Present
Mr. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi.
Date
of hearing : 10.09.2011, 24.09.2011,
08.10.2011,
15.10.2011,
22.10.2011
& 29.10.2011
Date of judgment :
08.12.2011
Applicant : Mrs.
Ghazala Parveen through Mrs. Benysh Qureshi, Advocate a/w applicant
Versus
Respondents : Sadiq
Daniel & others
: through M/s Farogh Naseem
and Khurram Iqbal,
Advocates
Respondent No.19 :
through Mr. Muntazir Mehdi,
APG.
JUDGMENT
Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J. The above referred
three Cr. Revision Applications, emanating from same incident, for which three
different F.I.Rs have been registered, are disposed off through this common
judgment.
2. Criminal Revision Application No.144
of 2009 has been filed by the applicant on being aggrieved and dissatisfied
with the order dated 05.09.2009 passed by the learned 1st Additional
Sessions Judge Karachi South in Cr. Bail Application No.141 of 2008 whereby the
learned Judge has dismissed the application for cancellation of bail.
Similarly, Criminal Revision Application No.145 of 2009 has been filed by the
applicant on being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 05.09.2009
passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge Karachi South in
Cr. Misc. Application No.59 of 2007 whereby consequent to order passed in Cr.
Bail Application No.141 of 2008, the learned Judge has disposed of the
application for pre-arrest bail as not pressed. Whereas Cr. Revision
Application No.48 of 2010 has been filed by the applicant on being aggrieved
and dissatisfied with the order dated 1st March 2010 passed by the
learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge Karachi South in Sessions Case
No.742 of 2006 whereby an application moved by DDPP to take all the respondents
accused persons into custody was dismissed. Since the fate of Cr. Revision
Application No.48 of 2010 is dependent upon the decision in Cr. Revision
Application Nos. 144 and 145 of 2009, therefore, it will be dealt after the
decision in the above referred two revision applications.
3. It is pertinent to note that all the
three cases arise from the orders passed in FIR No.169 of 2005, which according
to learned counsel for the applicant, contains the true facts, therefore, it
will be advantageous to reproduced the contents of FIR No.169/2005, which read
as follows:
"I am residing at the address mentioned in column
No.2 along with my family and husband and I am serving as the Administrator of
Brenton Carey Girls Hostel, situated at 247 Staff Lines, Fatima Jinnah Road,
Karachi, since last four years. From the last one year Bishop Sadiq Danial who
is residing in the Trinity Church Compound along with his family wanted to
terminate me from my job but my Management Committee was not agreeing for the
same. On 11.04.2005 Bishop Sadiq Daniel at 09.30 AM along with a group
including Shahzar Shamoon, Zafar Iqbal, George Bhatti, Claventina Burdge,
Pervaz Barkat, Raj Kumal, Saith Gill, Javed Alam, Riaz Boota, Simon John, Anwar
Sardar, Emmanuel Victor, Anwar Lal Din, Irfan Sharif, James Sardar and their
20/25 accomplices, to whom I can identify if brought forward, they with
intention to occupy the Hostel entered inside, watchman informed me from main
gate through Intercom Telephone, I locked the doors of Hostel and in this
regard informed my staff, after some while there was knock on the Accounts
Office of the Hostel, I saw from the window where Sadiq Daniel, Shahzar
Shamoon, George Bhatti, Zafar Iqbal, Claventina Burdge, and other people as
well as some workers of Dar-ul-Khushnud were standing and they started to break
the door, I immediately approached in my office and for assistance called on 15
emergency number and informed them about the incident and on phone they also
heard the sound of breaking of the doors, after some while they broke the door
of Accounts Office and thereafter started to break the center door of my
office, I ran inside the Hostel where students of Class IX and X were present
for preparation of their Board Examination while remaining students were in
their respective schools. I hid himself in the store room till 45 minutes,
while they searched for me everywhere, after 45 minutes they found me and
caught me, Claventina Burdge, slapped me on my face thereafter started beating
me with kicks and fists. George Bhatti and Zafar Iqbal were shouting saying
kill her. At that time students of Class IX and X came and snatched me from
their hands and took me to the prayer room and locked the door, on which
accused persons started to break the doors of prayer room but the students
resisted for about 2 1/2 hours and not allowed them to enter inside, on which they
gathered all their people who were between 30 to 40 and they broke the prayer
room door. The girls were shouting that Madam Ghazala is our mother and you
cannot take her. The personal guard of Sadiq Danial namely Sajid loaded his gun
and directed towards the girls and told the girls to hand over Ghazala
otherwise he will open the fire, the girls said you fire on us or kill us but
we will not let Ghazala go. Having failed to grab me he dropped his gun and
went out. Then Zafar Iqbal, George Bhatti, Clavintina Berge along with others
came forward and started beating the girls with kicks and fists and also pulled
the hairs of girls and torn their clothes and abused with bad words and took
away all the girl students away from there. George Bhatti, Zafar Iqbal and
Clavintina Berge dragged me out of the prayer room, beating all the way long to
the play ground where Sadiq Daniel, Shahzar Shamoon and others were standing.
Sadiq Danial commanded George Bhatti take off her clothes. Zafar Iqbal took my
shirt (qamiz) upwards and George Bhatti pulled down my shalwar, I begged George
Bhatti to have pity on me for the sake of your own daughter Lubna. He said you
could not be my daughter I will make you fully naked. Then they started hitting
my sensitive organs and naked legs. Clavintina Berge bit me on the shoulder and
tried to forcibly obtain my signatures on some unknown writings/documents, when
I refused; again they started beating me. At that time Mr. Sher Gill and
Mrs.Pamela Shakti arrived there, they also pressurized me to put signatures on
the unknown writings, which I once again refused and they continued to beat me.
After 6 hours on the intervention of elders and respected people of
Christianity I was rescued from them. All the above mentioned accused persons
with common intention and object tortured me, attacked the Hostel, exposed me
naked to the public view by stripping me off my clothes and humiliated the girl
students and tortured them, broke the doors of Hostel and without permission
entered inside and given me threats to kill and they are still illegally
occupying the Hostel. All the above mentioned was done on the order and active
participation of Sadiq Daniel and Shahzar Shamoon. On the basis of Inquiry
Police lodged the FIR where State was complainant but I was not satisfied with
the FIR, on which I moved C.P.No.1289/2005 in the High Court of Sindh, in which
High Court of Sindh issued directions to take action on my statement. Today I
alongwith my husband Reverend Shafique Kanwal came at Police Station, my claim
against the above mentioned accused persons is to outraging my modesty. I
request for legal action. Report heard and found correct."
