IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

 

H.C.A. No.08 of 2000

[ M/s. A. Meredith Jones & Co. Ltd., v. Quetta Textile Mills Limited ]

 

 

 

PRESENT:

            Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan

                                     Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito       

 

Appellant                               :           Through Mr. Khalid Javed, Advocate.

 

Respondent                           :           Through Mr. Jaam Zeeshan, Advocate

 

Date of hearing                     :           10.11.2026

 

Date of Judgment                 :           16.11.2026

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN J;                   This High Court Appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 10.09.1999, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Suit No.1585 of 1998, whereby the suit instituted by the Appellant/Plaintiff under Section 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award dated 14.12.1995, was dismissed with no order as to costs.

 

2.         Concisely stated, the facts leading to the present Appeal are that the Appellant, a company incorporated under the laws of England, instituted Suit No.1585 of 1998 under Section 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (“the Act, 1937”), seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award dated 14.12.1995, together with interest and costs. According to the Appellant, the parties entered into a contract dated 18.05.1994 through M/s. Universal Enterprises for the sale of approximately 375 metric tons of CIS raw cotton at US$0.82 per pound, which incorporated the Bye-laws and Rules of the Liverpool Cotton Association Limited (“LCA”), including an arbitration clause providing for resolution of disputes in Liverpool under English law. Upon disputes arising concerning performance of the contract and expiry/non-extension of the letter of credit, the Appellant invoked arbitration and nominated its arbitrator, while another arbitrator was appointed on behalf of the Respondent by the President of the LCA following the Respondent's refusal to nominate one on the ground that no arbitration agreement existed. The arbitrators rendered an award dated 14.12.1995 directing the Respondent to pay US$53,675.38 with interest, which, according to the Appellant, had become final and binding under the LCA Rules. The Respondent, resisted enforcement by denying acceptance of Contract No.7385 dated 18.05.1994 and asserting that the transaction was instead governed by its Order No.QTM/IMP/301/94 dated 20.05.1994 for 500 metric tons of cotton, which contained no arbitration clause and stipulated that, in the event of non-shipment, the contract would stand settled at par. It maintained that the said order was confirmed through the pro-forma invoice dated 24.05.1994 issued by the Appellant's local agent and was specifically referred to in the letter of credit opened on 16.06.1994, whereas the mere mention of Contract No.7385 on the pro-forma invoice did not constitute acceptance of its arbitration clause. The Respondent further denied membership of the LCA and maintained that it had expressly challenged the arbitrators' jurisdiction through its letter dated 30.01.1995. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 10.09.1999, dismissed the suit, principally holding that the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties had not been established for the purposes of enforcement of the foreign award under Section 7 of the Act, 1937.

3.         Learned counsel for the Appellant, while assailing the impugned judgment and decree, contends that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that no valid arbitration agreement existed between the parties, despite Contract No.7385 dated 18.05.1994 expressly incorporating, through Clause 15, the Bye-laws and Rules of the LCA, providing for arbitration in Liverpool under English law. He submits that the Respondent, having received and acted upon the pro-forma invoice dated 24.05.1994, which specifically referred to the said contract, was bound by its terms notwithstanding the absence of its signature thereon, as acceptance of a contract may also be established through conduct. It is further contended that the Respondent, through its letter dated 30.01.1995, while disputing the arbitrators' jurisdiction, nevertheless sought a favourable decision on merits in the event its preliminary objection was rejected, which, according to learned counsel, independently constituted submission to arbitration. He maintains that the arbitral tribunal was duly constituted under the LCA Rules and that the award dated 14.12.1995, having been duly stamped and not challenged through an appeal under Rule 345 of the LCA Rules, had attained finality. Learned counsel further argues that the learned Single Judge exceeded the limited scope of inquiry permissible under Section 7 of the Act, 1937, by re-examining the existence of the arbitration agreement, erroneously placing the burden of proof upon the Appellant and treating the Respondent's non-membership of the LCA as a ground for refusing enforcement, although such membership was not a prerequisite for incorporation of its arbitration rules. He further submits that the learned Single Judge misapplied the principles governing incorporation of onerous terms in standard-form documents, particularly those relating to dry-cleaning receipts and railway tickets, despite the express reference to Contract No.7385 in the pro-forma invoice. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliance upon A. Meredith Jones & Co. v. Crescent Board [1999 CLC 437] and Ralli Brothers & Coney Ltd. v. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. [1987 CLC 83], and accordingly prays that the impugned judgment and decree be set aside and the suit for enforcement of the foreign arbitral award be decreed with costs.

