ORDER SHEET

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH,

CIRCUIT COURT, HYDERABAD.

Present.

Mr. Justice Syed Hassan Azhar Rizvi.

Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar.

Cr. Rev. A. No.D-144 of 2013.

DATE ORDER WITH SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

Mr. Nisar Ahmed Durrani, advocate for the applicant.

Syed Meeral Shah, D.P.G.

Syed Tarique Ahmed Shah, advocate for respondent No.2.

SYED HASSAN AZHAR RIZVI, J.- The applicant filed instant criminal revision application against the order dated 23.08.2013, passed by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Hyderabad, whereby application filed on behalf of the applicant under section 23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), was dismissed.

2. The facts of the prosecution case, in brief, are that complainant Muhammad Javed lodged F.I.R. bearing Crime No.31/2013 at Police Station Sakhipir, Hyderabad about kidnapping of his 16 years’ old son, namely, Muhammad Wajdan alias Waji, who was allegedly abducted by unknown persons and they demanded a ransom of twenty pati (Rupees twenty lac) on telephone for release of his son. Since the complainant failed to arrange the amount of ransom, his son was murdered by accused persons and his dead body was found in a briefcase within the jurisdiction of Police Station Budhani.

3. Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned D.P.G. appearing for the State and learned counsel for respondent No.2 and perused the record.

4. Leaned counsel for the applicant contended that there is no material/element collected by the prosecution to justify the implication of the application with the alleged crime under section 6 / 7 of the Act. As per learned counsel, the offence is of ordinary nature and has no nexus with section 6 / 7 of the Act, therefore, the instant case is exclusively triable by the Court of sessions and not by a Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on Mohabbat Ali v. State (2007 S C M R 142) and Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Siddique (P L D 2009 SUPREME COURT 11).

5. Learned D.P.G. supported the impugned order. He submitted that that the act and the manner in which the alleged offence has been committed apparently created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public, therefore, the instant case is exclusively triable by the Court of Anti-Terrorism and not by an ordinary Court of sessions.

6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, while adopting the arguments advanced by learned D.P.G. has submitted that the learned trial Judge has rightly dismissed the application moved on behalf of the applicant under section 23 of the Act.

7. In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within the ambit of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it would be essential to have a glance over the allegations made in the F.I.R. and the surrounding circumstances. It is necessary to examine whether the ingredients of alleged offence have any nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under sections 6 / 7 of the Act. The motivation, object, design or purpose behind the alleged act has also to be examined. Section 6 (e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is reproduced as under:-

“6. Terrorism. (1) In this Act, “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where:

(2) An “action” shall fall within the meaning of sub-section (1), if it:

(a). . . . .

(b). . . . .

(c). . . . .

(d). . . . .

(e) involves kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking.”

8. Neither the motive nor intent for commission of the offence is relevant for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the Anti-Terrorism Court. It is the act which is designed to create sense of insecurity and or to destabilize the public at large, which attract the provisions of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which in the present case was designed to create sense of fear and insecurity amongst the locality / public at large. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, alongwith his statement has placed on record newspaper clippings of different newspaper, showing the reports of the incident and the reaction of general public on the incident. Perusal of such newspaper clippings further shows that after receipt of the information about the tragedian murder of the deceased, markets of Hyderabad city were closed. The manner, in which the alleged offence has been committed, appears to be an act of terrorism, as apparently it has caused sense of fear, insecurity and panic in the society. Clause (e) to sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Act, referred herein above, provides kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking as an act of “terrorism”. In the present case, the accused persons first kidnapped the boy and thereafter on telephone demanded ransom from the complainant for his release, but when the complainant failed to meet their demand they brutally murdered the innocent boy, cut down the dead body in pieces and after putting the same in a brief case thrown in the jungle.

9. In view of above, the case against the applicant is exclusively triable by the Court of Anti-Terrorism and not by the Court of Sessions and the impugned order passed by the trial Court is just and legal and does not call for any interference. The case law relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant is distinguishable to the facts and circumstances of instant case.

Above are the reasons of short order passed by us in Court on 02.04.2014.

JUDGE