4. Learned counsel for the applicant has
contended that from record it may be seen that applicant/complainant Mst. Ghazala
Shafiq instantly reported the matter to CPLC and was sent for medical
examination on the fateful day when the incident took place. Her medical
examination was conducted on the same day, whereas report of Medico Legal
Centre stated as follows:
1.
Diffuse
swelling of right thumb. On examination movement painful, tenderness present.
2.
Complaint
of pain over right shoulder. On examination movement painful, mild tenderness
present.
3.
Complaint
of pain over left lower part of leg. On examination tenderness positive.
Movement painful.
4.
Complaint
of pain over lower incisor. On examination mild pain.
5.
Bruises
of size 10 x 08 c.m on right thigh.
6.
Bruises
over left lower leg size 6 x 4 and 1.5 x 1 c.m.
According to the
applicant, no F.I.R was registered to this effect, on the contrary, an F.I.R
No.44/2005 was lodged on 13.4.2005 at 1630 hours at Frere Police Station,
Clifton Town, Karachi, in which complainant Naureen Sarfaraz, a lady constable
reported that on the day of incident she and another lady police constable were
posted inside the gate of Breton Carey Girls Hostel when at about 12:30 hours
Mst. Ghazala Shafiq in a company of 15 to 20 girls started ruckus, tore their
own clothes, gave fists and kicks blows to both lady constables, when they
attempted to stop them they tore uniform of lady constable Nighat Parveen. It
was further alleged that as a consequence the complainant lady constable
suffered miscarriage of her two months baby.
5. Per learned counsel, since no F.I.R of
the complainant was being registered, the applicant held a Press Conformance to
this effect on 12.04.2005, which was published in large number of newspapers on
13.4.2005 wherein the applicant narrated the entire facts. The Christian
community of the city condemned the incident and protested against the conduct
of the accused persons and the police, whereas the entire incident was
highlighted in the print and electronic media as well. The applicant approached
various high officials of the Government including President and Prime
Minister. Whereafter the CCPO, Karachi appointed Mr.Sanaullah Abbasi as
Incharge of Inquiry Board to conduct inquiry of the incident. The applicant
appeared before such Inquiry Board. Her statement was recorded, whereas
statement of other P.Ws including Rukhsana Naseem, Roma George, Surriya
Anthony, Huma Younus, Bishop Ejaz Inayat, Saba Younus, Nargis Shamsher, Shamila
Afroze, Zarashan Haroon and others were also recorded. Consequently, the
Inquiry Report was submitted on 21.5.2005, wherein following findings and recommendations
were given:-
"FINDINGS
i. This
is a fact that people entered the girls hostel, broke the doors open, dragged
Mrs. Ghazala Shafiq outside, manhandled her and outraged her modesty.
ii.
Both parties did not
act in a legal/desirable way to resolve their disputes. The matter should have
been either resolved/arbitrated by the court or by themselves according to the
Constitution of the Diocese of Karachi. Police should have played their
proactive role in resolution of matter.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF
ENQUIRY BY MR. SANAULLAH ABBASI.
i.
A criminal case under
the relevant sections of the law may be registered for outrage of modesty.
ii.
Local police may be
warned for not being proactive.
iii.
Role of lady police
will be determined later on, as the case has been registered. The enquiry is
under way. Why lady police was called and no male member of the force was sent
with them when male members of Christen community were present at the spot. It
is intriguing on the part of local police."
6. Per learned counsel for the applicant,
instead of following recommendations as contained in the Inquiry Report an FIR
bearing No.87 of 2005 was registered on behalf of the State on 27.6.2005
against unknown persons. Since the applicant was not satisfied with
registration of the FIR lodged by the police, she approached the Home Secretary
for proper inquiry into the matter who directed another inquiry to Additional
Inspector General Police (Investigation) Mr. Nayyer Hasnain, who after
examining the complainant and the witnesses completed the inquiry and reached
to the following conclusion:
“CONCLUSION
From the
statements of the Complaints and witnesses it is quite clear that the incident
of forcible evacuation of Mst. Ghazala Shafique did take place on 11.04.2005.
Although police was informed that there is likelihood of disturbance no action
was taken by police, it remained silent spectator while Mst. Ghazala Shafique
(administrator) of Brenton Carey hostel was forcibly evacuated from her office.
Whether any legal procedure was followed to terminate the services of Mst.
Ghazala Shafiq was beyond the mandate of this enquiry.
After the
incident had taken place the complainant Mst. Ghazala Shafique tried her best
to get the FIR registered but her Complaint was not entertained by police, instead
two Cases have been registered on behalf of the state. It is quite surprising
to note as to why her FIR was not registered.
The
background of the incident appears to be the tussle between Mr. Sadiq Danial
and Mr. Ejaz Inayat for the position of Bishop but this particular incident of
11.04.2005 took place in the presence of police. The Complainant Mst.Ghazala
Shafique, Administrator, Brenton Carey hostel may be exaggerating the actual
incident but forcible evacuation from her office did take place for which her
complaint should have been registered. The role of police is also not above
board it appears they were trying to help in the evacuation.
It is
recommended that the cases already registered may be handed over to some
impartial officer/agency for investigation and case of Mst.Ghazala Shafiq may
also be registered."
The applicant filed a
Constitution Petition No.D-1289 of 2005 before this Court, seeking registration
of FIR. Petition was allowed and the police was directed to record the
statement of complainant and register an FIR if cognizable offence is made out.
Accordingly, FIR No.169 of 2005 was registered against the respondents.
7. On registration of above FIR No.169 of
2005 the accused persons moved applications for bail before arrest bearing Cr.
Bail Application No.1019/2005, Cr. Bail application No.1048/2005 and Cr. Bail
application No.1051/2005 before the learned Sessions Judge Karachi South, who
granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail to the respondents, whereafter vide order
dated 04.01.2006 pre-arrest bail granted to the respondents was duly confirmed.
Per learned counsel, interim charge sheet was submitted on 23.12.2005 without
recording the statement of the complainant and her witnesses. The complainant
challenged such improper investigation and submission of challan. Whereafter
CCPO Karachi vide order dated 20.1.2006 constituted three members Board
comprising DIGP (Investigation-II) and 2 SSPs, which was later enhanced to 5
members comprising DIGP (Investigation-II) and 4 SSPs to deliberate on the
investigation and to give recommendations for re-investigation of the case.
