IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

 

 

H.C.A. No.329 OF 1998

[ Premier Insurance Co. of Pakistan Ltd., v. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation &others ]

 

 

 

 

 

PRESENT:

            Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan

                                     Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito       

 

 

Appellant                               :           Through M/s. Mazhar Imtiaz Lari and

Syed Zeeshan Ali, Advocates.

 

Respondent No.1                  :           Through Mr. Shehroze Khan, Advocate

 

Respondents  No. 2&3        :           Nemo

 

Date of hearing                     :           29.10.2026

 

Date of Judgment                 :           11.11.2026

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN J;                   Through the instant High Court Appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the Appellant has assailed the judgment and decree dated 10.08.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Suit No.77 of 1966, whereby the suit filed by Respondent No.1 was decreed against the Appellant for Rs.35,00,000/- along with cost and interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of institution of the suit until realization, while the suit against Respondents No.2 and 3 was dismissed. The Appellant seeks setting aside of the impugned judgment and decree and dismissal of the suit.

2.         Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that M/s. United Oriental Steamship Company, a partnership firm and the original owner of vessel S.S. Ilyas Bakhsh, instituted a suit in March 1966 against the Appellant, Premier Insurance Company of Pakistan Limited, seeking recovery of Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest on account of the alleged loss of the vessel. The vessel was already insured under a Marine Hull Policy dated 01.03.1965, containing a Dual Valuation Clause stipulating Rs.15,00,000/- for actual or constructive total loss and Rs.40,00,000/- for other purposes. On 02.09.1965, the original plaintiff requested additional insurance cover against war risks, followed by further correspondence and payment towards premium. However, on 07.09.1965, the Appellant communicated cancellation of war risk covers, subject to their renewal on revised terms and premium. Meanwhile, following the outbreak of war between Pakistan and India on 06.09.1965, the vessel, which was lying at Bombay for repairs, was seized/detained by the Indian authorities on 07.09.1965. Thereafter, through its letter dated 25.09.1965, the Appellant offered provisional war risk cover, subject to stipulated conditions, which was subsequently increased and finally confirmed at Rs.35,00,000/- through its letter dated 02.12.1965, for the period from 02.09.1965 to 20.09.1965. The original plaintiff, claiming that the vessel was insured against war risks for Rs.40,00,000/-, lodged an insurance claim and issued a notice of abandonment on 25.09.1965, which the Appellant declined on the grounds that no concluded contract of insurance existed and that mere impounding of the vessel did not constitute an insured loss. During the pendency of the suit, following the nationalization and subsequent statutory reorganization of the shipping business, the rights and proprietary interests of the original plaintiff ultimately vested in Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (Respondent No.1), which was substituted as plaintiff, whereas Pakistan Insurance Corporation and the Federation of Pakistan were also impleaded as defendants. The suit was initially decreed by the learned Single Judge on 07.02.1983 for Rs.15,00,000/- with interest at 6% per annum against the Appellant. However, in HCA. No.22 of 1983, this court vide judgment dated 31.10.1991, set aside the judgment and decree and remanded the matter for fresh determination of all issues, particularly the date on which the contract of war risk insurance was concluded, keeping in view the promulgation of the War Risk Insurance Ordinance, 1965 on 09.09.1965. Upon remand, the learned Single Judge, after reconsidering the evidence and correspondence exchanged between the parties, concluded that the vessel was covered against war risks prior to the promulgation of the said Ordinance for Rs.35,00,000/-, that its seizure constituted an insured loss and that the abandonment was valid. Consequently, by judgment and decree dated 10.08.1998, the suit was decreed against the Appellant for Rs.35,00,000/- along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of institution of the suit until realization, while the suit against the remaining defendants was dismissed. Being aggrieved, the Appellant has preferred the present appeal, challenging the findings regarding the existence of a concluded insurance contract, the validity of abandonment and the quantum of liability determined by the learned Single Judge.

3.         Learned counsel for the Appellant, while assailing the impugned judgment and decree, contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that under the Marine Hull Policy dated 01.03.1965 (Ex-DW-1/1), the insured value of the vessel for actual or constructive total loss was expressly limited to Rs.15,00,000/- under the Institute Dual Valuation Clause, and that the liability of the insurer could not exceed the insured value or the actual loss proved. He submitted that the provisional war risk cover communicated through letter dated 25.09.1965 was subject to the standard policy conditions and Institute War and Strike Clauses (Hulls-Time), under which constructive total loss arising from seizure, arrest, restraint or detention required continuous deprivation of the vessel for twelve months without likelihood of recovery, which Respondent No.1 failed to establish. He further argued that the vessel was merely detained by the Indian authorities under an administrative order (Ex-78/4) and was subsequently released pursuant to proceedings before the Bombay High Court, as reflected in the order dated 22.12.1966. According to learned counsel, the original plaintiff, by continuing to assert ownership, seeking release of the vessel through its letter dated 30.09.1965, obtaining further insurance in its own name on 28.10.1965 (Ex-10/23), issuing a second notice of abandonment on 09.03.1966 (Ex-24), and agreeing to arrange towage of the vessel to Karachi in the meeting dated 30.06.1966 (Ex-C.W.4), had effectively waived its earlier notice of abandonment dated 25.09.1965. He also referred to the evidence of Commander Mohammad Abdul Aziz (Ex-CW-2/5), indicating subsequent transfer of the vessel in 1970 and closure of its registry in 1972, to contend that the original owners continued exercising proprietary rights inconsistent with abandonment. Learned counsel further submitted that Respondent No.1 failed to establish the actual market value, age, purchase price or other particulars necessary to substantiate the claimed loss, notwithstanding which the learned Single Judge decreed the suit for Rs.35,00,000/-. He lastly contended that, following the promulgation of the War Risk Insurance Ordinance, 1965, the Appellant could undertake war risk insurance only as an agent of the Federal Government and, therefore, any liability arising under the statutory scheme could not independently be fastened upon the Appellant. He accordingly prayed that the impugned judgment and decree be set aside and the suit dismissed.