4.         Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree, contends that the learned Single Judge rightly declined enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in the absence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties, which is a prerequisite under Section 7(1)(a) of the Act, 1937. He submits that Contract No.7385 dated 18.05.1994, containing the arbitration clause, was merely an offer signed by the Appellant and was never accepted by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent issued Order No.QTM/IMP/301/94 dated 20.05.1994 for 500 metric tons of cotton, which constituted a counter-offer and was accepted through the pro-forma invoice dated 24.05.1994 issued by the Appellant's agent. The said order contained no arbitration clause, while the letter of credit dated 16.06.1994 also specifically referred to Order No.301. He maintains that the mere mention of Contract No.7385 on the pro-forma invoice did not incorporate its terms or bind the Respondent to arbitration. It is further contended that the Respondent had expressly disputed the arbitrators' jurisdiction through its letter dated 30.01.1995, and its conditional request for a decision on merits, made without prejudice to the jurisdictional objection, neither constituted consent to arbitration nor amounted to waiver of that objection. Learned counsel further submits that the Respondent's failure to challenge the award under Rule 345 of the LCA Rules did not preclude it from resisting enforcement under Section 7 of the Act, 1937, as the existence of a valid arbitration agreement is an independent jurisdictional requirement which the enforcing Court is competent to examine. He also maintains that the Respondent's alleged membership of the LCA was specifically denied and remained unproved, the burden of establishing the same resting upon the Appellant. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliance upon Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company [AIR 1985 SC 1156], Virgoz Oils and Fats Pte. Limited v. Faisal Exports (Pvt.) Limited [PLD 2026 Sindh 75], Marines Limited v. Aegus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1987 CLC 1299], Messrs Jugotekstil Impex v. Messrs Shams Textile Mills Ltd. [1990 MLD 857], Karachi Dock Labour Board v. Quality Builders Ltd. [PLD 2016 SC 121], SpaceCom International, LLC v. Wateen Telecom Limited [2025 CLD 241], Hakim Ali v. Muhammad Salim [1992 SCMR 46], Messrs Shalsons Fisheries Ltd. v. Messrs Lohmann & Co. [PLD 1982 Karachi 76] and Mst. Nazeeran v. Ali Bux [2024 SCMR 1271]. He distinguishes the authorities relied upon by the Appellant on the ground that the existence of the underlying contract or LCA membership was admitted in those cases, whereas both are disputed in the present matter. He accordingly prays that the Appeal be dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree be maintained.

5.         We have heard learned counsel for the parties, examined the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.09.1999, and considered the material available on record in the light of their respective submissions. The controversy essentially concerns the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and the enforceability of the foreign arbitral award dated 14.12.1995 under the Act, 1937. The following questions arise for determination:

(i) Whether the Appellant established the existence of a valid arbitration agreement binding upon the Respondent under Contract No.7385 dated 18.05.1994, either through subsequent correspondence, conduct or otherwise?

(ii) Whether the Respondent's alleged membership of the LCA, or its participation in the arbitral proceedings under protest, constituted an independent basis for binding it to arbitration?

(iii) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in refusing enforcement of the foreign arbitral award dated 14.12.1995 under Section 7(1)(a) of the Act, 1937?