However, per learned counsel, in utter disregard to the above directions the
concerned S.I. Noor Sabir submitted final challan on 21.01.2006. The Board so
constituted recommended re-investigation of the case. Whereafter 42 witnesses
were examined and consequently final challan was submitted on 25.5.2006 wherein
section 354-A P.P.C was substituted by section 354 P.P.C. Per learned counsel,
in the challan Section 354-A PPC was omitted, although eight eye-witnesses
supported the case of the complainant. The complainant moved an application
under Section 190(2) Cr.P.C before the learned Magistrate, who allowed the same
vide order dated 28.10.2006. Per learned counsel, such order has not been
challenged hence still in force. After inclusion of Section 354-A PPC the
applicant moved an application before the learned trial Court for taking the
accused persons into custody on the ground that the accused persons are not on
bail under Section 354-A PPC, but no order was passed by the learned trial
Court. Applicant moved Cr. Miscellaneous Application No.59 of 2007 before the
learned Sessions Judge Karachi South for cancellation of bail granted to the
accused persons on 04.01.2006. Since no order was being passed on above
application, the applicant invoked the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this
Court seeking directions to the trial Court to pass appropriate orders on
pending application. Whereafter, arguments on application for cancellation of
bail i.e. Cr. Misc. Application No.59 of 2007 were heard by the trial Court and
the case was fixed for order on 02.02.2008. In the meantime, Deputy District
Attorney on 21.01.2008 filed an application before the trial Court for custody
of the accused persons stating therein that the accused persons are not on bail
under Section 354-A PPC. Accused persons in the meantime obtained protective
bail from this Court vide order dated 01.02.2008. On 02.02.2008 the accused
persons moved an application before the trial Court for dismissal of Cr. Misc.
Application No.59 of 2007 on the ground that the accused persons have been
granted protective bail by High Court vide order dated 01.02.2008. Such order
was assailed by the applicant by filing Criminal Petition No.22-K of 2008
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. During pendency of such petition, the accused
persons filed Cr. Bail Application No.141 of 2008 before the learned trial
Court. However, during pendency of such bail application the accused persons
moved Cr. Bail Application No.172 of 2008 before the High Court and vide order
dated 25.02.2008 interim bail was granted to the accused persons. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court under the circumstances disposed of the matter vide order dated
16.01.2009 with directions to the parties to approach the Court below. On
02.07.2009, this Court in Cr. Bail Application No.172 of 2008 directed the
learned trial Court to decide the Cr. Bail Application No.141 of 2008 and Cr.
Misc. Application No.59 of 2007 within two months. Pursuant to which
directions, both the above matters i.e. Cr. Misc. Application No.59 of 2007 and
Cr. Bail Application No.141 of 2008 were heard and disposed of by the trial
Court vide impugned order dated 05.09.2009 whereby learned trial Court
dismissed the Cr. Misc. application No.59 of 2007 filed by the
applicant/complainant and disposed of Cr. Bail application No.141 of 2008 as
not pressed by the accused persons.
8. In the earlier round of proceedings, both
these revision applications were heard and disposed of by learned Single Judge
of this Court vide combined judgment dated 25.01.2010 in the following
terms:-
“50. There
are 18 accused persons. Role of every one of them is not identical. They, as
far as offence under section 354-A is concerned, fall into four categories:
(i) Respondent
No.1 allegedly commanded Respondent No.3 to strip the complainant;
(ii) Respondent
No.2 and 3 who it is alleged respectively pulled up shirt and pulled down
shalwar of the complainant;
(iii) Respondent
No.5 who allegedly bit the complainant on her shoulder;
(iv) Other
private respondent who were cam followers or by standers or who made hay of
insult and disgrace of the complaint while sun of infamy shone.
51. Result
of the above discussion is, following Sarfraz Khan’s case (supra), that
impugned order dated September 05, 2009 and order dated 04.01.2006 are set
aside, bail applications of Respondents No.1,2,3 and 5 are dismissed and
interim bail granted to other respondents is confirmed. Criminal Revision
Applications No.144 and 145 of 2009 are disposed of in the above terms.”
9. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
above judgment of this Court in Cr. Revision application No.144 and 145 of
2009, respondents No.1, 2, 3 and 5 preferred Cr. Petitions No.30-31 of 2010 before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which were converted into appeal and disposed of by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide short order dated 24.02.2010 whereby the
judgment passed by the learned Judge of this Court to the extent of petitioners
was set aside and the cases were remanded to this Court for fresh decision.
However, while setting aside the judgment, it was observed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that bail granted to the petitioners by Sessions Judge Karachi South vide
short order dated 4th January 2006 in FIR No.169/2005 registered at
P.S. Frere, Clifton Town, Karachi under Sections 147, 148, 337-A (i), 506-B,
354-A PPC is kept intact till decision of High Court. In the short order, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court further observed that initially section 354-A PPC was mentioned in
FIR No.169/2005 dated 16th December 2005 but subsequently section
354-A PPC was omitted, however, the Magistrate while taking cognizance of the
case vide order dated 28th October 2006 added section 354-A PPC as
well. It was further observed that the said order is still intact and had not
been challenged. It was further observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that since
the petitioner and co-accused Zafar Iqbal did not press the application for
grant of bail under section 354-A PPC, as such they cannot be treated to be on
bail by any Court under this section, therefore, to this extent law will take
to its course accordingly. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while
recording the reasons has remanded the case to this Court for fresh decision in
Cr. Revision Applications No.144 and 145 of 2009 in the following manner:-
“13. We,
therefore, by our short order noted above set aside the impugned order to the
extent of petitioners and remanded the case to High Court for fresh decision of
Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 144-145 of 2009 holding that the
petitioners and co-accused Zafar Iqbal cannot be treated on bail by any court
under section 354-A PPC and that the law will take its course accordingly.
Since the case law cited by learned counsel in this situation became
irrelevant, the discussion as to that being an academic discourse, shall be an
exercise in futility. These are the reasons for our short order.”
