C.P. No. D-2865, 2020 of 2013 and 4026 of 2012  


                   Before: Mr. Justice Faisal Arab, J, and

                                 Mr. Justice Salahuddin Panhwar, J



Petitioner:                             Rashid Latif,

                                                Through M/s  Umair A. Kazi, advocate &

                                                Mr. Abdul Sattar Pirzada, advocate.


Respondents                        Federation of Pakistan, Pakistan Cricket Board         and another,

                                                Mr. Asif Hussain Mangi, Standing Counsel on          behalf of respondent No.1.

                                                Mr. Taffazul H. Rizvi, advocate for respondents      No.2 & 3.


Date of Hearing:                 24.09.2013.


Date of Judgment:              27.11.2013.





SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR, J. Through this common judgment we intend to dispose of above captioned petitions, whereby petitioner has challenged the appointment of Chairman Pakistan Cricket Board and vires of its constitution.

2.                     Precisely, relevant facts as set out in the all three petitions are that:

C.P. No. D-2865/2012: Petitioner is a former captain and player of Pakistan National Cricket team and also runs a cricket academy free of cost under the name and style of Rashid Latif Cricket Academy. The respondent No.1, being federal body, is responsible for regulating development and control of sports in Pakistan. The respondent No.2 is the concerned board and is responsible for regulating all affairs related to cricket with the approval of the respondent No.1 and respondent No. 2 is a member of international cricket council (I.C.C.). The petitioner had filed constitutional petition No.D-2020/2013; whereby he challenged the procedure of appointment of the Chairman of the respondent No.2 under the new constitution (Constitution 2013). The said petition is currently subjudice before this Court. The petitioner had filed another similar petition No. WF-2242 of 2013 in the High Court of Islamabad whereby appointment of previous Chairman (Mr. Zaka Ashraf) was suspended by order dated 25.05.2013 and it was also observed that “In the peculiar circumstances, respondent No.3 is directed to appoint some acting Chairman of P.C.B. fully qualified to be appointed as Chairman till final disposal of this writ petition.” It is further maintained that the appointment of acting Chairman is not provided under the constitution 2013, thus appointment of respondent No.3 is completely against the terms of Article 6(2) for the appointment of an acting Chairman; Article 6(2) of constitution 2013, which provides comprehensive procedure regarding appointment of the Chairman and further prayed that:-

(a)       Declare that the respondents No. 1&2 have acted in violation     of law and failed to follow procedure laid down in the law.


(b)       Declare and hold that appointment of respondent No.3 by           respondent No.1 is unconstitutional.


C.P. No. D-2020/2013:      This petition challenges the appointment of respondent No.3 (Zaka Ashraf) and seeks declaration of part 4 of the constitution  2013, as illegal and unconstitutional.

C.P. No. D-4026/2012:      This  petition questions legality of constitution of Pakistan Cricket Board 2007, on the ground that same is against the spirit of  constitution of Pakistan 1973.

3.                     Leaned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the contention of instant petition, inter alia, has contended that appointment of respondent No.3 is against the procedure provided in Article 6(2) of the Constitution of 2013 (PCB); therefore respondent No.3 cannot hold such post and thereby all acts/actions of said respondent are contrary to the law and elaborate procedure is provided for the appointment of Chairman but respondent No.1 has completely by-passed such mode. He further asserted that composition of Board of Governors (BoG), is defined in Section 9 which reflects that it has 15 regions all over the country, thus this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition and nullify the Notification issued by respondent No.1 in favour of respondent No.3, in support of his contention, he has relied upon case of A.R. KHAN & SONS (PVT.) LTD. through Authorized Officer versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad (2010 CLD 1648); Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd vs. Pakistan Agro Forestry Corporation (Pvt) Ltd (2000 SCMR 1703); Al-Iblagh ltd., Lahore vs. Copyright board, Karachi  (1985 SCMR 758);  Messrs FACTO Belarus Tractors Limited Karachi vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives Islamabad (PLD 2006 K 479);   Ardeshir Cowasjee  vs. Karachi Building Control Authority (KMC), Karachi (1999 SCMR 2883); Muhammad Naseem Hijazi  Versus Province of Punjab  (2000 SCMR 1720); Dr. Azim-ur-Rehman Khan Meo versus Government of Sindh and another (2004 SCMR 1299).

