IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

 

                                               

Present :-  

Mr. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi.

                                                           Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar.

 

 

C. P. NO. D-1904/2014

 

 

M/s Fotile Kitchen & Home Appliances ---------------------Petitioners

 

Vs.

 

Federation of Pakistan & others-------------------------------Respondents

 

 

C. P. NO. D-2597/2014

 

 

M/s S. F. International­--------------------------------------------Petitioners

 

Vs.

 

Federation of Pakistan & others -------------------------------Respondents

 

 

C.P.NO.D-1561/2014

 

 

M/s Fotile Kitchen & Home Appliances (Pvt.) Ltd ----------- Petitioners

 

Vs.

 

Federation of Pakistan and others------------------------------- Respondents

 

 

C. P. NO. D-138/2014

 

 

M/s Weldon Electronics Corp & others ----------------------- Petitioners

 

Vs.

 

Federation of Pakistan and others ------------------------------ Respondents

 


C. P. NO. D-798/2014

 

 

M/s Fotile Kitchen and Home Appliances-------------------Petitioners

 

Vs.

 

Federation of Pakistan-------------------------------------------Respondents

 

 

C. P. NO. D-2777/2014

 

 

M/s Mini Tech Corporation-------------------------------------Petitioners

 

Versus

 

Federation of Pakistan & others---------------------------------Respondents

 

 

 

Date of hearing:                    13.11.2014.

 

Date of order:                         13.11.2014.

 

Petitioners:                            Through Mr. Ghulamullah, Advocate,

 

Respondents :                        Through Mr. Dilawar Hussain Standing

                                               Counsel, Mr. Ghulam Haider Shaikh,                                          

   M. Sarfaraz Ali Metlo, Iqbal M. Khurram,

   Mrs. Masooda   Siraj & Ms. Dil Khurram     

   Shaheen Advocates.

 

 

J U D G M E N T

 

 

 

Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, J:-     Through this common Judgment, we will dispose of all the aforesaid petitions, wherein the petitioners have impugned certain Valuation Rulings issued by the Director of Valuation, Karachi in terms of Section 25(A) of the Customs Act, 1969, and have also prayed that the transactional value as declared by the petitioners shall be accepted for assessment of goods in terms of Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969.

 

2.         Briefly, the facts as stated in the Memo of Petitions are that all the petitioners have imported several consignments of various goods which have been assessed by the respondent department on the basis of Valuation Rulings No.618/2013 dated 6.12.2013, 645/2013 dated 18.03.2014 and 643/2014 dated 7.3.2014 issued by the Director of Valuation, Karachi, in terms of Section 25(A) of the Customs Act, 1969. The petitioners have also challenged the Valuation Rulings by filing Revision Applications before the Director General, Customs Valuation, Karachi under Section 25(D) of the Customs Act, 1969, and after having failed to convince the respondents for release of their consignments, provisionally under Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, have filed instant petitions, whereby, in addition to impugning the said Valuation Rulings, petitioners have also sought release of their consignment provisionally by depositing the differential amount of duty and taxes before the Nazir this Court.

 