10. Learned counsel for the applicant has
vehemently argued that the respondents/accused have committed a heinous crime
on the fateful day, which is punishable with death or life. However, per
learned counsel, by abusing the process of law and with the active connivance
of the police officials they have managed to avoid the rigrous of the law so
far. Per learned counsel, there is no denial to the fact that the alleged
incident took place on the fateful day, but the accused persons are attempting
to distort the actual facts by exercising their influence over police and by
issuing threats to the complainant and her family, as well as prosecution
witnesses. Per learned counsel, the impugned order has been obtained by
misrepresentation of facts, as the learned trial Court has not taken into
account the material collected during the course of investigation. It is
contended that the contents of F.I.R No.169 of 2005 are duly corroborated by
the statement of prosecution witnesses including eye-witnesses recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C., whereas the inquiry conducted by the senior police
officials also support the case of complainant. Per learned counsel, on taking
the complete stock of the material available on record and the events stated
hereinabove, it may be seen that the accused persons are fully implicated in
the instant crime and under no circumstances were entitled to concession of
pre-arrest bail which is otherwise based on misconceived facts. It is contended
by learned counsel for the applicant, that prima-facie case is made out against
the accused persons, who have outraged modesty of complainant in the eye of
public at large, therefore, the pre-arrest bail granted to the accused persons
is liable to be cancelled and the accused persons are required to be
apprehended by the police to face trial. While concluding her arguments the
learned counsel for the applicant has also readout the statements of some of
the prosecution witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C including the
statement of P.Ws Shamsunnisa, Surraya Anthony, Zarish Aziz, Zarafshan Haroon,
Shumaila Afroze, Saba Younus and Dalsy John. In support of her contention, the
learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the following reported
judgments, (i) Sarfraz Khan v. The State and 2 others PLD 1988 SC 726, (ii)
Mst.Zaitoon v. M. Riaz and 3 others PLD 1996 (Peshawar) 30, (iii) Allah Ditta v.
The State 2003 MLD 1848, (iv) Naveed
v. The State 2004 YLR 2392, (v) Mst. Qudrat Bibi v. Muhammad Iqbal and
others 2003 SCMR 68, (vi) Gul Zaman v. The State 2004 YLR 3335, (vii) Muhammad
Safdar v. The State 1983 SCMR 645, (viii) Muhammad Azam v. The State 1996 SCMR
71, (ix) Arif Matin Bhutta v. The State PLJ 1984 Cr.C (Lahore) 372, (x) Rana
Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique & another PLD 2009 SC 427 and (xi)
Faqir Muhammad and two others v. The State 2010 YLR 457.
11. Conversely, learned counsel for the
respondents/accused has supported the impugned order for having been passed in
accordance with law. It is contended by the learned counsel that the applicant,
with ulterior motives and mala-fide intention, has attempted to drag the respondents
who are all respectable citizens of Christian Community in Pakistan including
Bishop of the Church, into a false case in order to cause harm and injury to
their reputation. Per learned counsel, the facts as narrated by the learned
counsel for the applicant are false and distorted, whereas the applicant in an
attempt to perpetuate her illegal possession as Administrator of the Breton
Carey Hostel has concocted the entire story. While narrating the facts in his
own words learned counsel for the respondents submitted that applicants and the
respondents are Christian by faith and follower of Anglican Protestant
denomination. Their Church is called Church of Pakistan. There is a Bishop of
Pakistan, who heads the Church of Pakistan. Church of Pakistan is divided into
8 dioceses. Diocese of Karachi encompasses Karachi and Balochistan. A Dutch
gentleman was Bishop of Karachi for a long time. He expired and office of
Bishop of Karachi became vacant. Elections were held in 1997 and Respondent
No.1 i.e. Sadiq Dainel and one Ejaz Inayat were candidates for election of
Office of Bishop of Karachi. Respondent No.1 alleged rigging in the election. A
suit was filed in the High Court. Status-quo was ordered by the High Court in
the suit and finally suit was disposed of on the basis that a fact finding
inquiry shall be held under the orders of Archbishop of Canterbury and
thereafter result of such inquiry shall be followed. That inquiry recommended
fresh elections. Fresh elections were held on 4.2.2002 and Respondent No.1 was
elected as Bishop of Karachi. This was done in accordance with the order passed
by this Court in Civil Suit No.1454/1997 on 28.1.2002. In Suit No.996/2002
filed by the present Respondent No.1 against the said Ejaz Inayat, an order
dated 1.10.2002 was passed by this Court restraining him from acting,
representing or stating himself in any manner to be Bishop of Karachi. Counter
suit was filed by said Ejaz Inayat
(No.279/2002). Both the suits are still pending.
12. Per learned counsel for the respondents, on
April 10th 2005 a meeting of the managing committee was held in
which Mrs. I. Pearl, Dr. Shireen Martin, Mrs. P. Shakti (Respondent No.16) and
Mrs. Freed Shergill (Respondent No.15) were present. This was a meeting of
Board Committee of Breton Carey Hostel and the meeting decided that services of
present applicant be terminated on the ground of insubordination, gross
misconduct and mismanagement. The Committee in this connection considered
various complaints received by it from the students and priests. In
consequences of this decision of the committee letter of suspension dated
10.4.2005 under the signatures of present respondent No.1 was issued to the
present applicant. According to learned counsel, it was when this letter was
sought to be served, the present applicant conducted herself in a manner as was
alleged in F.I.R No. 44/2005. Learned counsel referred to newspapers clipping
of daily New Akhbar, Jura’at and Awam of April 15th, Khabrain of
April 16, daily Jang of April 15, Awam of April 19th, Khabrain of
April 29th, Jura’at of April 26th, daily Dawn of April 15th
to contend that the present applicant’s conduct as Incharge of Hostel has been
very diabolical and had caused serious unrest in the Christian community.
Learned counsel further submitted that Executive Committee of the Karachi
Diocese in its meeting held on 18.02.2004 resolved to strike off names of all
the presbyters from the diocesan rolls who had worked beyond the system and
procedure. Consequently, show-cause notice dated March 8th, 2005 was
issued to the husband of the applicant. As soon as this show-cause notice was
issued, husband of the applicant filed Civil Suit No.283/2005 in the Court of
IV-Civil Judge, Karachi South, in which suit it was, inter alia, prayed that
show-cause notice dated 8.3.2005 be declared as null and void and without
lawful authority. This civil suit was dismissed.
