IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

 

 

H.C.A. No.29 OF 2007

[ M/s. Nidera Handelscompagine & another, v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd ]

 

 

 

 

 

PRESENT:

            Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan

                                     Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito        

 

 

Appellants                             :           Through M/s. Abbas Rasheed Rizvi and

Nabeel Ahmed Khan, Advocates.

 

Respondent                           :           Through Ms. Nazia Hanjrah, Advocate

 

Date of hearing                     :           03.11.2026

 

Date of Judgment                 :           17.11.2026

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN J;                   This High Court Appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 is directed against the Judgment dated 12.01.2007 and Decree dated 02.02.2007 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Suit No.588 of 1991, whereby the suit respondent/plaintiff was decreed to the extent that no binding contract was concluded between the parties. The appellants/defendants pray that the judgment and decree be set aside and the suit dismissed with costs.

2.         Briefly, the facts giving rise to the present Appeal are that the Respondent, Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited (“TCP”), invited tenders on 19.02.1991 for the purchase of 26,000 metric tons of Soyabean Oil on C&F Karachi basis against deferred payment. Appellant No.1, M/s. Nidera Handelscompagnie B.V., through its local agent, Appellant No.2, M/s. Sunflower Enterprises, offered to supply Soyabean Oil at the rate of US$562.50 per metric ton, which offer was accepted by the Respondent through telex dated 10.03.1991, subject to submission of an acceptable performance bond and execution of a formal contract, whereafter a letter of credit was to be opened. Although the Appellants submitted a signed contract and performance guarantee, the Respondent declined to execute the contract on the ground that the guarantee was not in accordance with the prescribed proforma, particularly due to an additional stipulation limiting its validity to 15.08.1991, and consequently withdrew its acceptance on 31.03.1991. The Appellants disputed such withdrawal, asserting that a binding contract had already been concluded, and invoked arbitration before the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations (“FOSFA”), London. The Respondent instituted Suit No.588 of 1991 seeking to restrain the arbitration proceedings or, alternatively, a declaration that no binding contract had been concluded between the parties. Its application for interim injunction was dismissed on 22.10.1996, which order was maintained in HCA No.187 of 1996 on 04.05.1998, with the observation that the outcome of arbitration would abide the result of the suit. The Respondent's petition for leave to appeal was subsequently dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 18.11.1998. Meanwhile, the arbitration proceedings culminated in an award dated 10.09.1999 in favour of Appellant No.1 for US$1,832,250, together with interest and costs, for enforcement whereof Suit No.1517 of 2000 was instituted. Upon recording evidence and hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge, through the impugned judgment dated 12.01.2007, held that execution of a formal contract and submission of a performance guarantee in the prescribed form were essential requirements which had not been fulfilled and, therefore, no binding contract had come into existence between the parties and the arbitration clause could not be invoked. Consequently, the suit was decreed to the extent of declaring that no binding contract had been concluded between the parties, giving rise to the present Appeal.

3.         Learned counsel for the Appellants, while assailing the impugned judgment and decree, contends that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that no binding contract had been concluded between the parties despite the Respondent's acceptance of the Appellants' offer through telex dated 10.03.1991. He submits that the requirements relating to execution of a formal contract, furnishing of a performance bond and opening of a letter of credit pertained to performance of contractual obligations and did not constitute conditions precedent to the formation of a binding contract. According to him, the acceptance of the tender, receipt of the performance guarantee, return of the bid bond, appointment of a pre-shipment inspection agency and other steps taken by the Respondent established that a concluded and enforceable contract had come into existence between the parties. He further contends that the learned Single Judge failed to distinguish between formation of a contract and performance of obligations arising thereunder and erroneously treated the absence of a formally executed agreement as decisive. It is further argued that the suit was not maintainable in view of Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as the declaration sought by the Respondent was, in substance, intended to defeat the arbitration agreement, for which the law provides a specific remedy. He also submits that the declaration granted was beyond the scope of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the legal effect of the earlier judicial orders permitting arbitration to proceed and the subsequent FOSFA award dated 10.09.1999 in favour of Appellant No.1, which, according to him, rendered the suit infructuous. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge improperly relied upon the testimony of the Respondent's Deputy Manager, who allegedly lacked authority to depose on its behalf, and failed to appreciate the documentary evidence and conduct of the parties in their proper perspective. Lastly he prays that the impugned judgment and decree be set aside and the Respondent's suit dismissed with costs. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliance upon M/s. Jamal Jute Baling & Co. v. M/s. M. Sarkies & Sons [PLD 1971 SC 784], Nan Fong Textiles Ltd. v. Pir Muhammad Shamsuddin [PLD 1979 Karachi 762], Meridech Jones & Co. Ltd. v. Quetta Textile Mills Ltd. [2002 CLD 1195], Port Qasim Authority v. Al-Ghurair Group of Companies [PLD 1997 Karachi 636], Badri Narayan Agarwala v. Pak Jute Baled Ltd. [PLD 1970 SC 43], Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another  [1992 SCMR 65), Cantonment Board Peshawar v. RACO Advertisers [2023 SCMR 2075] and Haji Shinkai v. Abdul Shakoor [2024 SCMR 344].