4.                     On the contrary, learned counsel for respondents stoutly refutes the claim of petitioner and has raised legal objection with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court. Per counsel Islamabad High Court in similar type of petition has passed a verdict therefore in pursuance of that judgment respondent No.3 is working as caretaker Chairman of Cricket Board; impugned Notification was issued by Prime Minister, who sits at Islamabad, therefore territorial jurisdiction lies to the Islamabad High Court and this Hon’ble Court can direct functionaries within its territorial jurisdiction only, hence issue involved in this petition is out of the jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his contention he has relied upon AIR 1961 Supreme Court 532 (Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh Vs. Union of India and another), 2005 S.C.M.R. 1746 (Shahida Maqsood Vs. President of Pakistan and others), 2008 S.C.M.R.  240 (Izhar Alam Farooqi Vs. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and others), P.L.J. 2012 Karachi page (Danish Keneria Vs. Pakistan and another), 1, 2012  P.T.D. page 1869 (Messrs Sethi and Sons Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others), 2010 P.L.C. (CS) 137 (Gul Muhammad Hajano Vs. Province of Sindh and others), 1979 S.C.M.R. 555 (Sabir Din Vs. Govt. of Pakistan and others) and P.L.D. 1963 (S.C.) 296 (The province of East Pakistan Vs. Dr. Aziz-ul- Islam)

5.                     Before addressing the merits of the case, it would be significant to examine the jurisdiction of this Court, thus it would be conducive to reproduce Article 199 (1) (a) (i) & (ii), of the Constitution of Pakistan, which read as follows:-

(i)               directing a person performing, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority, to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do, or to do anything he is required by law to do, or


(ii)            declaring that any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federal, a Province or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect;


                     Bare perusal of the above clause (s),  illustrates that  the High Court (s) have been vested with powers, jurisdiction and authority to examine any order / action complained to be unlawful because the High Court is the ultimate guardian of the rights of the people residing within its territorial jurisdiction. Thus function (s) or act (s) / proceeding (s) of the Person on behalf of Federation are not exempted from judicial scrutiny and examination of the High Court (s). The purpose and object behind this seems to be nothing but that rights, interest and fundamental rights of the people residing in territorial jurisdiction (s) of all High Court (s), likely to be effected by such function (s) or act (s) of the Federation, are not left unattended by the Legislature (s).

 6.                    Further, the plain reading of the clause (i) shows that what the legislature  has insisted upon for invoking Constitutional Jurisdiction of the High Court is the phrase within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, functions in connection with the affairs of the federation…………”.  (Underlining is provided for emphasis).

                        This phrase is required to be given its due weight and meaning in its true spirit as intended by legislature. The clause (i) has been confined to the word “function” which, per Black’s Law Dictionary means:

1.               Activity that is appropriate to a particular business or profession;

2.               Office; duty; the occupation of an office


and if the said meaning is taken in continuity of the phrase “within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court” it can well be concluded that it is the impact of function(activity, office, duty or the occupation of an office) which should have been within territorial jurisdiction, which would be sufficient for one to invoke the Constitutional Jurisdiction if the same results in effecting the person residing within jurisdiction of such High Court. we may further add here that it is always the impact (s) and effect (s) of an act or order which makes one to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction or to approach court of law for legal rescue and not the act or order itself alone. The citizens residing at place “A” cannot be allowed to suffer from the effect (s) of an act or order solely for the reason that it was done / passed at place “B” rather the High court of place “B”, being ultimate guardian of the rights, interests and claims of the public masses, shall have to come forward for rescue else it would frustrate the purpose of justice because the principle of judicial system is that justice at no cost and at no stage be allowed to fall prey to the procedural technicalities. Thus technicalities must be ignored if they tend to create hurdle in the way of justice.

7.                     At  this juncture, we would like to refer the case of L.P.G. Association of Pakistan through Chairman Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others reported in 2009 C.L.D. 1498 Lahore, wherein the question was same that of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Said controversy was resolved while examining, the case of Sandalbar Enterprises reported in PLD 1997 SC 334, case of Messrs Al-lblagh limited Lahore reported in 1985 SCMR 758, case of Dr Zahoor Ahmed shah reported in 2005 MLD 718, case of Dr Qaiser Rasheed reported in PLD 2006 L 789, case of Messrs Ibrahim Fibers reported in PLD 2009 K 154, case of Abdul Ghafar Lakhani reported in PLD 1986 K 525, case of Amin Textile Mills reported in 1998 SCMR 2389, case of Flying Craft Paper Mills reported in 1997 SCMR 1874, case of Shah Abdul Sattar Lasi reported in  2006 CLD 18, and other cases reported as