13. Learned counsel for the respondents
also referred to the first inquiry conducted by Sanaullah Abbasi, T.P.O. Saddar
Town, Karachi, and submitted that the said inquiry was conducted behind the
back of the respondents without associating the respondents. Per learned
counsel, the said inquiry report was slip-shod and one sided, which has no
legal sanctity in the eye of law. The applicant, per learned counsel, continued
to make hue and cry at the behest of Ejaz Inayat and leveled allegations
against respondents, as a result of which second inquiry was also conducted by
the team of police officials headed by Nayyer Hasnain Zaidi, Additional I.G.
Police and the conclusion of such inquiry report reflects that allegations
regarding application of the provisions of Section 354-A PPC are prima-facie
not attracted in the instant case. Findings of the inquiry report suggest that “(i) background of the incident is due to
the tussle between Bishop Sadiq Daniel and Ejaz Inayat”, “(ii) At best, forcible evacuation of the
applicant took place for which her complaint should be registered”. Per
learned counsel, in order to exert more pressure on the respondents the
applicant preferred C.P.No.D-1289 of 2005 in this Court whereby directions were
given to the police to register F.I.R inspite of the fact that two F.I.Rs had
already been registered in respect of the same incident i.e. F.I.R bearing
No.44/2005 dated 13.04.2005 and F.I.R No.87/2005 dated 27.06.2005.
14. It is contended by the learned counsel for
the respondents that though Section 354-A PPC was mentioned in F.I.R
No.169/2005 dated 6.12.2005, however, after investigation the charge-sheet No.67/2006
dated 26.5.2006 was submitted before the trial Court wherein Section 354-A PPC
was deleted. Accordingly, on 10.12.2005 the respondents i.e. Bishop Sadiq
Daniel and others moved pre-arrest bail applications bearing Cr. Bail
Application No.1019 and 1048 of 2005 before the learned District Sessions Judge
(South) Karachi, which were duly confirmed vide order dated 04.01.2006.
Thereafter, the applicant approached the concerned Magistrate by filing an
application under Section 190 (2) Cr.P.C, on which an order dated 28.10.2006
was passed and the prosecution was directed to add Section 354-A PPC and sent
the case to be tried by the Sessions Court. Bishop Sadiq Daniel and others made
an application for consolidation of all the three cases arising out of all the
above three F.I.Rs, by filing Criminal Transfer Application No.2 of 2007 before
the High Court, which was granted vide order dated 16.04.2007 and the 1st
ADJ (South) Karachi was directed to try all the three cases together. Such
order was challenged by the applicant through C.P.L.A No.77-K of 2007 in the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was disposed of vide order dated 31.7.2007 whereby
the order of High Court was modified to the extent that the three cases would
not be consolidated but would be proceeded with by the same Court side by side.
Per learned counsel, thereafter the applicant moved application i.e. Cr. Misc.
Application No.59 of 2007 before the trial Court to arrest respondent Bishop
Sadiq Daniel and others under Section 354-A PPC, as according to the applicant
they were not on bail under the said provision of law. On 21.10.2008, Deputy
District Attorney at the behest of applicant moved an application before the
trial Court for the custody of respondents accused persons. In addition to
above said applications, the applicant moved yet another applications i.e. Cr.
Misc. Application No.186 of 2007 before the High Court seeking directions for
the trial Court to dispose of the above pending application at an early date.
Per learned counsel, on 01.02.2008 Bishop Sadiq Daniel and others obtained
protective bail before arrest from the High Court in Cr. Bail Application No.91
of 2008. Such order of protective bail was challenged by the applicant before
the Supreme Court in Cr. Petition No. 22-K of 2008. Bishop Sadiq Daniel and
others moved Cr. Bail Application No.141 of 2008 before the trial Court in
respect of offence under Section 354-A PPC. However, instead of granting
pre-arrest interim bail the trial Court ordered that “the advocate to be heard.” Since there was great apprehension as
the interim pre-arrest bail was not granted to Bishop Sadiq Daniel and others,
they moved Cr. Bail Application No.172 of 2008 before the High Court and
obtained interim pre-arrest bail vide order dated 25.02.2008. Thereafter, Cr.
Petition No.22-K of 2008 filed by the applicant to question the bail before
arrest granted by the High Court was disposed of vide order dated 16.02.2009
and the parties were directed to approach trial Court. Finally, the High Court
vide order dated 02.07.2009 directed the trial Court to decide both
applications i.e. Cr. Misc. Application No.59 of 2007 moved by applicant for
cancellation of the bail of Bishop Sadiq Daniel and others and Cr. Bail
Application No.141 of 2008 filed by Bishop Sadiq Daniel and others to obtain
bail under Section 354-A PPC. Learned ADJ (South) Karachi vide impugned order
dated 05.09.2008 dismissed the applicant’s application i.e. Cr. Misc.
application No.59 of 2007 for cancellation of bail before arrest and further
observed that Bishop Sadiq Daniel and
others need not obtain any bail under section 354-A PPC as the same has become
infructuous. According to learned counsel for the respondents, the above
order has been assailed by the applicant through two Cr. Revision Applications
No.144 and 145 of 2009 before this Court, which were, in the earlier round of
proceedings, partly allowed by the learned Judge of this Court on 25.01.2010
whereby the bail of respondents Sadiq Daniel, Shahzar Shamoon, George Bhatti
and Mrs. Claventina Burdge were cancelled, whereas in respect of other
respondents the revision applications filed by the applicant were dismissed.
The order of this Court was challenged by the applicant before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by filing Cr. Petitions Nos.30 and 31 of 2010, which were
converted into Cr. Appeals Nos.91 and 92 of 2010 and disposed of by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court vide order dated 24.2.2010 whereby the order of this Court has
been set aside and the matter has been remanded to this Court for decision
afresh.
15. Learned counsel for the respondents
has argued that the effect of setting aside the order of this Court by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court with the observations made therein is that the original
order of the learned trial Court dated 5.9.2009 for the respondents No.1, 2, 3,
4 and 5 stands revived. However, in view of the observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the respondents No.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have filed Cr. Bail
Application No.233 of 2010 before the trial Court, wherein, the respondents
No.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail, which is now
pending for confirmation or otherwise. Per learned counsel, learned DDPP moved
an application on 01.3.2010 before the learned trial Court to detain the
remaining 13 accused persons, who did not move any fresh bail application. The
said application was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order dated
01.03.2010, which order has now been challenged by the applicant in Cr.
