ORDER SHEET

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH,

CIRCUIT COURT, HYDERABAD.

 

 

CR.MISC. APPLICATION NO.D-471 of 2010.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

                                                                  

DATE        ORDER WITH SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

                            

Present: Mr.Justice Sajjad Ali Shah & 

                                  Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. 

 

For Katcha Peshi.

For orders on MA No.3524/10.

                            

                                                         

Date of hearing: 22.3.2011.

                            

                              

Applicant:           Nooruddin S/o Muamla

 

Respondents.       Nazeer Ahmed and others.

 

 

Mr. Aftab Ahmed Warraich, Advocate for the Applicant.

 

Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro, Addl. P.G. for the State.

 

Mr. Salahuddin Panhwar, Advocate for Respondents No.1 and 4.

=====

 

 

Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J. This Criminal Miscellaneous Application has been brought to challenge an order passed by learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Mirpurkhas on 25th September, 2010, whereby directions have been issued to the Investigating Officer for submitting the challan in Crime No.194 of 2010 of P.S., Kot Ghulam Muhammad, under Sections 302, 147, 148 and 149 PPC read with Section 6/7 of Anti-Terrorism Act along with connected cases/crimes No.197/10, 198/10, 199/10 and 200/10 of P.S. Kot Ghulam Muhammad lodged under section 13-D, Arms Ordinance in the court having jurisdiction to try the offences.

 

1. The facts forming the background of the case are that the applicant Nooruddin lodged an FIR on 18.8.2010 at Police Station, Kot Ghulam Muhammad, District Mirpurkhas in which it was inter alia alleged as under:-

“Complaint is that, I reside at above address and am Zamindar. I have got my own agricultural land. On 8.8.2010, Bhawal Banglani stolen away grass from our land because of which there happened a quarrel between us. After 2/3 days, the nek mards of our village intervened and settled the matter. On 13.8.2010, I, my son Ashfaque and father-in-law of my son namely Muhammad Hussain and his grand son Anees Ahmed age about 7 years and a guest from Punjab went to offer Jumma Namaz, thereafter, we all were sitting in the shop of Majeed tailor. For the purposes of buying house hold articles I came out from the shop and purchased articles, thereafter, reached near the shop of Majeed tailor at about 3.15 p.m., where I saw that Bhutto S/o Khuda Bux Banglani, armed with gun, Ali Gul S/o Sajjad Banglani, armed with K.K, Haq Nawaz S/o Lal Khan Banglani, armed with K.K, Muhammad Ramzan S/o Karam Ali Banglani armed with rifle, Munawar S/o Ghulam Hyder, armed with 12 bore gun and 5/6 unknown persons, who could be identified on seeing, being armed with weapons and hatchets were standing having encircled the shop and Nazeer Ahmed S/o Allahdad Banglani, armed with repeater, Maqbool alias Makko S/o Karam Ali Banglani armed with pistol, Allah Rakhio S/o Haji Muhammad Khan Banglani armed with 12 bore gun, Abdul Aziz S/o Muhammad Khan Banglani armed with double barrel gun climbed on the roof. The door of the shop was bolted from inside. My son Ashfaque, his father-in-law Muhammad Hussain and minor Anees Ahmed were raising cries “Bachao bachao”. Due to fear, I stood at some distance. Meanwhile people of our village and from nearby gathered there. Within my sight Nazeer Ahmed Banglani, Maqbool alias Makko Banglani, Allah Rakhio Banglani, Abdul Aziz Banglani were breaking the roof with the help of spade (kowder)  while Bhutto Banglani, Ali Gul Banglani, Haque Nawaz Banglani, Ramzan Banglani, Munawar Banglani, were making heavy aerial firing and creating terror and harassment. Meanwhile, the persons standing on the roof of the shop,  namely Nazer Ahmed Banglani, Maqbool Ahmed alias Makko Banglani, Allah Rakhio Banglani, Abdul Aziz Banglani made heavy firing inside the shop with their weapons continuously. Having made heavy firing they came down from the roof and made their escape good while making heavy firing for the purpose of creating harassment. Thereafter, it was found that my son Ashfaque, his father-in-law Muhammad Hussain had died while boy Anees Ahmed had sustained fire shots and was found unconscious. He was breathing and taken to Civil Hospital, Mirpurkhas where during treatment Anees Ahmed succumbed to injuries. I have come to lodge the report that above accused persons being armed with deadly weapons in furtherance of their common intention murdered my son Ashfaque Ahmed, his father-in-law Muhammad Hussain and minor Anees Ahmed and also created terror by making aerial firing. Investigation be made.”