3.         Mr. Ghulamullah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of all the petitioners has contended that through impugned Valuation Rulings, values have been fixed by the Director of Valuation, Karachi, unilaterally, whereas, such values cannot be fixed and can only be determined by the Director of Valuation, Karachi, on case to case basis. Learned Counsel further contended that since the Valuation Rulings have been issued in violation of the provisions of Section 25 & 25A of the Customs Act, 1969 and the Judgment of this Court in the case of Sadia Jababar versus Federation of Pakistan & others (PTCL 2014 CL 537), hence, the remedy of Revision as provided under the law, is not efficacious remedy and the same has become illusionary in nature, and therefore, the petitioners, after having availed the alternate remedy by filing the Revision Applications under Section 25(D) of the Customs Act, 1969, have preferred instant petitions. Per learned Counsel, since the Director of Valuation, Karachi, has failed to appreciate the dicta laid down by this Court in the case of Sadia Jabbar supra, hence, the entire exercise of issuing the impugned Valuation Rulings is without jurisdiction, therefore, impugned Valuation Rulings are liable to be set aside. Learned Counsel further submitted that even otherwise, fiscal rights of the petitioners are involved, hence, instant petitions are maintainable, despite having an alternate remedy under the law. Per learned Counsel, the Director of Valuation, Karachi, while issuing the impugned Valuation Rulings has not appreciated the provisions of Section 25(7) of the Customs Act, 1969 read with Rule 114 of the Customs Rules, 2001. Learned Counsel further contended that this Court in the case of Sadia Jabbar supra has laid down certain principles and guidelines for the Valuation Department, which are required to be mandatorily followed and adopted, while issuing Valuation Rulings under section 25A, of the Customs Act, 1969, therefore, the entire exercise of fixation of values through impugned Valuation Rulings, is without any lawful authority and jurisdiction. Learned Counsel further submitted that, subsequently, another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Goodwill Traders, Karachi  versus Federation of Pakistan and others (2014 PTD 176) has further elaborated and interpreted the provisions of Section 25 and 25(A) of the Customs Act, 1969 and after considering the earlier Judgment in the case of Sadia Jabbar supra has gone a step further, whereby, instead of remanding the matter to the department for determination of Valuation afresh, has set-aside  the Valuation Ruling under its Constitutional jurisdiction, and has directed to make assessment of the goods imported by the petitioner by accepting the declared transactional value in terms of Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, therefore, according to learned Counsel aforesaid petitions may also be allowed in the same terms and values declared by the petitioners may be ordered to be accepted as correct transactional value under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969.  In support of his contention, learned Counsel has relied upon the cases of Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan versus The Controller of Estate Duty and others  PLD 1961 Supreme Court 119,  The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd versus Pakistan & 2 others PLD 1970 Lahore 821,  Mst. Sattan and others versus Group Captain Masroor Hussain PLD 1962(W.P) Lahore 151,  Sadia Jabbar & 3 others versus Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 617, Capt. Siraj Ali versus Director General and another 1989 CLC 1026,  Premier Cloth Mills Ltd Lyallpur versus The Sales Tax Officers, Investigation and another 1972 SCMR 257,   Husein Sugar Mills Ltd versus The Islamic Republic of Pakistan & another (1979) 7 B T D 90,  Fazal Elahi versus Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board and another 1987 CLC 1010,  M/s Amin Textile Mills (Pvt) Ltd versus Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others 2000 SCMR 201, Tawakkal General Export Corporation and another versus The Collector of Customs (Export) Karachi and 2 others PLD 1992 Karachi 199,  Mehboob Ali Sani versus Additional District Judge and others 1991 SCMR 1880,  Pakistan Metal Industries versus Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs and another 1990 CLC 1022,  Town Committee, Gakhar Mandi versus Authority under the payment of wages Act, Gujranwala and 57 others PLD 2002 Supreme Court 452,  Ch. Abdul Hamid versus Deputy Commissioner and others 1985 SCMR 359,  Mst. Zahida Begum versus Wing Commander Ziauddin Ahmed and 5 others  1983 CLC 187,   Collector of Customs, Lahore and others versus Universal Gateway Trading Corporation and another 2005 SCMR 37,  Messsrs Faco Trading through Proprietor versus Member Customs Federal Board of  Revenue and others,  M/s Kamran Industries versus The Collector of Customs (Exports  and 4 others PLD 1996 Karachi 68.