Revision Application No.48 of 2010. Per learned counsel, as regards Cr.
Revision Application No.48 of 2010 is concerned it may be stated that the bail
applications of 13 accused persons were even confirmed by the learned Single
Judge of this Court in earlier round of proceedings vide order dated 25.01.2010
against which no appeal was filed by the applicant before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, whereas the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also not passed any order to upset
the bails granted to 13 accused persons, hence the order of the learned Single
Judge of this Court dated 25.01.2010 to the extent of these 13 accused has
attained finality. Per learned counsel, in view of legal position stated
hereinabove, the learned trial Court was justified to pass the order dated 1st
March 2010, which has been impugned by the applicant in Cr. Revision
Application No.48 of 2010, which is liable to be dismissed on this account. Per
learned counsel, keeping in view the above facts, the scope of Cr. Revision
Applications No. 144 and 145 of 2009 is now restricted only to determine as to
whether this Court could cancel the bail in respect of charges as contained in
F.I.R No.169/2005 excluding the offence under section 354-A PPC, whereas fresh
bail application in respect of section 354-A PPC is pending before the trial
Court and the same is liable to be decided on its own merits. Learned counsel
further submitted that for the purposes of Cr. Revision Applications No.144 and
145 of 2009 only FIR No.169/2005 dated 06.12.2005 is relevant and except
section 354-A PPC all the relevant sections in the FIR and its charge-sheet do
not fall within the prohibitory clause, whereas maximum punishment is either 2
years, 3 years or 7 years. While concluding his arguments, the learned counsel
has argued that this is a case where counter FIRs have been registered in respect
of the same alleged incident, which requires further inquiry into the matter,
whereas, there is admittedly an enmity between the parties and litigation is
also pending in Court of law. Per learned counsel, there has been considerable
delay in registration of the F.I.R No.169/2005. Whereas the grant of ad-interim
pre-arrest bail is the discretion of the trial Court, which has been exercised
in the instant case keeping in view the contents of FIR and the material
available on record i.e. the inquiry reports and statement of witnesses etc.
hence, the said discretion may not be disturbed by this Court in the instant
proceedings particularly when fresh pre-arrest bail applications in respect of
the respondents No.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 under section 354-A PPC are now pending
disposal before the trial Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel
has placed reliance on the following reported judgments, (i) Tariq Bashsir and
others v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34, (ii) Mir Ahmad Gul and 2 others v. The
State 1996 SCMR 979, (iii) Samina Shafi
v. The State 2002 YLR 899, (iv) Qabil v. The State 2011 P.Cr.L.J 232, (v) Mst.
Mumtaz Bibi and others v. The State 2011 SCMR 355, (vi) Tahir Abbas v. The
State 2003 SCMR 426, (vii) Mst. Shafiqan v. Hashim Ali and another 1972 SCMR
682, (viii) Fazal Muhammad v. Ali Ahmed and 3 others 1976 SCMR 391, (ix) Ghulam
Hussain v. Muhammad Saleh 1983 SCMR 357, (x) Shoaib Mehmood Butt v.
Iftikhar-ul-Haq and 3 others 1996 SCMR 1845, (xi) Shukar Din v. Zafar Hayat and
other 2002 SCMR 201, (xii) Muhammad Shahzad Siddique v. The State and another
PLD 2009 SC 58, (xiii) Muhammad Saleh and another v. The State 2011 P.Cr.L.J
120, (xiv) Asmatullah v. The State PLD
2011 178, (xv) Muhammad Salman Shafique v. The State 2011 SCMR 165, (xvi)
Muhammad Akbar v. Muhammad Akhtar 2006 YLR 3123, (xvii) Zakaullah v. The State
1976 SCMR 352, (xviii) Shahnaz Bibi v. Gul Khan alias Haji Khan1999 P.Cr.L.J
868, (xix) Ayaz Ahmad Khan v. The State PLD 2011 SC 171, (xx) Muzaffar Iqbal v.
Muhammad Imran 2004 SCMR 231, (xxi) Muhammad Saeed v. Muhammad Bakhsh & 4
others PLJ 2003 Crl. Case 871, (xxii) Abid Ali alias Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR
161, (xxiii) Asif Jameel and others v. The State 2003 MLD 676, (xxiv) Rukhsar
Ahmad and 3 others v. The State and another 2005 P.Cr.L.J 988, (xxv) Muhammad
Bashir Guraya v.Raja Muhammad Irshad and another 2005 YLR 1220, (xxvi) Sajjad
Hussain v. The State PLD 1996 Lahore 286 and (xxvii) Khalil Ahmad and another
v. The State 2003 P.Cr.L.J 1754.
16. I have heard both the learned counsel and
perused the record. It is pertinent to note that instant proceedings arise from
FIR No.169 of 2005, which was registered on 16.12.2005 pursuant to directions
of this Court in C.P.No.D-1289 of 2005 filed by the applicant. The FIR
No.169/2005, amongst other sections also contains section 354-A PPC, however,
record shows that subsequently in final challan submitted on 26.5.2006 section
354-A PPC was omitted and it was substituted by section 354 PPC. The applicant
being aggrieved by such omission of section 354-A PPC in the final challan,
filed an application under section 190 (2) Cr.P.C on 17.8.2006 with the prayer
to include section 354-A PPC. Such application was granted by the concerned
Magistrate vide order dated 28.10.2006 and section 354-A PPC was inserted.
Admittedly, this order has not been challenged by the respondents/accused hence
still holds the field. The pre-arrest bail granted to the accused persons was
confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge Karachi South on 04.01.2006 on the
pretext that all the offences shown in the challan are bailable except section
338-A PPC, which is punishable with three years, further more section 354-A PPC
has been substituted by section 354 PPC. In view of the order passed by the
Magistrate on application under Section 190 (2) Cr.P.C, the applicant moved an
application before the learned trial Court seeking cancellation of bail granted
to the respondents/accused, however, the learned trial Court, vide impugned
order dated 05.09.2009 has dismissed the same, once again observing as follows,
“the order passed on 04.01.2006 clearly
shows that the accused were also granted bail under section 354-A PPC.”
17. There is no cavil to the proposition that
the parameters for grant of bail and for cancellation of bail are different. Once
an accused is granted bail on merits, and the bail granting order is not
arbitrary or perverse in such case the bail should not be cancelled, whereas
cancellation of bail can only be done on exceptional grounds such as; where
accused on bail repeats the offence, hampers investigation, makes efforts to
suborn evidence, commits act of violence against prosecution witnesses or try
to run away from the jurisdiction of the Court and control of sureties.