 

 

3. The applicant has also attached another copy of FIR No.195/10 with the present application lodged by the accused party at the same police station on 19th August, 2010 for an incident occurred on the same date and time. In the FIR, the complainant Nazar Ali has alleged as under:-

 

“Complaint is that I am Primary Teacher and we are six brothers. The younger brother was Ali Gul. My deceased brother Ali Gul had narrated facts 2/3 times to me that Ashfaque Meo has threatened him not to come in front of his house. On 13.8.2010, I along with my brother Ali Gul when reached at about 3.15 P.m., near the shop of Majeed Tailor, Ashfaque son of Nooruddin Meo met us. Majeed Tailor, Muhammad Aslam Meo, Umar son of Nabi Khan were also with him who said to Ali Gul that number of times, you have been asked not to pass in front of our houses but you don’t stop. On this, hot words were exchanged. Meanwhile Muhammad Aslam took out pistol from his fold and made straight fire upon Ali Gul on his chest while other accused persons namely Raheemuddin son of Shareef, Ishaque son of Sassi Khan, Asghar son of Muhammad Ishaque, Aas Muhammad Meo and two unknown persons who could be identified on seeing, came there. By coming they abused us. On commotion, my relative Haq Nawaz also reached there who tried to separate us, upon which, Majeed tailor took out pistol from his fold and made straight fire upon Haq Hawaz with the intention to kill him which hit over the left eye of Haque nawaz and Ashfaque had also made straight fire. Thereafter the number of persons from nearby gathered and we saw that my brother Ali Gul had sustained fire arm injury on his chest and died while Haq Nawaz was seriously injured. Meanwhile police also reached there. Thereafter, the injured and dead body were taken to Taluka Hospital, Kot Ghulam Muhammad and after necessary proceedings the dead body was taken to village for funeral. I am present to lodge the report that the accused persons namely Majeed Darzi (tailor), Ashfaque, Muhammad Aslam, Umer, Raheemuddin, Mohammad Ishaque, Asghar,  Muhammad Meo and two unknown persons, who could be identified on seeing, in furtherance of their common object formed unlawful assembly and having made straight fire from their pistols committed murder of my brother Ali Gul and also injured Haque Nawaz.”

 

 

4. The investigation in Crime No.194 of 2010 was conducted. Police recorded the statement of witnesses and after completion, submitted challan in Anti Terrorism Court, Mirpurkhas for Trial but the learned Judge vide his order dated 25.9.2010, returned the police papers to I.O for submitting challan before the court having jurisdiction. The papers were returned on the ground that after appreciating the FIR, report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., statements of inhabitants of the locality and opinion given by SPP, Section 6 and 7 of Anti Terrorism Act do not attract in the present case. From the aforesaid order it is also transpiring that FIR     No.195 of 2010, lodged by the accused party against the complainant’s party has been challaned in the Sessions Court, Mirpurkhas, where the proceedings are pending.


5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the applicant argued that while passing the impugned order, the learned Judge, Anti Terrorism Court has failed to consider the word “Terrorism” in its true perspective and did not appreciate the contents of FIR and its cumulative effect on the society and the evidence which came on record. He further argued that the learned court failed to consider the material which was collected during course of investigation which prima facie shows the nature in which the accused persons caused murder of three innocent persons by breaking down the roof of the shop and created terror and fear amongst the people of the locality. It was the mandatory obligation on the court to consider all aspects of the case before determining the application of Section 6 and 7 of the Anti Terrorism Act 1997. He further averred that the learned court wrongly accepted the opinion of SPP who was not supposed to offer his opinion rather he was only responsible to check the completion of documents before submission in the court. The learned counsel however, could not controvert the challan submitted in Crime No. 195 of 2010 for trial in the Sessions Court Mirpurkhas. In support of arguments, the learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the following case law.