 

4.         Conversely, Mr. Ghulam Haider Shaikh learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Valuation Department in C P. Nos. D-1561/2014, 138/2014, 798/2014 and 2777/2014 has contended that aforesaid petitions are not maintainable, as the petitioners have already availed the alternate remedy as provided under Section 25(D) of the Customs Act, 1969, by filing Revision Applications before the Director General, Customs Valuation, Karachi, whereas, during pendency of  the aforesaid petitions, Revision Applications filed on behalf of the petitioners, have been dismissed, against which, the petitioners have already preferred Appeals under Section 194(A) of the Customs Act, 1969 before the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi. Learned Counsel further contended that the petitioners have failed to bring any material on record, which could justify their contention with regard to the correctness of their declared values. Learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioners including their respective Trade Associations were consulted before issuance of impugned Valuation Rulings, whereafter, detailed and reasoned order has been passed while issuing Impugned Valuation Rulings. Per learned Counsel in all the aforesaid petitions disputed facts are involved, as determination of value of a consignments is a subjective exercise, which can only be carried out and determined appropriately by the forums provided under the Customs Act, 1969. In view of such contention, learned Counsel prayed for dismissal of the aforesaid petitions.

 

5.         Mr. Muhammad Sarfraz Ali Metlo, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 in C.P.No.D.1904/2014 has contended that all the aforesaid petitions are liable to be dismissed as determination of value of a consignment requires ascertainment of facts and such factual controversy can only be resolved by the forums provided under the law, whereas, the legislature has already provided an efficacious and alternate remedy, under the Customs Act, 1969, which has been availed by the petitioners, as such, aforesaid petitions cannot be entertained  by this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Learned Counsel further submitted that Valuation Rulings impugned through instant petitions, have been issued by the respondent department after following the directions and guidelines of this Court in the case of Sadia Jabbar supra, and a reasoned order has been passed in respect of all the impugned Valuation Rulings. Learned Counsel further contended that the question that as to whether, such reasons are correct or otherwise, cannot be determined by this Court under its writ jurisdiction, and the forums provided under the Act, including the Customs Appellate Tribunal is the appropriate Authority in law to decide such matters. Learned Counsel further contended that in so far as the case of Goodwill Traders supra is concerned, respondent department has already filed a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal  before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, whereas, the case of Sadia Jabbar supra, wherein this Court after setting aside the impugned Valuation Rulings, had remanded the matter to the Valuation Department for issuance of fresh Valuation Rulings, after following the guidelines given by this Court, has been finally approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported as Sadia Jabbar and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (2012 SCMR 617). Per learned Counsel, in view of such position, the observations of the learned Division Bench in the case of Goodwill Traders Supra is per in-curium, as the Court was required to remand the matter to the Valuation Department for issuance of a fresh Valuation Ruling, instead of accepting the transactional value of the petitioner in terms of Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, as the order for remand of the case has been duly approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadia Jabbar (SC) Supra.

 

6.         All the other learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent department have adopted the arguments of M/s Ghulam Haider Shaikh and Muhammad Sarfraz Ali Metlo, Advocates.

 

7.         We have heard all the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the record and the case law referred to hereinabove. By consent of all the learned Counsel, aforesaid petitions are being heard and disposed of finally at Katcha peshi stage.

 

8.         Before dilating upon the merits of the case, we would like to address the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents regarding maintainability of the aforesaid petitions, as according to the learned Counsel for the respondents, the petitioners after having availed the alternate remedy of Revision under Section 25-D of the Customs Act, 1969, cannot come before this Court and agitate the same controversy, for which they have already availed the departmental remedy. Learned Counsel for the respondents had contended that in view of the fact that the primary grievance of the petitioners regarding non-release of their consignments provisionally, pending Revision Applications before the Director General of Customs Valuation, Karachi, has already been redressed by this Court, through various orders, whereby interim relief has been granted to all the petitioners, the aforesaid petitions may be disposed of and the petitioners may be directed to pursue the alternate remedy before the appropriate forums as provided under the law which they have already availed. While confronted with such position, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, though admitted that the petitioners have availed the alternate remedy by filing Revision Application under Section 25-D of the Customs Act, 1969 before Director General, Customs Valuation, Karachi and in some of the petitions even orders have been passed by the Director General Valuation against which appeals have also been preferred before the Customs Appellate Tribunal. However, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that since this Court in the case of  Sadia Jabbar (HC) supra and Goodwill Traders supra, has already set aside several Valuation Rulings and has also accepted the declared transactional value of the petitioner, in the case of Goodwill Traders, therefore, the petitioners would press instant petition for decision on merits, despite availing the alternate remedy which according to the learned Counsel for the petitioners had become illusionary in nature. 