However, in the instant case it is noted that the bail was granted by ignoring
material facts and without considering the merits of the case. Particularly,
the cognizance of an offence falling under section 354-A PPC, which was
mentioned in the FIR has not been taken by the trial Court. It will not be out
of place to observe that the parameters for grant of pre-arrest bail are
different and distinct from the parameters of bail after arrest. The applicant
seeking pre-arrest bail has to show that the prosecution has falsely implicated
him in the alleged crime in order to cause harm and injury to his reputation,
and there is no material available with the prosecution to implicate and
connect the applicant with the alleged crime. It appears that trial Court was
mislead by mis-conceived facts and misdirected itself by observing that these
accused persons have already been granted bail under section 354-A PPC. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court has also noted these defects and has observed that since the petitioners and co-accused Zafar
Iqbal did not press the application for grant of bail under Section 354-A PPC,
as such they cannot be treated to be on bail by any Court under this section
and the law will take its course accordingly.
18. From tentative assessment of record and
perusal of the contents of FIR, statement of prosecution witnesses recorded
under section 161 Cr.P.C and the inquiry conducted by the superior police
officials, it appears that there is sufficient material available on record
which connects some of the accused persons with the alleged crime falling under
section 354-A PPC. However, since there are number of accused persons who have
been nominated in FIR No.169/2005 with different roles, therefore, their cases
may be dealt in accordance with the role assigned to them, and on the basis of
material and evidence available against them.
19. On tentative assessment of material
available on record, it may be seen that there is no overt act or any direct
role of respondents No. 6 to 18 namely, Raj
Kumar, Saith Gill, Jawaid Khursheed, Riaz Boota, Simon Jan, Emmanuel Victor,
Anwer Sarder Khan, Irfan Shareef, Pervaiz Bakat, Mrs. Fareeda Shaer Gill, Mrs.
Pimla Zafar Shakti, Anwar Lal Din and James Sardar, in relation to
allegations of having committed an offence falling under section 354-A PPC,
whereas, to examine as to whether there was common intention of these accused
persons to commit an offence falling under section 354-A PPC, the matter
requires further inquiry. Since registration of FIR and submission of final
challan the matter has not proceeded any further as no prosecution witness,
including the complainant, has been examined so far, hence at present, there is
hardly any material which may connect these accused persons with the alleged
crime. No useful purpose will be served by recalling the bail granted to these
accused persons by trial Court. Moreover, in the earlier round of proceedings
in this Court, the bail granted to these accused persons was confirmed and the
bail application of respondents No. 1, 2, 3 and 5 only was cancelled. Such
order was assailed by the applicant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, who has
remanded the same for fresh decision by observing that respondents No.1, 2, 3 and 5 cannot be treated on bail under Section
354-A PPC, whereas no such observations have been made in respect of respondents
No.6 to 18. Under these circumstances, bail granted to these accused
persons by the trail Court does not require any interference by this Court at
this stage. However, it is directed that in case of any misuse of concession of
bail by these accused persons, the trial Court shall proceed against them in
accordance with law.
20. As regards role of respondent No.1, Sadiq Daniel, respondent No.2 Shahzer
Shamoon and respondent No.5, Mrs. Claventina Burdge is concerned, from
record it appears that they have not been implicated directly for having
committed the offence which may attract the provision of section 354-A PPC,
whereas, the allegation regarding their common intention to commit offence
under Section 354-A PPC requires further inquiry, and can only be established
after recording of evidence. Therefore, keeping in view the above
circumstances, they may be treated on bail under Section 354-A PPC till
recording of evidence of the complainant and at least six prosecution
witnesses. However, if at all, after recording of the evidence of these
witnesses, some material is brought on record which may connect these accused
persons with an offence falling under Section 354-A PPC, the applicant shall be
at liberty to move an application to the Court for cancellation of bail, which
shall be disposed off on the basis of evidence and the material, strictly in
accordance with law. Trial Court is directed to record the statement of
complainant and at least six prosecution witnesses within a period of two
months from the date of this order. It is clarified that observations made
hereinabove are tentative in nature and the trial Court shall not be influenced
by any such observation while examining the merits of the case.
21. Now I would refer to the role of accused
namely, Zafar Iqbal and Geroge Bhatti,
as per contents of the FIR the allegations against these two accused persons
are as follows; Zafar Iqbal took my
shirt (qamiz) upwards and George Bhatti pulled down my shalwar, I begged George
Bhatti to have pity on me for the sake of your own daughter Lubna. He said you
could not be my daughter I will make you fully naked. Then they started hitting
my sensitive organs and naked legs.” From
perusal of the press conference of the complainant published in a large numbers
of daily newspapers on 13th April 2005 including Roznama
Nawa-i-Waqt, Roznama Express, Roznama Aghaz, Roznama Jasarat, and Roznama Awam,
similar allegations against these two accused persons find mention. Statement
of eye-witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C, particularly statement of Rukhsana Nasim, Shamsunnisa, Surraya
Anthony, Zrish Aziz, Zarafshan Haroon, Shumaila Afroze, Saba Younus and Dalsy
Johan also support the version of the complainant in this regard. The two
inquiry reports conducted by superior police officials suggest that on the
fateful date the incident took place and FIR was required to be registered,
however, reason best known to the police such, FIR was registered only after
directions of this Court in C.P.No.D-1289 of 2005. Inspite of the fact that the
FIR No.169/2005 contained section 354-A PPC, none of the accused nominated
therein was arrested. Various proceedings were filed by the accused persons
before the trial Court as well as before this Court in the shape of either protective
bail, or bail before arrest. I am of the view that there is sufficient material
against the above two accused persons, which connects them with the commission
of the alleged offence falling under Section 354-A PPC, which suggest that the
above two accused persons assaulted the complainant, used criminal force against her, and striped her
of her clothes and, in that condition exposed her to the public view. The
plea of the accused persons regarding enmity and counter version requires
detailed inquiry and recording of evidence which exercise cannot be taken at
bail stage, whereas only tentative assessment of the material available on
record is to be made at the time of considering bail to the applicant. It may
be further observed that the trial Court while confirming pre-arrest bail of
the above named accused persons has mis-directed itself that Section 354-A PPC
has been substituted by Section 354 PPC. Similarly, learned trial Court has
erred in law and fact while dismissing the application of the applicant seeking
cancellation of bail by observing that the
order passed on 4.1.2006 clearly shows that the accused were also granted the
bail under section 354-A PPC but the said order has not been challenged at any
forum thereafter the complainant remained silent and after about one year filed
the present application.