 

1.     2003 SCMR 1323, (Mst. Najmunisa v. Judge Special Court constituted under Anti Terrorism Act 1997). In this case, the honorable Supreme Court has discussed the jurisdiction of Special Court conferred under Section 12 of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 and held that venue of commission of crime, the time of occurrence and the motive which had led to the commission of crime and the fact whether the said crime had or had not being witnessed public at large or not, the only factors determining the issue whether a case did or did not fall within the parameters of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997. Crucial question for determination is whether the crime had or had not the effect of striking terror or creating essence of fear and insecurity in the public or any section of the people. Crime committed even in a remote corner does not remain unnoticed in the area in which it is committed or even in the country on account of the print and electronic media. Seven persons butchered in a house at night was not the kind of occurrence which would not create terror or horror in the people or any section of the people.

 

2.     PLD 2005 SC 530, (Mirza Shaukat Baig v. Shahid Jamil). In this matter, the honourable Supreme Court held that Section 6 of the Act is exhaustive and is capable enough to meet all kinds of “terrorism” and does not revolve around the word “designed to” as used in S.6 (1) (b) of the Act or mens rea but the key word is “action” on the basis whereof it can be adjudged as to whether the alleged offence falls within the scope of S.6 of the Act or otherwise. Word “designed to” can be equated with words willfully, knowingly and deliberately. Significance and the import or word “action” cannot be minimized and requires interpretation in a broader perspective. Act is meant for the internal security of the country having no concern with the “Terrorism” prevailing at global level. “Terrorism” means the use or threat of “action” where the “action” falls within the meaning of S.6 (2) of the Act and creates a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of public, or is designed to frighten the general public and thereby prevents them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts civil life, such act shall amount to terrorism as enumerated in S.6 of the Act. Court cannot pick and choose one or two sentences or a few words for academic purpose and their scholarly interpretation by ignoring the objects and reasons for the promulgation of the Act and its Preamble. Section 6 creates a statutory offence and hence the question of knowledge or mens rea is immaterial if in any case the legislature has omitted to prescribe a particular mental condition, the presumption is that the omission is intentional and in such a case mens rea is not applicable. Striking off terror is since qua non for the application of the provisions as contained in S.6 of the Act which cannot be determined without examining the nature, gravity and heinousness of the alleged offence, contents of FIR, its cumulative effects on the society or a group of persons and the evidence which has come on record. What was the real intention of the offender can only be adjudged on the basis of evidence which cannot be determined by invocation of Constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court and the Special Judge can take care of the matter which can be transferred by him if it does not fall within the jurisdictional domain.

 

 

6. The learned Additional Prosecutor General, supported the impugned order and argued that from the bare look of FIR, this is a case of previous enmity and the learned Anti Terrorism Court rightly reached to the conclusion that that the provision of Section 6 and 7 of the Anti Terrorism Act are not attracted in the present circumstances.

 

7. The learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 4, invited our attention to the FIR and argued that this is a case of previous enmity between the parties, the complainant Nooruddin himself stated that he is Zamindar and owns agricultural land and on 8.8.2010, Bhawal Bhanglani stolen away grass from his land due to which there was a quarrel between them. He further argued that it is an admitted fact that the accused party has also lodged an FIR No. 195 of 2010, against the complainant’s party which manifestly shows the situation of previous enmity between parties therefore, both the parties have lodged their FIR, against each other and reported the incident of the same date, time and even the place of occurrence of the incident is also same. The nutshell of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel is that this is a obvious case of previous enmity between the parties, therefore, the learned Judge, Anti Terrorism Court has rightly returned the police papers to the I.O. The learned counsel further argued that the learned judge has passed the order after considering all police papers including the report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and thereafter, he reached to the conclusion that Section 6 and 7 of the Anti Terrorism Act have no application in the instant matter and the case is triable by the regular/normal court. He further averred that the definition of terrorism is not attracted in the present case as the offence has neither created any threat to coerce or intimidate or overawe the government or the public or a section of the public or community or create sense of fear or insecurity in the society. If the motive for occurrence is enmity inter se the parties, the application of Section 6 of the Act does not apply. In support of his arguments, he referred to the following case law:

 

1.PLD 2009 SC 11 (Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Siddiq). In this matter, the honorable Supreme Court held that in order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within the ambit of section 6 of the Anti Terrorism Act 1997, it would be essential to have a glance over the allegations made in the FIR, it is also necessary to examine whether the ingredients of the alleged offence have any nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under section 6, 7 and 8 thereof. Whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not the motivation, object, design or purpose behind said act is to be seen. It is also to be seen as to whether the said act has created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public or any section of the public or community or in any sect. It was further held that if the motive for the occurrence is enmity inter se the parties on account of some previous murders, the application of section 7 of the Act, which primarily requires the spread of sense of insecurity and fear in the common mind is lacking in the case. The occurrence neither reflected any act of terrorism nor it was sectarian matter, instead the murders in question were committed owing to previous enmity between the two groups.

 

2. 2007 SCMR 142 (Mohabat Ali v. The State). In this matter, the honorable Supreme Court held that whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design or purpose behind the said act is to be seen. Examining the case in hand on the above         touchstone, it is manifest on the face of it that the alleged offence took place because of previous enmity and private vendetta. Motive as defined in the FIR is also to be given a specific attention which indicates that there was a personal enmity between the parties over the land and murder case of haris of complainant.

 

3. 2009 SCMR 527 (Muhammad Yakoob v. The State). In this matter, the honorable Supreme Court held that since nothing was brought on record to show that the occurrence created terror, panic or sense of insecurity amongst the people by securing possession of the land in question by the accused persons, therefore, the case did not qualify to be a terrorist act within the contemplation of section 6 of the Anti Terrorism Act or its schedule. Convictions and sentences recorded against the appellant under section 7 of Anti Terrorism Act were therefore, setaside. However, rest of convictions and sentences recorded against them under Section 302(b)/34, 324/34 and 337-A (i) PPC by the Trial Court were maintained.

 

8. In order to sift grain out of the chaff, it would be expedient to look into the preamble and Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.

 

Preamble

 

"An Act to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trail of heinous offences.

 

No. F.9(39)/97‑Legis. The following Act of Majlis‑e‑Shoora (Parliament) received the assent of the President on 16th August, 1997 is hereby published for general information:

 

Whereas it is expedient to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto."

 

 

Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 

 

"6. Terrorism.‑‑(1) In this Act, `terrorism' means the use or threat of action where:

 

(a) The action falls within the meaning of subsection (2), and

 

(b) the use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a section of the public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society; or

 

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause.

 

(2) An "action" shall fall within the meaning of sub‑section (1), if it:

 

(a) involves the doing of anything that causes death;

 

(b) involves grievous violence against a person or grievous bodily injury or harm to a person;

 

(c) involves grievous damage to property;

 

(d) involves the doing of anything that is likely to cause death or endangers a person's life;

 

(e) involves kidnapping for ransom, hostage, taking or hijacking;

 

(f) incites hatred and contempt on religious, sectarian or ethnic basis to stir up violence or cause internal disturbance;

 

(g) involves stoning, brick‑bating or any other form of mischief to spread panic;

 

(h) Involves firing on religious congregations, mosques, Imambargahs, churches, temples and all other places of worship, or random firing to spread panic, or involves any forcible takeover of mosques or other places of worship;

 

(i) creates a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed to frighten the general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts civil life;

 

(j) involves the burning of vehicles or any other serious form of arson;

 

(k) involves extortion of money ("Bhatta") or property;

 

(l) is designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt a communications system or public utility service;

 

(m) involves serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force him to discharge or to refrain from discharging his lawful duties; or

 

(n) involves serious violence against a member of the police force, armed forces, civil armed forces, or a public servant.