 

9.         On perusal of the record placed before us, it appears to be an admitted position that the petitioners before filing aforesaid petitions, had filed Revision Applications under Section 25-D of the Customs Act, 1969 and during pendency of such Revision Applications, had preferred aforesaid petitions, whereby, they had sought provisional release of their consignments and in addition to such relief, they have also challenged the Valuation Rulings on the basis of which, assessment of their imported consignments had been made by the Respondents. It has been further noted that during pendency of these petitions, and after passing of interim orders for the provisional release of the petitioner’s consignments, the Revision Applications in respect of Valuation Ruling Nos. 618/2014 dated 6.12.2013 impugned through C.P. Nos. D-1904/2014, 1561/2014, 138/2014 and 798/2014 have been decided by the Director General, Customs Valuation, Karachi, against the petitioners vide order dated 11.4.2014, and the petitioners have further assailed the said decision in Revision, by filing appeals before the Customs  Appellate Tribunal in terms of Section 194-A of the Customs Act, 1969, whereas, even after passing of the decision on the Revision Applications and filing of Appeals before the Customs Appellate Tribunal, the petitioners instead of bringing such fact on record before this Court have filed Misc. Applications, seeking release of various consignments, which had arrived during pendency of such proceedings and have been able to seek further interim orders for provisional release of consignments from this Court. It is noted with concern that such conduct on the part of the petitioners cannot be appreciated and this Court has to take a serious note of such practice on the part of the petitioners.  It was incumbent upon the petitioners to have immediately brought to the notice of this Court, that the Revision Applications have been dismissed against which they have availed further remedy by filing Appeals before the Customs Appellate Tribunal. Whereas, on the contrary, they have chosen to file Misc. Applications and have been successful in seeking interim relief by concealment of facts, instead of getting the petitions disposed of as suggested by the learned Counsel for the respondents, as for all practical and legal purposes, aforesaid petitions had become infructuous. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has failed to satisfactorily response on such conduct of the petitioners, that as to why after opting to seek further alternate remedy by filing Appeals before the Customs Appellate Tribunal, without leave of this Court, the petitioners continued to proceed with the aforesaid petitions, by seeking interim relief for release of their consignments on regular basis. The learned Counsel for the petitioners was also unable to satisfy as to how this Court can issue a writ under Article 199 of the Constitution in respect of the same legal controversy, which has been raised through aforesaid petitions and for which alternate remedy has already been availed. It is a settled law that where any party resorts to a statutory remedy against an order, then the same cannot be abandoned or bypassed, without any valid and reasonable cause by filing Constitutional Petition challenging the same action. Such conduct on the part of the petitioners wherein the statute provides alternate and efficacious remedy up to the level of High Court, which has already been availed by the petitioners, could not be approved or encouraged for the convenience of the petitioners. In the instant matter, we have not been able to persuade ourselves as to availability of any valid, plausible and or justifiable reason with the petitioners, which could have compelled them to abruptly abandon and bypass the alternate remedy already availed by them. 

 

10.      In this context it would be advantageous to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax Vs. Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf) Karachi reported in PLD 1992 SC 847, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that such practice, in cases when statute provides alternate and efficacious remedy up to the High Court, invoking Constitutional Jurisdiction cannot be approved or encouraged. In the above judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court had relied upon the following observation of the Court in C.A. NO. 79-K/1991 which were as follows:-

 

“We may now revert to the question, whether the appellant was justified to file above Constitution petition against the order of the Tribunal instead of invoking section 136 of the Ordinance for making a reference to the High Court.  According to Mr. Rehan Naqvi, a reference under the above provision would not have been adequate and efficacious remedy as it would have taken years before it could have been heard.  The same could be true for a Constitution Petition.  The tendency to bypass the remedy provided under the relevant statute and to press into service Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court has developed lately, which is to be discouraged.  However, in certain cases invoking of Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court instead of availing of remedy provided for under the relevant statute may be justified, for example when the impugned order/action is palpably without jurisdiction and/or mala fide.  To force an aggrieved person in such a case to approach the forum provided under the relevant statute may not be just and proper.