PLD 1988 SC 387 (Superintendent of Police Headquarter Lahore & others vs. Muhammad Latif), 1995 CLC 1027 (Ghulam Haider Badini & others vs. Govt. of Pakistan through Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and another), PLD 1997 SC 334 (Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd vs. CBR), 1998 PLC (CS) 239 (Muhammad Idrees v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 5 others), PLD 2001 Peshawar 7 (Messrs Lucky Cement Ltd. v. The Central Board of Revenue and others), PLD 1976 Pesh. 66 (Muhammad Aslam Khan and 9 others v. Federal Land Commission through its Chairman, Central Secretariat Islamabad and 3 others) and 2000 SCMR 1703 (Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Private) Ltd. v. Pakistan Agro Forestry Corporation (Private) Ltd. and another), and the answer was in para 6, which is reproduced as follows:

“From the judgments cited at the Bard on both the sides, the

portions whereof have been extensively reproduced, the following ratio is deducible:-


(A)         The Federal Government or any body politic or a corporation or a statutory authority having exclusive residence or location at Islamabad with no office at any other place in any of the Provinces, shall still be deemed to function all over the country.


(B)          If such Government, body or authority passes any order or initiates an action at Islamabad, but it affects the “aggrieved party” at the place other than the Federal capital, such party shall have a cause of action to agitate about his grievance within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in which said order/action has affected him.


(C)          This shall be moreso in the cases where a party is aggrieved or a legislative instrument (including any rules, etc.) on the ground of it being ultra vires, because the cause to sue against that law shall accrue to a person at the place where his rights have been affected. For example, if a law is challenged on the ground that it is confiscatory in nature, violative of the fundamental rights to property; profession, association etc. and any curb has been placed upon such a right by a law enforced at Islamabad, besides there, it can also be challenged within the jurisdiction of the High Court, where the right is likely to be affected.

In this context, illustrations can be given, that if some duty/tax has been imposed upon the withdrawal of the amounts by the account holders from their bank account and the aggrieved party is maintaining the account at Lahore, though the Act/law has been passed at Islamabad, yet his right being affected where he maintains the account (Lahore), he also can competently initiate a writ petition in Lahore besides Islamabad; this shall also be true for the violation of any right to profession, if being conducted by a person at Lahore, obviously in the situation, he shall have a right to seek the enforcement of his right in any of the two High Courts.


(D)        On account of the above, both the Islamabad and Lahore High Courts shall have the concurrent jurisdiction in certain matters and it shall not be legally sound or valid to hold that as the Federal Government etc. resides in Islamabad, and operates from there; the assailed order/action has also emanated from Islamabad, therefore, it is only the Capital High Court which shall possess the jurisdiction. The dominant purpose in such a situation shall be irrelevant, rather on account of the rule of choice, the plaintiff/petitioner shall have the right to choose the forum of his convenience.

8.                     In another case of Barrister Sardar Muhammad Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others reported in P.L.D. 2013, Lahore, page 343, the appointment of Chairman of P.T.A. was challenged and same jurisdictional point was raised but while maintaining the petition such appointment was declared illegal, the ratio of the said dictum is that:

“Para No. 22 to 23.            

22.       Even if the Act provided that the head office of Chairman P.T.A. is in Islamabad it would still make no difference because the test is the territorial jurisdiction of the public office. The geographical jurisdiction of the “public office” is determined under the law that establishes the said public office. It is the same law that helps determine whether the public office falls with the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court. No person can be deprived of the constitutional remedy of quo warranto, under Article 199 of the constitution, against a statutory or public sector institution that operates nationwide, on mere cosmetics and technicalities like the location of the place of work, head office or the residence of the incumbent to the public office.


23.       In the present case Members and Chairman P.T.A. enjoy nation-wide jurisdiction hence a nation-wide presence. These public offices, therefore, fall within the territorial jurisdiction of every High Court in the country. It would be different if the public office belonged to a provincial public or statutory authority with its jurisdiction limited to a province. In such a case, the public offices of the said authority, will fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of the relevant province. The foundational concept of territorial jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 199 has already been deliberated in detail in Messrs Sethi & Sethi Sons through Humayun Khan V. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others (2012 P.T.D. 1869) and L.P.G. Association of Pakistan through Chairman v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Islamabad and 8 others (2009 C.L.D. 1498). The reasoning and logic of the above judgments has been simply extended to the writ of quo warranto.”