4.         Learned counsel for the Respondent, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree, contends that the learned Single Judge rightly held that no binding contract had been concluded between the parties. She submits that the dispute relates to an alleged foreign arbitration agreement and, therefore, is governed by the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, rather than the Arbitration Act, 1940, rendering Section 32 of the latter Act inapplicable. She further submits that the Appellants neither invoked Section 3 of the 1937 Act seeking stay of the suit proceedings nor raised any objection to the jurisdiction of this Court in their written statements, but instead participated in the trial and led evidence, thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court and forfeiting their right to subsequently question the maintainability of the suit. It is further contended that the dispute concerns the very existence of a concluded contract, which cannot be determined by invoking an arbitration clause contained in the disputed agreement. On merits, she submits that the acceptance communicated through telex dated 10.03.1991 was expressly conditional upon execution of a formal contract and submission of an acceptable performance bond in the prescribed proforma. The Appellants, however, unilaterally altered the terms of the performance guarantee by inserting a stipulation limiting its validity to 15.08.1991, contrary to the prescribed requirements and without the Respondent's consent. Consequently, the Respondent was justified in withdrawing its conditional acceptance through telex dated 31.03.1991. She maintains that, since the formal contract was admittedly never executed and the stipulated performance guarantee was not furnished, the essential conditions for formation of a binding agreement remained unfulfilled. She further submits that the earlier judgment dated 04.05.1998 passed in HCA No.187 of 1996 recognized the distinction between a challenge to the underlying contract and a challenge to the arbitration agreement, and expressly observed that the outcome of arbitration would abide the result of the suit. The said judgment was subsequently left undisturbed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court through its order dated 18.11.1998 refusing leave to appeal. She accordingly prays that the Appeal be dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree maintained. In support of her submissions, learned counsel places reliance upon Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Messrs Pak Sud Dry Cleaners [PLD 1981 SC 593], Lahore Stock Exchange v. Frederick J. Whyte Group (Pakistan) Limited [PLD 1990 SC 48], and the judgment dated 04.05.1998 passed in HCA No.187 of 1996, besides referring to the principles discussed in Chitty on Contracts (24th Edition) and Treitel, The Law of Contract.

5.         We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the impugned judgment, the material available on record and the authorities cited at the Bar. The controversy essentially concerns whether the communication dated 10.03.1991 resulted in a concluded and binding contract, notwithstanding the requirements of a formal agreement and an acceptable performance guarantee. The objections concerning maintainability of the suit, the effect of the earlier judicial orders and the subsequent foreign arbitral award also require consideration.

6.         In view of the rival submissions, the following questions arise for determination:

(i) Whether the Respondent's suit challenging the existence of a binding contract was maintainable, having regard to the applicable arbitration law and the earlier proceedings between the parties;

(ii) Whether the acceptance communicated through telex dated 10.03.1991 constituted a concluded contract or was conditional upon execution of a formal agreement and submission of an acceptable performance guarantee; and

(iii) Whether the subsequent FOSFA award dated 10.09.1999 rendered the suit infructuous or otherwise affected the relief granted by the learned Single Judge.

 

7.         We shall first examine the objection concerning maintainability of the suit. The Appellants contend that the Respondent, by seeking a declaration that no binding contract existed and consequently that arbitration could not proceed, was in substance challenging the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement, for which Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 provide a special remedy. The Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the proceedings concerned a foreign arbitration agreement governed by the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (“the 1937 Act”), and that the Appellants, having contested the suit without seeking a stay under Section 3 thereof, cannot now question its maintainability.

8.         Section 3 of the 1937 Act provides a mechanism for staying judicial proceedings instituted in respect of matters covered by an arbitration agreement falling within the statutory framework. An application for such stay is required to be made after appearance but before filing a written statement or taking other steps in the proceedings. The provision, however, does not declare that the mere existence of an arbitration agreement extinguishes the jurisdiction of the civil court. Rather, it contemplates judicial proceedings being stayed upon an application made at the prescribed stage, subject to satisfaction of the statutory conditions.