 

In the present case, the appellant had opted to avail of the hierarchy of forums provided for under the Ordinance upto the stage of filing of appeal before the Tribunal and, therefore, it would have been proper on the part of the appellant to have invoked section 136 of the Ordinance for making a reference to the High Court instead of filing a Constitutional petition.  In our view, once a party opts to invoke the remedies provided for under the relevant statute, he cannot at his sweet will switch over to Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court in the mid of the proceeding in the absence of any compelling and justifiable reason.”

 

 

11.    The same view has been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Commissioner Of Income Tax Karachi And 2 Others Vs. Messrs N.V. Philips Gloeilampenfabriaken (PLD 1993 SC 434). Similarly in the case of Messrs Pak-Saudi Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Federation of Pakistan and Others(2002 PTD 679) this Court after exhaustively examining the judgments of various courts came to the conclusion that a person cannot be permitted to pursue a petition before this Court and so also avail the alternate remedies at the same time. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:-

 

“In the present case the petitioner has filed the petition after finalization of the assessment order.  Even the first appeal was filed by it during the pendency of its petition.  Pressing into service the principle of law enunciated in Banarsi Dass (cited supra) the petition is dismissed as not maintainable.   As regards the challenge to framing of the main assessment order it is clarified that nothing in this judgment shall preclude the petitioner from pursuing his departmental remedies.  The appellate authorities are directed to dispose of appeals strictly in accordance with law without any instructions or directions from any superior or other authority.”

 

 

12.    The same view has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Arshad Hussain Vs. Collector of Customs and 2 others reported in (2010 PTD 104) wherein a learned Division bench of this Court has observed that the petitioner on his own sweet will and whims cannot be allowed to agitate the same cause of action in writ petition filed before the Court and also at the same time pursue the remedy available under the law. Similar view has been taken in the case of M/S Bilal International V/S Federation of Pakistan & others (2014 PTD 465), Bulk Shipping and Trading Pvt. Limited Vs. Collector of Customs(2004 PTD 679), Pakistan Exploration BP and Production Inc. Karachi Vs. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (2011 PTD 647).

 

13.    In view of the above facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the petitioners have failed to satisfy this Court that there was any valid or reasonable cause available with the petitioners to abandon and or bypass the proceedings before the Revisional / Appellate Authorities and to file the aforesaid petitions before this Court. In view of such position, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid petitions are misconceived and not maintainable in law as an alternate and efficacious remedy was available to the petitioners which has already been availed by them.

 

14.      Insofar as the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, that in view of the judgments passed by this Court in the case of Sadia Jabbar (HC) supra and subsequently in the case of a Goodwill Traders Supra whereby, the learned Division Bench of this Court after setting aside the impugned Valuation Ruling had accepted the declared transactional value of the petitioners in terms of Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, this Court may also direct the respondents, after setting aside the impugned Valuation Rulings in the aforesaid petitions, to accept the declared transactional value of the petitioners, is concerned, the same appears to be misconceived and is hereby repelled. We have perused the entire judgment in the case of Sadia Jabbar (HC) Supra and have noticed that in that case the learned Division Bench after examining the entire provisions of Section 25 and 25-A of the Customs Act, 1969, came to the conclusion that all the Valuation Rulings impugned by the petitioners were not in conformity with the provisions of Section 25 and 25-A of the Customs Act, 1969, and were accordingly set aside. However, all the petitions were remanded to the Valuation Department for determination of Valuation afresh after following the guidelines as given by this Court. The said findings of the learned Division bench were further impugned by the aggrieved petitioners before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the ground that after setting-aside the impugned Valuation Rulings, the Court ought not to have remanded the matters to the Valuation Department, and instead should have directed the respondents to accept the declared values of the petitioners. The primary grievance of the petitioners before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was to the effect that in such circumstances, no remand orders could have been passed. Such contention of the petitioners was repelled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported as Sadia Jabbar and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (2012 SCMR 617) by holding that there was no illegality in remanding the matters as that would not, in any way, go to the detriment of the petitioners. The relevant finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reads as under:-

