasions and the second was not in existence at the time of the first suit, as in this case, there was neither any occasion nor any necessity for the plaintiff to seek his redress for the second trespass in the first suit. The second trespass which was committed by the appellants in the present case after the first suit had been filed, gave a fresh cause of action to the plaintiff-respondents which validly formed the subject-matter of their second suit. The plea that the second suit was barred under Order II, rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, in the circumstances, is wholly misconceived.”  

Hashim Khan v. NBP (PLD 2001 SC 325)


‘9.      In view of these two documents, we now refer to the provisions of Order II rule 2, CPC. The reading of the said provisions in very clear terms discloses that omission or failure to include any of the reliefs operates as relinquishment of such claim, it is essential that party instituting proceedings should include all reliefs flowing out of main grievance, otherwise omission would be fatal, as such, it would be essential for the plaintiff to assert claimable reliefs concerning the grievance of cause of action. However, if any such relief which flows out of basic grievance is not claimed or omitted, then such party stands precluded from agitating those reliefs subsequently. The main object of the above provisions is to avoid splitting of claim and restrict multiplicity of litigation in the matter.



Muhammad Tahir v. Abdul Latif & 5 others (1990 SCMR 751)


The causes of action were different, the occasions when the causes of action arose were different and the High Court has also recognized this difference by saying that the plaintiff ought to have amended the plaint and incorporated the subsequent causes of action and the relief in the first suit. That was at best an option open to plaintiff. He could not, however, be penalized for not availing of it and adopting the other course of restricting in the third suit the controversy  to the causes of action which had arisen after the institution of the first suit.


(underlining is provided for emphasis)


12.       In view of above, once it is found that plaintiff himself/herself omitted or deliberately relinquished his/her certain available rights/claims, arising out of same cause of action, while filing former suit before a Court which was competent to entertain the suit even on inclusion of omitted or relinquished claims then he/she will not be legally justified to claim the same because the law is always clear that one has to bear the consequence of his own actions/omissions. In short, he/she will be precluded from asking what he/she himself/herself ‘omitted’ or ‘relinquished’.

13.       In view of above discussion, now I shall proceed to examine the applicability of the bar, created by Order II rule 2 CPC, in the instant suit. At the very outset, it would be proper to have a comparative look at causes of action claimed in both i.e former and later (instant) suit which are:


          That cause of action accrues to the plaintiff on or about 2007 , 2008 and 2009 whereon the objections to accounts were made by the plaintiff; then on 6th October 2009 when publication of defamatory substance tarnishing the character of plaintiff was made; and permanently published with malice and on 27th December, 2009, 20th March 2010 when notice was served then on 17th April 2010 when the meeting was held in Dubai, on which date the slander was repeated and lastly when notice was served upon the defendant for recovery of money on 28th May 2010 and continuously day to day till filing of the suit;



        That the cause of action first accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant on 06.10.2009 when the plaintiff was illegally and forcibly asked to resign on fraudulent charges. The cause of continues to accrue from day to day as the defendants are forcibly not returning the personal belongings of the plaintiff and the material relating to the documentary. In addition to the same the cause of action continues to accrue as the plaintiff is not being compensated for his services rendered and expenses incurred.



The above would show that in former suit the cause of action was confined to allegation of ‘slander’ (defamation) and so does the relief was in respect thereof while the cause of action in later suit (instant one) is not in that respect but appears to be independent one so does the claims, based on such cause of action, are altogether different from the one sought in former suit. Since there can be no denial to the legal position that to prove a case of ‘slander (defamation)’ the evidence, required, would not be similar to that to prove the claims of Declaration, Mandatory or Damages. Thus, if this is put onto the test, as set out in the case of ‘Abdul Hakim & 2 others (supra) for determining the claim or relief, arising out of same cause of action, the answer would be in ‘negation’. The conclusion thereof will no doubt result in making the bar inapplicable.

14.       Be as it may, let’s proceed further and to examine whether the former Court was competent to entertain the omitted or relinquished claims (which are sought in instant suit) if same would have been included in earlier suit. The former suit was recovery on ‘on account of defamation’ for which the former Court specifically held to be ‘not competent’ to entertain same, as is evident from order, passed Under Order VII r 11 CPC, rejecting the plaint of plaintiff in clear terms found the suit incompetent on count of ‘jurisdiction’, being relating to ‘defamation Ordinance’. The position, being so, make it clear that even if the instant claims would have been included yet the former Court was not competent to entertain ‘whole of the claim’. The position, being so, also results in dislodging the plea of bar, so raised by the learned counsel for the defendants.

            Not only above, but the plaintiff in the instant suit (later suit) has claimed the continuity of the cause of action in respect of his claims, prayed for in the instant suit which he is claiming with reference to his working with defendants, his personal belonging with defendants and consequences of his such working with defendants which are being claimed with reference to some contract or understanding. A breach of a contract/understanding and consequence thereof is an independent cause of action and cannot be said to be ‘an obligation and a collateral security and even successive claims’ , arising from a claim of ‘defamation’, as is explained in the explanation, provided to explain the Order 2 of the Code.  

15.       Accordingly, the bar of the said provisions is not applicable in the instant case. Hence, the application of the defendants, seeking rejection of the plaint of the plaintiff under Order VII rule 11 CPC, is hereby dismissed.