9.         In the present case, the Appellants filed their written statements, contested the proceedings and participated in the recording of evidence. No application seeking stay of the suit under Section 3 of the 1937 Act has been shown to have been filed. The principle governing submission to the jurisdiction of the Court, as discussed in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (supra), is relevant to this extent. Participation in the proceedings may disentitle a party from subsequently insisting upon a statutory stay in favour of arbitration. Nevertheless, such participation does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction where the law expressly excludes it. The distinction is material because the Appellants' objection is not confined to the absence of a stay; they also contend that the declaration sought was prohibited by the statutory scheme governing arbitration.

10.       The question, therefore, is whether the suit, as framed, was directed merely against the arbitration agreement or challenged the existence of the underlying commercial contract. This distinction was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the earlier proceedings between the same parties, reported as Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. M/s. Nidera Handelscompagnie B.V. and another [1998 CLC 1610]. The Division Bench recognized that a suit challenging the underlying contract, in which an arbitration clause is incidentally contained, stands on a different footing from proceedings directed exclusively against the arbitration agreement. It further held that such a suit would not, merely by its institution, justify restraining arbitration at the interlocutory stage. Accordingly, while declining interim injunction, the Division Bench expressly provided that the outcome of arbitration would abide the result of the suit.

11.       The aforesaid judgment is of particular significance, as it arose from the same suit and concerned the identical contractual controversy. Although the observations were made while determining an interlocutory appeal and did not finally adjudicate the existence of the contract, the distinction drawn between the underlying contract and the arbitration agreement was material to the decision. The subsequent refusal of leave by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 18.11.1998 left the interlocutory order undisturbed, but cannot be construed as a final determination of the substantive contractual rights of the parties. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, required to decide the suit on the evidence without treating the earlier interlocutory proceedings as having conclusively established either the existence or non-existence of the contract.

12.       The reliance placed by learned counsel for the Appellants upon Badri Narayan Agarwala (supra), Awan Industries (supra), Cantonment Board Peshawar (supra) and Haji Shinkai (supra), in support of the special statutory procedure governing arbitration, does not dispense with the necessity of examining the substance of the relief claimed. The Respondent's suit was founded upon the assertion that the essential requirements for formation of the commercial contract had never been fulfilled. The relief concerning arbitration was consequential to that assertion. In these circumstances, and having regard particularly to the earlier Division Bench judgment between the same parties, we are not persuaded that the learned Single Judge committed any jurisdictional error in entertaining the suit and determining whether a binding contract had come into existence.

13.       The objection under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, must likewise be examined in the context of the relief actually sought. The Respondent was not seeking an abstract opinion concerning a commercial transaction. It asserted that the Appellants were claiming contractual rights against it, including a right to recover damages through arbitration, although, according to the Respondent, no enforceable contractual relationship had arisen. The declaration sought was thus directed towards the existence of the legal relationship upon which those claims were founded. While Section 42 does not authorize declarations divorced from an enforceable legal character or right, the present dispute concerned the parties' asserted contractual rights and liabilities. The objection to the form of relief, therefore, does not furnish sufficient ground for setting aside the impugned judgment.

14.       Turning to the merits, the central question is whether the acceptance communicated by the Respondent through telex dated 10.03.1991 was absolute and unqualified within the meaning of the Contract Act, 1872, or whether the parties intended that no binding contract would arise until the stipulated formalities had been fulfilled. Under Sections 2, 7 and 10 of the Contract Act, the formation of an enforceable agreement depends upon acceptance of the offer and satisfaction of the legal requirements governing contractual consent. The law does not invariably require a formal written instrument to establish a binding contract. Equally, where the parties have expressly made execution of a formal document or fulfillment of a specified requirement a condition precedent to contractual formation, such intention cannot be disregarded merely because the principal commercial terms have been agreed upon.

15.       In M/s. Jamal Jute Baling & Co. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognized that an agreement reduced into writing and accepted and acted upon by the parties may be enforceable notwithstanding the absence of a signature by one of them. The decision, however, proceeded upon proof that the parties had accepted the contractual terms and partially performed the agreement. It does not lay down an inflexible rule that a formal contract is unnecessary even where its execution has expressly been stipulated as a condition for concluding the transaction. The applicability of that principle must, therefore, be determined with reference to the actual terms and conduct of the parties in the present case.