 

6.         Before examining the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of judicial scrutiny permissible under the Act, 1937. Section 7(1)(a) expressly provides that, for a foreign arbitral award to be enforceable, it must have been made pursuant to an arbitration agreement valid under the law governing such agreement. The remaining provisions prescribe additional conditions relating to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, conformity with the applicable procedural law, finality of the award and arbitrability of the dispute. Although the scope of interference with a foreign arbitral award is narrower than that available under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement remains a fundamental requirement which the enforcing Court is competent to examine when specifically disputed. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. (Supra), the Supreme Court of India, while examining the corresponding foreign-awards enforcement framework, recognized that questions concerning the existence, validity and scope of an arbitration agreement may initially be determined by the arbitrators, but their determination remains subject to judicial examination when enforcement is sought. The principle, though persuasive, is consistent with the express requirement of Section 7(1)(a) of the Act, 1937. Thus, the contention that the learned Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by examining the existence of an arbitration agreement merely because the arbitrators had already decided that question is without substance.

7.         The principal controversy is whether the Respondent had agreed to Clause 15 of Contract No.7385 dated 18.05.1994, which incorporated the Bye-laws and Rules of the LCA and provided for arbitration in Liverpool under English law. Admittedly, the said document was signed by the Appellant alone and provided for the sale of approximately 375 metric tons of CIS raw cotton. The Respondent, instead of accepting the said offer, issued its Order No.QTM/IMP/301/94 dated 20.05.1994 for the purchase of 500 metric tons of cotton on different terms, without any arbitration clause. The said order also contained a stipulation that, in the event of non-shipment for any reason, the contract would stand settled at par. The subsequent pro-forma invoice dated 24.05.1994, issued through the Appellant's local agent, and the letter of credit opened on 16.06.1994 are, therefore, material to determining which contractual terms were accepted by the parties.

8.         It is settled that an arbitration agreement need not necessarily be signed by both parties, provided their consensus to arbitrate is otherwise established through written correspondence or conduct. However, the absence of signatures does not dispense with the requirement of proving acceptance of the arbitration clause. The distinction between the existence of a commercial contract and an agreement to submit disputes arising therefrom to arbitration must be maintained. In the present case, the Appellant principally relies upon the reference to Contract No.7385 appearing on the pro-forma invoice dated 24.05.1994. Such reference, when considered alongside the Respondent's Order No.301 dated 20.05.1994, cannot by itself establish that the Respondent accepted all the terms of the earlier document, including Clause 15. The difference between the quantities specified in the respective documents, namely 375 metric tons in Contract No.7385 and 500 metric tons in Order No.301, is material. Furthermore, the letter of credit opened by the Respondent specifically referred to Order No.301. These circumstances support the finding of the learned Single Judge that the subsequent order and its acceptance through the pro-forma invoice constituted the basis of the concluded commercial transaction, without establishing incorporation of the arbitration clause contained in the earlier document.

9.         In Hakim Ali (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the enforceability of printed contractual conditions contained in an unsigned document and emphasized the necessity of establishing that the terms relied upon had been accepted by the party sought to be bound. Although that case arose in a different contractual setting, the underlying principle concerning acceptance of contractual terms is relevant. We are mindful that an arbitration clause contained in a standard commercial contract is not necessarily an unusual or onerous stipulation merely because it provides for arbitration. Nevertheless, where the very document containing the clause is disputed, the party relying upon it must establish that the clause formed part of the concluded agreement. The learned Single Judge's conclusion is sustainable on this broader principle of contractual consent, independently of any analogy drawn from railway tickets or other standard-form receipts.

10.       The reliance placed by learned counsel for the Appellant upon Ralli Brothers (supra) and A. Meredith Jones & Co. (supra) does not advance its case. The principle recognized in the former decision, as discussed in the impugned judgment, is that the absence of signatures does not necessarily invalidate an arbitration agreement where the requisite consensus is otherwise established. The latter decision was also considered by the learned Single Judge in the context of the contractual relationship and applicability of the LCA Rules. Neither authority dispenses with the necessity of establishing an agreement to arbitrate. In the present case, the Respondent consistently disputed acceptance of Contract No.7385, and the subsequent contractual documents do not sufficiently establish incorporation of its arbitration clause. The factual distinction is material, and the authorities relied upon by the Appellant do not warrant a contrary conclusion.