22. It may not be out of place to observe that
the parameters for grant of pre-arrest bail are different from the parameters
for grant of post-arrest bail. Reference in this regard can be made to the case
of Muhammad Safdar v. The State 1983
SCMR 645, Muhammad Azam v. The State 1996 SCMR 71 and Rana Muhammad Irshad v.
Muhammad Rafique & another PLD 2009 SC 427.
In the case of Muhammad Safdar and others vs. The State
1983 SCMR 645, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding a case pertaining
to bail before arrest has held that bail
before arrest is not the rule in cognizable offences, and is to be allowed only
when it can be shown that the petitioner apprehends arrest due to some ulterior
motive on the part of the authorities or other influential persons or there are
some peculiar features of the case which would justify the exercise of this
discretionary power by the High Court or Sessions Court.
In the case of Muhammad Azam v. The State 1996 SCMR 71,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the
right of pre-arrest bail is limited to exceptional and rare cases which are
based on malafide/enmity or where no offence is shown to have been committed on
the bare reading of FIR.
In the case of Rana Muhammad Irshad v. Muhammad Rafique
& another PLD 2009 SC 427, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has given the
framework within which and the guidelines according to which, the jurisdiction
vesting in the High Courts and the Courts of Session, is to be exercised in the
following manner:-
“For the reasons given above, the reply which I would give
to the question referred to us is that, in a proper case, the High Court has
power under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code, to make an order that a
person who is suspected of an offence for which he may be arrested by a Police
Officer or a Court, shall be admitted to bail. The exercise of this power
should, however, be confined to cases in which, not only is good prima facie
ground made out for the grant of bail in respect of the offence alleged, but
also it should be shown that if the petitioner were to be arrested and refused
bail, such an order would, in all probability, be made not from motives of
furthering the ends of justice in relation to the case, but from some ulterior
motive, and with the object of injuring the petitioner, or that the petitioner
would in such an eventuality suffer irreparable harm.
Ever since then, the said interpretation so made, the said
powers so found and the parameters so prescribed, have been regularly and
repeatedly coming up for scrutiny by the Superior Courts including this Court.
But each time the matter was re-examined, the same was only re-affirmed. The
said concept as it was initially propounded; as it developed and as the same
stands today, may be summarized for the benefit of us all as under:--
(a) grant
of bail before arrest is an extraordinary relief to be granted only in
extraordinary situations to protect innocent persons against victimization
through abuse of law for ulterior motives;
(b) pre-arrest
bail is not to be used as a substitute or as an alternative for post-arrest
bail;
(c) bail
before arrest can not be granted unless the person seeking it satisfies the
conditions specified through subsection (2) of section 497 of Code of Criminal
Procedure i.e. unless he establishes the existence of reasonable grounds
leading to a belief that he was not guilty of the offence alleged against him
and that there were, in fact, sufficient grounds warranting further inquiry
into his guilt;
(d) not
just this but in addition thereto, he must also show that his arrest was being
sought for ulterior motive, particularly on the part of the police; to cause
irreparable humiliation to him and to disagree and dishonour him;
(e) such
a petitioner should further establish that he had not done or suffered any act
which would disentitle him to a discretionary relief in equity e.g. he had no
past criminal record or that he had not been a fugitive at law; and finally
that;
(f) in
the absence of a reasonable and a justifiable cause, a person desiring his
admission to bail before arrest, must, in the first instance approach the Court
of first instant i.e. the Court of Session, before petitioning the High Court
for the purpose.”
23. Scrutiny of the case law relied upon
by the learned counsel for the respondents accused reveals that all most all
the cited cases relate to bail after arrest and do not contain the offence
falling under Section 354-A PPC. The facts of this case are also
distinguishable from the facts of the cited case-laws. This is not a case of
counter FIRs or two version of parties, arising from the same incident i.e. one
given by the complainant in FIR and the other given by the opposite party. FIR
No.169/2005 has been registered at the instance of the complainant Ghazala
Parveen against the accused persons nominated therein, whereas no counter FIR
has been registered by such accused persons against the applicant/complainant.
FIR No.44/2005 was got registered on 13.04.2005 by Constable Naureen against
the applicant after two days of the alleged incident, whereas FIR No.78/2005
was lodged by the State on 27.6.2005 pursuant to an inquiry conducted by the
police officials at the direction of CCPO, Karachi. From perusal of the
impugned order it is seen that the same is based on misconceived fact that the
accused persons have already been granted bail under Section 354-A PPC. For
this reason alone, the impugned order passed by the trial Court by ignoring the
material facts and without discussing the merits of the case is not sustainable
in law. Accordingly, the case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the
respondents/accused mostly relates to post-arrest bail and its cancellation
hence, the same is of no assistance to the learned counsel for the respondents.
24. In view of hereinabove facts, I am of the
opinion that the above named two accused persons namely, Zafar Iqbal and Geroge Bhatti were not entitled to concession of
pre-arrest bail. The application moved by the applicant seeking cancellation of
bail under the circumstances against above accused persons was justified in law
and facts. Accordingly, the impugned order rejecting the application seeking
cancellation of bail in respect of accused namely Zafar Iqbal and George Bhatti
is hereby set-aside, and they will not be treated on bail under Section 354-A
PPC. The above Criminal Revision Applications are disposed of in the above
terms.
25. While parting with this judgment, it is
noted with discomfort that no progress whatsoever has been made in the criminal
case pending before the trial Court emanating from FIR No.169/2005 as well as
cases emanating from FIR No.44/2005 and 87/2005. No evidence has been recorded
so far and even the statement of complainant has not yet been recorded. The
multiplicity of proceedings initiated in this case may not hamper the smooth
prosecution of the case by the trial Court. Accordingly, learned trial Court is
directed to proceed with all the pending cases emanating from three F.I.Rs as
mentioned hereinabove expeditiously and conclude the trial preferably within a
period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. It is expected
that both the parties will cooperate in the early disposal of the cases pending
before the trial Court, whereas no delay whatsoever shall be caused by them in
this regard.
JUDGE