16.       The telex dated 10.03.1991 is the principal document upon which the Appellants rely to establish acceptance of their offer. Apart from communicating acceptance of the tender, it required the Appellants to furnish a performance bond, formalize the contract immediately and provided that the letter of credit would be opened only upon receipt of the formal contract and an acceptable performance bond. These stipulations must be read together with the tender conditions and the subsequent correspondence. The learned Single Judge found that the contractual arrangement contemplated execution of a formal agreement following submission and acceptance of the performance guarantee, with the letter of credit to be established thereafter. The question is whether this sequence merely regulated performance of an already concluded contract or reflected the parties' intention that the transaction would not become binding until the stipulated requirements were fulfilled.

17.       The evidence recorded by the learned Single Judge establishes that the Respondent never signed the formal contract and that the performance guarantee furnished by the Appellants departed from the prescribed proforma. In particular, the guarantee contained an additional stipulation limiting its validity to 15.08.1991, whichever was earlier, whereas the prescribed guarantee required its continuance for the stipulated period following completion of discharge. This was not merely a variation in language. The additional stipulation was capable of curtailing the period for which the issuing bank remained liable, irrespective of whether discharge of the contracted goods had been completed within the contemplated period. The Respondent was consequently entitled to insist upon compliance with the prescribed form, unless the variation had been accepted or waived by it.

18.       The Appellants maintain that the guarantee remained valid for a period sufficient to cover the contemplated shipment and discharge and that the issuing bank had undertaken to extend its validity if required. However, the relevant consideration is not merely whether the altered guarantee might have afforded adequate commercial protection in ordinary circumstances. The question is whether it satisfied the requirement expressly stipulated by the Respondent. The existence of a provision permitting extension of the guarantee did not necessarily neutralize the additional expiry stipulation, particularly when no acceptance of that alteration by the Respondent was established. The learned Single Judge, therefore, did not err in treating the departure from the prescribed proforma as material to the question of contractual formation.

19.       The Appellants have also relied upon the return of the bid bond, receipt of the performance guarantee, appointment of a pre-shipment inspection agency and other preparatory steps undertaken by the Respondent. These circumstances undoubtedly required consideration and could not be disregarded merely because the formal contract remained unsigned. The learned Single Judge examined this aspect of the evidence and referred to the explanation furnished by the Respondent's witness that such steps were undertaken in good faith as part of the ordinary preparatory arrangements. The evidence does not establish that the Respondent accepted the altered guarantee or waived the requirement of formal execution. Preparatory acts consistent with an anticipated contractual arrangement cannot, without more, establish final assent where the parties have expressly stipulated further requirements for concluding the transaction.

20.       We are conscious that the mere use of the expression “formal contract” does not invariably make execution of that document a condition precedent to formation of an agreement. Much depends upon the language employed, the commercial context and the objectively ascertainable intention of the parties. In the present case, however, the stipulations concerning formal execution and an acceptable performance guarantee were expressly incorporated in the acceptance communication, and the subsequent conduct did not establish that those requirements had been waived or satisfied. The learned Single Judge's conclusion was thus not founded solely upon the absence of signatures but upon the cumulative effect of the contractual terms, the altered guarantee and the evidence concerning the parties' conduct. We find no sufficient ground to interfere with that conclusion.

21.       The reliance placed by learned counsel for the Appellants upon Nan Fong Textiles Ltd. (supra), Meridech Jones & Co. Ltd. (supra) and Port Qasim Authority (supra) does not advance their case in the absence of proof that the Respondent had finally assented to the contractual terms notwithstanding the express requirements contained in its acceptance communication. The principle that a contract may arise from correspondence and conduct is not disputed. Its application, however, depends upon the intention disclosed by the particular transaction. Likewise, Lahore Stock Exchange (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the Respondent, does not establish that every dispute concerning the validity of a contract must necessarily be excluded from arbitration. The scope of an arbitration clause and the existence of an agreement binding the parties are distinct considerations. In the present matter, the finding that no binding contract was concluded rests upon the contractual documents and evidence, rather than upon any general proposition that disputes concerning contractual validity are incapable of arbitration.