 

(3) The use or threat of use of any action falling within sub‑section (2), which involves the use of firearms, explosives or any other weapon, is terrorism, whether or not subsection 1(c) is satisfied.

 

(4) In this section "action" includes an act or a series of acts.

 

(5) In this Act, terrorism includes any act done for the benefit of a proscribed organization.

 

(6) A person who commits an offence under this section or any other provision of this Act, shall be guilty of an act of terrorism.

 

(7) In this Act, a "terrorist" means:

 

(a) a person who has committed an offence of terrorism under this Act, and is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;

 

(b) a person who is or has been, whether before or after the coming into force of this Act, concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, shall also be included in the meaning given in clause (a) above."

 

9. The pros and cons of the matter lead us to an irresistible conclusion that the combined effect of the word terrorism inter alia means the use or threat of action where use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a section of the public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society and creates a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed to frighten the general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts civil life. Section 6 of the ATA Act 1997 has its own independent applicability and interpretation and all acts of terrorism in relation to this act are to be seen on the touchstone of Section 6 which provides and defines in detail the meaning of terrorism. The legislature has neither provided any immunity nor relaxation that in case of previous enmity, the case will not be tried by the ATC but again, the criteria to judge is the gravity of offence and its modus operandi whether it created a sense of fear or insecurity in the society and creates a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed to frighten the general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts civil life.

 

10. Though in the case in hand, the possibility of previous enmity can not be ruled out bearing in mind the allegations bring up in the FIR(s). The complainant party lodged the FIR No. 194 of 2010 against the accused party and the accused party had lodged FIR No. 195 of 2010 against the complainant party in the same PS, but merely for this reason, it can not be held that due to previous enmity, ATC should stay its hands from taking cognizance in the matter and return the challan to I.O for submitting the same in the Session Court. The impugned order passed by the learned Judge of Anti-Terrorism Court is simply reflecting that I.O had recorded the statements of the inhabitants of the locality under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and also collected the documentary evidence in the case. During investigation, it has come into his knowledge that there was previous enmity between the parties and the complainant party firstly assaulted upon the accused persons due to which one person from accused side was seriously injured and subsequently succumbed to death.

 

11. In our view, while deciding whether challan is to be entertained or not, the learned trial court failed to consider the true perspective of Section 6 of ATA Act but in a slipshod manner, returned the challan on the effortless notion that this is a case of previous enmity which is not the sole criteria to decide. Had the learned judge while passing the impugned order considered the gravity and seriousness of the violent act  and atrocity,  he might have expressed the different view. In order to find out the severity of charge whether Section (6) ATA Act applies or not,  it is expedient to look into the allegations leveled in the FIR by the complainant. The gist of FIR is as under:

  

“On 13.8.2010, I, my son Ashfaque and father-in-law of my son namely Muhammad Hussain and his grand son Anees Ahmed age about 7 years and a guest from Punjab went to offer Jumma Namaz.

 

we all were sitting in the shop of Majeed tailor. For purpose of buying house hold articles I came out from the shop and purchased articles.

 

thereafter, reached near the shop of Majeed tailor at about 3.15 p.m., where I saw that Bhutto S/o Khuda Bux Banglani, armed with gun, Ali Gul S/o Sajjad Banglani, armed with K.K, Haq Nawaz S/o Lal Khan Banglani, armed with K.K, Muhammad Ramzan S/o Karam Ali Banglani armed with rifle, Munawar S/o Ghulam Hyder, armed with 12 bore gun and 5/6 unknown persons, who could be identified on seeing, being armed with weapons and hatchets were standing having encircled the shop.

 

Nazeer Ahmed S/o Allahdad Banglani, armed with repeater, Maqbool alias Makko S/o Karam Ali Banglani armed with pistol, Allah Rakhio S/o Haji Muhammad Khan Banglani armed with 12 bore gun, Abdul Aziz S/o Muhammad Khan Banglani armed with double barrel gun climbed on the roof.

 

The door of the shop was bolted from inside. My son Ashfaque, his father-in-law Muhammad Hussain and minor Anees Ahmed were raising cries of “Bachao-bachao”.