 

"A look at the above quoted paragraph shows that no decision much less adverse has been passed against the petitioners. Yes the case has been sent back to the department for determination of value afresh, but we don't think that that would in any way go to the detriment of the petitioners. There is absolutely nothing in the above quoted paragraph as could show that any of the provisions of the Customs Act in general or section 18 of the Act in particular has been overstretched against its letter and sprit. The apprehension appears to be conjectural on the face of it. Quite apart from this when the petitions are barred by 4 days and no plausible explanation has been offered therefore, we do not feel persuaded to grant leave to appeal. For the reasons discussed above all the petitions are dismissed."

 

15.     The conclusion which could be drawn from the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court herein above is that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has approved the judgment in the case of Sadia Jabbar (HC) Supra to the extent, that after setting aside of the Valuation Rulings, the order of remand for determination of the value afresh was correct and there cannot be any exception to it. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that subsequent to the case of Sadia Jabbar (HC) supra as approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Goodwill Traders Supra has observed, that this case is an extension to the case of Sadia Jabbar (HC) Supra and since in this case, after setting aside of the Valuation Ruling, the matter was not remanded for determination of the Valuation afresh, and the declared value of the petitioner was accepted by the Court for the purposes of assessment under section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, therefore, the petitioners in the aforesaid petitions, are also entitled for the same treatment. In our view, such contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is not appropriate and the same is devoid of any merits, is misconceived and is hereby repelled. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadia Jabbar (SC) supra has already approved remand of the matters for determination of the Valuation afresh, therefore, the findings in the case of Goodwill Traders Supra in so far as the acceptance of declared transactional value in terms of section 25(1) of the Customs Act 1969 instead of remand, is concerned, does not appear to be in conformity with the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as recorded in the case of Sadia Jabbar (SC) Supra. We have been further informed that the respondents have also filed a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by impugning the judgment in the case of Goodwill Traders Supra, therefore, we are of the view that since the findings of this Court in the case of Sadia Jabbar (HC) Supra as of today, stands confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore, we would refrain ourselves from giving any finding and or observations with regard to the applicability of the dicta laid down in the case of Goodwill Traders Supra on the case of the petitioners in the aforesaid petitions, since the matter, as of now is pending before Hon'ble Supreme Court for adjudication. For us the case of Sadia Jabbar (HC) Supra has been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein after remand of the matters, the final determination of Valuation was left to the department, hence is a valid law which is to be followed by this Court until the case of Goodwill Traders Supra is finally upheld or otherwise decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

 

16.    In so far as the case law relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is concerned, we are of the view that they are not applicable as the fact of the aforesaid petitions are quite distinguishable from the facts referred to in the judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, as in none of these cases a writ petition was entertained by the Courts once a party had submitted itself to the departmental jurisdiction, by availing the alternate remedy provided under the law.

 

17.   In view of hereinabove facts and circumstances of the aforesaid petitions and specially the conduct of the petitioners whereby they had concealed material facts from this Court and had further availed departmental remedy by filing appeals before the Customs Appellate Tribunal, without leave of this Court, we had dismissed all the aforesaid petitions with cost vide short order dated 13.11.2014 in the following terms;

 

“For reasons to be recorded later on, instant petitions are dismissed alongwith listed application(s) with cost of Rs. 5,000/- in each petition to be deposited by the petitioners in the account of High Court Clinic. However, the petitioners may continue to seek the remedy as provided under the Customs Act, 1969, which remedy has already been availed by the petitioners in all these petitions in respect of the impugned Valuation Rulings.”

 

18.     The above are the reasons for such short order.

 

 

 

J U D G E

 

 

 

 

J U D G E