                        From the above it is evident that mere existence of an office of Federation outside the jurisdiction of the High Court shall not alone be sufficient to take the matter away from the extra- ordinary jurisdiction of High Court (s) to examine the issue (s) relating to vires of law, statutes, rules and action (s) if the same are going to cause an effect upon the rights of the  people, residing within such area because the principle is that an office, law, rule and legislation is always done / established to provide security and safety to the rights, interests and claims of the people for whom such office, law rules and legislation is meant, so at all material times, the law requires such actions, law, rules and legislation to be strictly in accordance with law keeping the rights, interests and claims of the masses at their proper place.

9.                     Let’s examine the case law relied upon by respondents advocate.  In the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), one army officer who was working in Jammu and Kashmir which force was amalgamated with the defence force of the union of India and his retirement date was 20th November, 1961 but in July, 13, 1954 government of India issued letter whereby he was retired from August, 12, 1954 thus he challenged the same before High Court of Jammu and Kashmir who issued certificate in favour of petitioner same was assailed in Supreme Court whereby with majority judgment it was held that since Notification was issued from Delhi therefore High Court of Jammu and Kashmir was not having jurisdiction. 

            In the case of Danish Kaneria (supra) relevant facts were that petitioner was selected on merit by the respondent No.2 as special leg spinner and he was selected to play for Essex County in the United Kingdom and other various places but he was stopped to play series against South Africa, West Indies and New Zealand and further in national team. Hence , being aggrieved, he filed petition before this Court but such petition was dismissed, relevant paras , inter-alia, are as under:

7.       A perusal of the memo of petition indicates that the thrust of the attack of the petitioner was directed against the letters of Respondent No.2 calling up the petitioner to appear before the Integrity Committee which is housed at Central Office of P.C.B, Lahore, all the correspondences were issued to the petitioner from the Central Office of the respondent No.2 which is housed at Lahore. In our view this fact would not be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of Lahore High Court within whose jurisdiction the main cause of action accrued. Article 199(1)(a)(i)(ii) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (herein after referred to as the Constitution ) and that perusal of above clause (a)(i) of the above articles indicates that a High Court has power to issue direction to a person performing within its territorial jurisdiction, functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a province or local authority to refrain from doing anything which he is not permitted by law to do or to do anything he is required by law to do. Similarly, under sub-clause (a)(ii) the High Court has powers to declare any act done or proceedings taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing function in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority.

8.       We have observed that the Central Office of the Respondent No.2 is located at Lahore and the Petitioner has to attend the Central Office of the Respondent at Lahore for appearing before the Integrity Committee and not before the sub office, which is located at Karachi. We have also observed that all the correspondences have taken place at Lahore. The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is residing at Karachi and he has received all the correspondences at Karachi, hence part of cause of action may be seemed to be taken place at Karachi is without any substance.


                         In case of M/s Sethi & Sethi sons (supra) petitioner was businessman having office at Lahore.  An F.I.R. was lodged against him that he has committed tax fraud by issuing fake sales tax invoices. Simultaneously show cause notice was issued to him by Director General Intelligence and Investigation Karachi thus he challenged the same before Lahore High Court but such petition was dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction as discussed in para No.21, same is as under:-

            “There is yet another dimension to the above principle. In managing its day-to-day affairs a PERSON, performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation may often delegate its powers to its officers. Such delegation ordinarily limits the power of the officer within a specified territorial domain. In such a situation, the all encompassing countrywide territorial jurisdiction of the PERSON is localized to a specific limited territorial jurisdiction. For example, Collector of Customs, and officer of F.B.R, has specific territorial jurisdiction limited to a particular area, as opposed to the countrywide territorial jurisdiction enjoyed by F.B.R. Such an officer, therefore, performs a localized function in connection with the affairs of the Federation in a particular area and will be considered to be performing functions within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Couth within whose territorial jurisdiction the territorial jurisdiction of the Officer/PERSON falls. In the present case the Deputy Director is an officer of the Directorate General of the Intelligence and Investigation, F.B.R. at Karachi. As per Order dated 9.12.2010 issued by the F.B.R, the said officer enjoys specific territorial jurisdiction confined to Karachi. Similarly a person having territorial jurisdiction limited to Karachi has registered the F.I.R. at Karachi. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Deputy Director or the Directorate is performing functions all over Pakistan as compared to F.B.R., therefore, only the High Court within corresponding territorial jurisdiction will assume jurisdiction in the matter.”