22.       The Appellants' contention that the Respondent withdrew its acceptance because of a decline in the international price of Soyabean Oil was also considered by the learned Single Judge. Under Issue No.4, the learned Single Judge observed that no independent evidence had been produced to establish the alleged fall in prices or its effect upon the Respondent's decision. Although the issue was treated as having become redundant in view of the finding on Issue No.1, the Appellants have not demonstrated that the allegation was established through reliable evidence. Even otherwise, a possible commercial motive, without proof of final contractual assent, cannot substitute for the legal requirements governing formation of a binding agreement. We, therefore, find no reason to disturb the conclusion reached on this aspect.

23.       The objection concerning the authority of the Respondent's Deputy Manager, Zahid Ahmed, to depose on its behalf is equally without substance in the circumstances of the case. The learned Single Judge recorded that the objection was not founded upon the pleadings and that no corresponding issue had been framed. It is settled that parties are ordinarily confined to the case set up in their pleadings and cannot introduce an altogether new factual controversy through evidence. Moreover, the authority to institute or prosecute proceedings on behalf of a company is distinguishable from the competency of a witness to testify concerning facts within his knowledge. The absence of a power of attorney, by itself, does not render the testimony of an otherwise competent witness inadmissible. The Appellants have not demonstrated that the material findings of the learned Single Judge depended upon evidence which was legally inadmissible or that the alleged deficiency caused any prejudice affecting the decision of the suit.

24.       This brings us to the effect of the FOSFA award dated 10.09.1999. The Appellants contend that, since the arbitral proceedings culminated in an award in their favour, the Respondent's suit had become infructuous. We are unable to accept this contention. The earlier Division Bench, while permitting arbitration to proceed, expressly provided that its outcome would abide the result of the suit. The object of that direction was to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending adjudication of the underlying contractual dispute. The subsequent pronouncement of an arbitral award, therefore, did not, by itself, extinguish the controversy pending before the learned Single Judge. To hold otherwise would render the earlier direction ineffective and permit the subsequent arbitral proceedings to determine the fate of a suit which had expressly been allowed to proceed to trial.

25.       It is also material that the Appellants instituted Suit No.1517 of 2000 seeking enforcement of the foreign arbitral award under the 1937 Act. The existence of those proceedings does not establish that the award had acquired the status of an enforceable decree in Pakistan. Recognition and enforcement of a foreign award are governed by the applicable statutory requirements and grounds of refusal. The award in question was made on 10.09.1999, and the proceedings for its enforcement must be considered under the statutory regime applicable to that award, including the relevant saving provisions following enactment of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011. The present Appeal, however, arises from the declaratory decree in Suit No.588 of 1991 and not from any final adjudication of the enforcement proceedings. We, therefore, refrain from recording any independent finding upon the enforceability of the award or the ultimate entitlement of either party in Suit No.1517 of 2000, which shall be determined in accordance with law, having regard to the findings in the present judgment.

26.       Upon an overall examination of the impugned judgment, the evidence discussed therein and the rival submissions, we find that the learned Single Judge correctly identified the decisive issue, namely, whether the acceptance communicated through telex dated 10.03.1991 resulted in a concluded contract notwithstanding the stipulated requirements of formal execution and an acceptable performance guarantee. The learned Single Judge examined the relevant correspondence, the altered guarantee and the evidence concerning the conduct of the parties before concluding that the essential requirements for formation of a binding contract had not been fulfilled. The Appellants have not demonstrated any material misreading or non-reading of evidence, disregard of an applicable legal principle or jurisdictional defect warranting interference in appeal. The authorities cited on their behalf recognize that a contract may be concluded without formal execution, but do not dispense with the requirement of establishing final and unconditional assent in the circumstances of the particular transaction.

27.       In view of the foregoing discussion, the questions formulated in paragraph 6 are answered as follows; (i) the Respondent's suit was maintainable, as it challenged the existence of the underlying contract, and the Appellants had contested the proceedings without seeking a stay under Section 3 of the 1937 Act. (ii) the acceptance communicated through telex dated 10.03.1991 did not result in a concluded and binding contract, as the stipulated requirements of executing a formal agreement and furnishing an acceptable performance guarantee remained unfulfilled and (iii) the subsequent FOSFA award dated 10.09.1999 did not render the suit infructuous, particularly in view of the earlier judicial direction that the outcome of arbitration would abide the result of the suit. The question of enforcement of the award shall be determined independently in Suit No.1517 of 2000 in accordance with the applicable law.

28.       For the foregoing reasons, we find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment dated 12.01.2007 and decree dated 02.02.2007 warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the present High Court Appeal is dismissed, and the impugned judgment and decree are maintained. The parties shall bear their own costs. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of accordingly.

 

                                                                                                            JUDGE

JUDGE

Naveed PA