 

Nazeer Ahmed Banglani, Maqbool alias Makko Banglani, Allah Rakhio Banglani, Abdul Aziz Banglani were breaking the roof with the help of kowder and spade while Bhutto Banglani, Ali Gul Banglani, Haque Nawaz Banglani, Ramzan Banglani, Munawar Banglani, were making heavy aerial firing whereby creating terror and harassment.

 

The persons standing on the roof  namely Nazer Ahmed Banglani, Maqbool Ahmed alias Makko Banglani, Allah Rakhio Banglani, Abdul Aziz Banglani made heavy firing inside the shop with their weapons continuously.

 

Having made heavy firing they came down from the roof and made their escape good while making heavy firing for the purpose of creating harassment.

 

it was found that my son Ashfaque, his father-in-law Muhammad Hussain had died while boy Anees Ahmed who sustained fire shots was found unconscious. He was breathing and taken to Civil Hospital, Mirpurkhas where during treatment Anees Ahmed succumbed to injuries”.

 

 

12. The depiction of incident clearly deduces and figures out that three persons had been murdered brutally in the day light at the shop situated in the market. The shop was bolted from inside even then, the accused persons had climbed on the roof of the shop and broken the roof and  viciously murdered three persons. It is also alleged that all accused persons made heavy aerial firing to create harassment and terrorism.    

 

13. The honorable Supreme Court in its judgment reported in PLD 2005 SC 530 has held that striking off terror is sine qua non for the application of provisions as contained in Section 6 of the Act which cannot be determined without examining the nature, gravity and heinousness of the alleged offence, contents of FIR, its cumulative effect on the society or a group of persons. “Terrorism” means the use or threat of “action” where the action falls within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section (6) of the Act and creates a serious risk to the safety of the public or a section of the public or is designed to frighten the general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business and disrupts civil life. Such action shall amount to terrorism as enumerated in section 6 of the Act.

 

14. After minutely taking into account the gist and contents of the FIR, it is clear beyond any shadow of doubt in our mind that the way in which three persons had been brutally murdered in the day light on the shop situated in the market having an overall impact of creating a sense of fear or insecurity in the society and risk to safety of the public and frighten the general public thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business and disrupts civil life. The petitioner has attached the photos of broken roof of the shop and the bodies of victims lying at the hospital which are portraying dreadful and terrible state of affairs and the niceties of incident committed in a manner which unquestionably and undoubtedly amounts to terrorism as enumerated in section 6 of the Act.

 

15. The case law cited by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 deals the instances in which the crucial point to decide is whether the case falls within the jurisdictional domain of the Anti Terrorism Court or it should be tried by the normal court having jurisdiction. In all the cases cited by the learned counsel which are mentioned supra, the Supreme court held that the offence took place because of previous enmity and private vendetta and the intention of accused was not at all to create sense of insecurity or to destabilize public at large or to advance any sectarian cause therefore, the provisions of section 6 of Anti Terrorism Court was not attracted. In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within the ambit of section 6 of the Act it would be essential to have a glance over the allegations made in the FIR, record of the case and surrounding circumstances. It is also necessary to examine that the ingredients of the alleged offence has any nexus with the object of the case, whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not. It is also to be seen as to whether the said act has created a sense of fear and insecurity. According to our understanding, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent provided a guideline to decide which court will try the offence and the criteria for such decision is the gravity of offence whether it created a sense of fear and insecurity. 

 

16. Examining the case in hand on the above touchstone, we can not subscribe the view articulated by the learned counsel for the respondent that the case is triable by the Session court only for the reason that it is a case of previous enmity. It is clearly deducible that the offence was committed in the manner which was enough to create a sense of insecurity or to destabilize the public at large and amounts to terrorism as enumerated in section 6 of the Act.

  

17. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order is set aside, the I.O in the case is directed to submit the challan in the Anti-Terrorism Court, Mirpurkhas forthwith.

 

Hyderabad

Dated. 5.5.2011                                                             Judge

                                                         

                                                                   Judge

.