                        In case of Sabir Din (supra) the petitioner was posted as Deputy Assistant Military Estate Officer of Hazara circle Abbotabad, wherefrom he was transferred to Muzaffarabad as Deputy Military Estate Officer which is stated falls within Hazara circle. The petitioner challenged his reversal order in Peshawar High Court through a writ petition, which was dismissed. Hon’ble Supreme Court also dismissed such petition while holding that:-

            “The normal consideration of ‘residence”, etc. and the “cause of action’ qua territorial jurisdiction, even if attracted in the circumstances, do not support the petitioner’s case. The cause of action partly arose at Muzaffarabad and partly at Rawalpindi. The Central Government, as held in the case of Waliullah Safyani, does not reside at any one place, in the realm. However, the respondent No.2 whose order (Annexure ‘B’ to the writ petition) was brought under challenge, is at Rawalpindi. On this view the Peshawar High Court would have no territorial jurisdiction. The Hazara Office of the respondents Nos. 1and 2 is only one chain in the administrative set up. It has not done anything against the petitioner nor any relief has been sought against it nor even a formal one. Indeed it has not even been impleaded as a party. That aspect of the matter either, would not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Peshawar High Court.

            The question having arisen in the context of a writ petition the Peshawar High Court was justified in refusing to exercise jurisdiction on another ground as well. As provided in Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitution the impugned action or the authority taking the same should be within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, for exercise of jurisdiction thereunder. None of those conditions is satisfied herein. Therefore, the refusal by the Peshawar High Court to exercise jurisdiction is unexceptionable. The argument of the learned counsel that the petitioner has been left with no forum for seeking relief has not impressed us. There is no reason why should he not act on the observation made in the impugned order that if so advised, the Lahore High Court may be moved in this behalf. We are of the view that it is not a case of first impression. The law has already been laid down in the rulings of this Court including those cited at the Bar and qua special circumstances of this case, no separate general treatment is necessary so as to grant leave to appeal.”


                        In case of Sandalbar Enterprises (pvt) Ltd. Vs. Central Board of Revenue and others reported in P.L.D. 1997 (S.C.) page 334 the petitioner imported certain consignments from abroad. The same arrived at airport of Karachi. They filed a bill of entry for the release of the same. The custom authorities assessed the levy of regulatory duty imposed under Notification dated 29th October, 1995. Same was assailed before Lahore High Court thus Supreme Court while dismissing the petition held that jurisdiction lies to Sindh High Court.  In para 8, it was observed as under-

           “We may observe that it has become a common practice to file a writ petition either at Peshawar, or Lahore, or Rawalpindi or Multan etc. to challenge the order of assessment passed at Karachi by adding a ground for impugning the notification under which a particular levy is imposed. This practice is to be depreciated. The Court is to see, what is the dominant object of filing of the writ petition. In the present case, the dominant object was not to pay the regulatory duty assessed by a Custom official at Karachi. We are, therefore, not inclined to grant leave. Leave is refused.”



                        In all these cases the dispute/issue was not related to the Federation and the effect/impact of the action (function) was not found to be having a general impact upon the general public as is usually found in the matter (s) of enactment of law (s), rule (s), statute (s) or notification/order of the nature having its effect upon the people at large or a class of people residing within territorial jurisdiction of different High Court (s).

10.                   Before the conclusion of moot issue, relating to the territorial jurisdiction of the High court (s), we would like to refer to the meaning of the word Federation in Black’s Law Dictionary which reads as under:

Federation. A league or union of states, groups, or people arranged with a strong central authority and limited regional sovereignties—though the individual states, groups, or peoples may retain rights of varying degrees.”


The plain reading of above leaves nothing to doubt that it speaks about groups or people arranged with a strong central authority thereby meaning that all linked with such central authority be deemed to be one.

11.                   Now, we come to what we find from comparative study and analysis of case laws on the said point. This can well be mewed as follows:-

a)              The Federal Government or any body or a corporation or a statutory authority having exclusive residence or location at Islamabad with no office at any other place in any of the provinces shall still be deemed to function all over the country for those act (s) / action (s) which are meant for whole of the State;


b)             If such Government, body or authority passes any order or initiates an action at Islamabad which has an effect of general applicability upon all souls of the State or a particular class of people;


In such like situation the aggrieved party shall be well within rights to seek help and constitutional protection towards its / their rights.