11.       The alternative contention that the Respondent was bound by the LCA Rules on account of its membership also requires consideration. The Appellant asserted that the parties were members of the LCA, whereas the Respondent specifically denied such membership. The learned Single Judge observed that no documentary evidence establishing the Respondent's membership had been produced and that the affidavit filed on behalf of the Appellant was silent on this aspect. The burden of establishing membership, where relied upon as an independent basis for binding the Respondent to arbitration, rested upon the Appellant. In the absence of supporting evidence, the learned Single Judge was justified in declining to accept that assertion. It must, however, be clarified that membership of the LCA is not an indispensable requirement where parties have otherwise validly agreed to arbitration under its Rules. The decisive consideration remains whether the Respondent was contractually bound to arbitrate, either through an express agreement incorporating the LCA Rules or through some other legally established basis. Neither has been demonstrated on the material available.

12.       The further contention that the Respondent submitted to arbitration by seeking a favourable decision on merits through its letter dated 30.01.1995 is equally unpersuasive. The said communication must be read as a whole rather than by isolating its concluding words. The Respondent expressly disputed the existence of an arbitration agreement and objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. Its request for a decision on merits was conditional upon rejection of that preliminary objection and was made without prejudice to its jurisdictional stance. Participation in proceedings while maintaining an express objection to jurisdiction cannot, by itself, be treated as unequivocal consent to arbitration or waiver of that objection. The Respondent's failure to nominate an arbitrator, resulting in an appointment by the President of the LCA, further supports its consistent objection to the arbitral forum.

13.       Nor does the Respondent's failure to challenge the award under Rule 345 of the LCA Rules preclude it from resisting enforcement under Section 7(1)(a) of the Act, 1937. Finality of an award in the country where it was made and the existence of a valid arbitration agreement are distinct statutory requirements. The former cannot, by itself, establish the latter. Accordingly, the fact that the award dated 14.12.1995 was duly stamped and no appeal was preferred under the LCA Rules does not dispense with the obligation to establish that the award was rendered pursuant to an arbitration agreement binding upon the Respondent. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, competent to examine this objection notwithstanding the award's asserted finality.

14.       We may also observe that the dispute concerning performance of the contract, opening or extension of the letter of credit, arrangements for inspection and shipment, and the alleged breaches attributed to either party relates to the merits of the underlying commercial transaction. Such matters would ordinarily fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal where a valid arbitration agreement exists. However, the present controversy concerns the anterior question whether the parties had agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration at all. Once that essential requirement is found wanting, the merits of the contractual dispute or the correctness of the arbitrators' assessment of damages do not require examination in these enforcement proceedings.

15.       Upon consideration of the impugned judgment, the rival contractual documents and the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, we find that the learned Single Judge correctly identified and determined the material controversy. The finding that Contract No.7385 dated 18.05.1994 had not been shown to constitute the binding agreement between the parties, insofar as its arbitration clause was concerned, is supported by the subsequent Order No.301 dated 20.05.1994, the pro-forma invoice dated 24.05.1994 and the letter of credit dated 16.06.1994. The Appellant has also failed to establish any independent basis arising from LCA membership or subsequent submission to arbitration. Consequently, the essential condition prescribed under Section 7(1)(a) of the Act, 1937 has not been satisfied.

16.       In view of the foregoing discussion, Questions Nos.(i) and (ii) are answered against the Appellant, while Question No.(iii) is answered in the affirmative. We hold that the learned Single Judge committed no error of law or misreading of the material on record in declining enforcement of the foreign arbitral award dated 14.12.1995. The impugned judgment and decree dated 10.09.1999, therefore, call for no interference by this Court.

17.       Accordingly, the instant High Court Appeal is dismissed, along with all pending applications, if any, with no order as to costs. The impugned judgment and decree dated 10.09.1999, passed by the learned Single Judge in Suit No.1585 of 1998, are maintained.

 

                                                                                                            JUDGE

JUDGE

 

 

Naveed PA