                         However, if a particular order or action of an authority is not having its impact upon people at large but is confined to a particular individual, re then the jurisdiction to challenge such order or action shall remain with the High Court wherefrom that order or action has been done or taken.

12.                   In view of above touchstone, there is no cavil in the proposition that in the instant proceedings, petitioner has challenged the notification issued by the respondent No.1(Federation of Pakistan), moreover there can be no denial to the status that there are as many as 15 regions of PCB which run their affairs under the PCB hence the PCB is not a body having its function at Lahore only but does function all over the State, wherever the regional body is established. Not only this but we cannot confine the game of  ‘cricket’ to a particular place only because the object of establishment of the PCB is to promote ‘Cricket’ all over the country and choose a team from all over the country , thus notification impugned and  the function (s) of respondent No. 1, are undoubtedly having a general impact all over the region (s) of PCB. This makes us to view that this court is competent to  examine the legality and validity of notification issued by the respondent No.1  

13.                   Having attended the above objection, now we would like to examine the another legal position, surfaced in instant proceeding, candidly  similar controversy was adjudicated by Islam Abad High Court by judgment dated  04.7.2013 in writ petition No.2242 of 2013, which is assailed by respondents in intra court appeal No: 928/2013, before same court. The operative part of judgment regarding the issue, involved, being material is reproduced hereunder:-

“Practically, Mr. Najam Sethi is no more Acting Chairman rather his status is of Caretaker being appointed by this court for a period of ninety (90) days with the object to look into day to day affairs of PCB, cooperate, and ensure the holding of election by the Election Commission of Pakistan within the stipulated period commencing from 21st July, 2013 to 18th October, 2013 which period shall not be extended on any pretext whatsoever”.



The above makes it clear that Mr. Najam Sethi is not an Acting Chairman but is a Caretaker who has been appointed by the Court for a specific purpose and specific period i.e 18th October 2013. Thus once the legality of respondents No. 3, was adjudicated by a competent court, the propriety demands that this court , must not examine the legality and validity thereof for the simple reason that a decision of this court, if in conflict with said order, will cause  confusion and complicity of the case and if comes in affirmation it will result in prejudicing the intra Court appeal, filed by respondents. In other words, issue, decided by a competent court , if pending determination before appellate forum, the court of same status should refrain from deciding such issue as a demand of propriety, fairness, good conscious and equity, therefore, we refrain ourselves to discuss the vires of impugned notification, however petitioner is at liberty to joined the proceeding of Intra court appeal, if so advised.

                        Accordingly, this petition is disposed of in terms stated above.

14.                   Regarding the petition No.2020 of 2013; petitioner has challenged the appointment of respondent No. 3 (Zaka Ashraf) and vires of part 4 of the impugned notification as illegal and unconstitutional but record reveals that respondent No.3 is no more working as Chairman, Pakistan Cricket Board and his re-appointment has already been set-aside as is evident from operative para of judgment of Islamabad High Court which reads as under:-

“Appointment of Mr. Zaka Ashraf by the patron, vide notification dated 13.10.2011 was not on the basis of his career as cricketer, knowledge about game of cricket, administrative qualities and management skills but apparently for the reasons that he was President of ZGBL, a banker in status and due to personal affiliation with the persons on the helm of affairs. Re-appointment of Mr. Zaka Ashraf, is totally deceptive, as no election in accordance with the spirit of democratic process has been held, therefore, same is hereby set aside”.


It is also matter of record ,  later part of prayer was also resolved in same dictum, which follows:

            “In this view of the matter, Part-IV of the Constitution of Pakistan Cricket Board consisting of Sections 28, 29,30 and 31 is hereby declared to be void as initio, unconstitutional, besides the democratic values, offensive to rights of individuals qualified to be elected as Chairman PCB, against the principle of transparency, fairness, impartiality, credibility and openness, therefore, all the provisions under Part-IV of the Constitution of P?CB are declared to be of no legal effect and it is directed that the same may be deleted forthwith.”


Thus, it is evident that this petition has become infructuous and is dismissed as such.

15.                   So far as  the  petition No 4026 of 2012; petitioner has mainly challenged constitution of 2007, on the ground that same is against spirit of Ordinance 1962 and against fundamental rights provided in chapter 2 of Constitution of Pakistan 1973. During proceedings it has come on record that such Constitution is no more in field thus instant petition being infructuous is also dismissed.  

                                                                                      J U D G E

                                                            J U D G E


Announced on November ____ 2013.