4.         Learned counsel for Respondent No.1, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree, contended that the correspondence exchanged between the parties from 02.09.1965 to 02.12.1965 conclusively established the existence of a binding contract of war risk insurance. He particularly referred to the Appellant's letter dated 02.12.1965 (Ex-41), whereby war risk cover for the vessel was expressly confirmed at Rs.35,00,000/- for the period from 02.09.1965 to 20.09.1965, subject to the standard marine policy conditions and Institute War and Strike Clauses. He further submitted that the oral and documentary evidence, particularly the testimonies of Khan Wajahat Jamil (P.W.-1) and Saleem Ahmed Aijazi (P.W.-2), established that the vessel was forcibly seized by the Indian authorities at Bombay during the Indo-Pak war in September 1965, thereby depriving its owners of possession and control. According to learned counsel, such seizure constituted an insured war risk, justifying the notice of abandonment dated 25.09.1965, particularly when there was no reasonable prospect of recovery of the vessel at the relevant time. He maintained that subsequent correspondence concerning the vessel or demands for settlement of the insurance claim neither invalidated nor amounted to waiver of the earlier abandonment. He further contended that the learned Single Judge, after examining the entire evidence and determining the recast issues, rightly concluded that the vessel was insured against war risks for Rs.35,00,000/- and that its seizure and abandonment entitled Respondent No.1 to recover the insured amount. He accordingly prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

5.         None is in attendance on behalf of Respondents No.2 and 3. However, written objections filed on behalf of Respondent No.2, Pakistan Insurance Corporation, are available on record, wherein the impugned judgment has been supported to the extent of dismissal of the suit against it. It has been contended that the disputed war risk insurance was neither obtained nor issued under the War Risk Insurance Ordinance, 1965 or the scheme framed thereunder, as the Ordinance came into force on 09.09.1965, whereas the learned Single Judge found that the insurance arrangement had commenced prior thereto. It has further been stated that no application under the statutory scheme was made, nor was any policy issued in the prescribed Form ‘C’. Reference has also been made to the statement of counsel for the original plaintiff recorded during trial, acknowledging that the vessel was not insured under the Ordinance. It has accordingly been maintained that the Appellant had failed to establish having acted as an agent of the Federal Government and, therefore, the dismissal of the suit against Respondent No.2 calls for no interference.

6.         We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the impugned judgment, the documentary material referred to therein, the grounds of appeal and the relevant contractual provisions. The questions requiring determination are whether a binding contract of war risk insurance had been established, whether the detention or seizure of the vessel entitled Respondent No.1 to claim a total loss under the applicable contractual terms, and whether the evidence justified the decree for Rs.35,00,000/-.

7.         At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between the existence of insurance cover and the accrual of liability under that cover. The learned Single Judge placed considerable reliance upon the correspondence exchanged between the parties, particularly the Appellant's letters dated 25.09.1965 (Ex-10/14) and 02.12.1965 (Ex-41). The latter expressly confirmed war risk cover for Rs.35,00,000/- for the period from 02.09.1965 to 20.09.1965. These communications constitute material evidence against the Appellant's categorical denial of insurance coverage. Nevertheless, the confirmation of cover, particularly when expressed to be subject to standard policy conditions and the Institute War and Strike Clauses, cannot be construed independently of the terms governing the nature and extent of the insurer's liability. The insured amount represents the extent of the contractual cover and does not, merely by reason of the occurrence of an insured peril, become automatically payable as compensation for total loss.

8.         The earlier Division Bench, while remanding the matter through judgment dated 31.10.1991, specifically required determination of the date on which the contract of insurance was concluded, having regard to the promulgation of the War Risk Insurance Ordinance, 1965 on 09.09.1965. This direction was material because the legal consequences of a contract concluded before the Ordinance could differ from those of an arrangement subsequently entered into. The correspondence relied upon by the learned Single Judge establishes that negotiations commenced on 02.09.1965, but the initial request did not specify the amount of insurance, while the Appellant's endorsement made commencement of cover conditional upon confirmation from its London reinsurers. The subsequent communications also reveal cancellation of existing war risk covers on 07.09.1965 and negotiations concerning revised premiums and conditions. Although the letters dated 25.09.1965 and 02.12.1965 purported to provide cover for an earlier period, the retrospective commencement date stated therein is not necessarily identical to the date on which a binding agreement was concluded. The learned Single Judge, notwithstanding the earlier appellate direction, did not identify with sufficient precision the particular offer, acceptance and date establishing contractual consensus before 09.09.1965. The finding that insurance cover existed prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance, therefore, required a more specific examination of the contractual correspondence and the conditions attached thereto.

9.         The Appellant's further objection concerning the absence of a separately executed and stamped sea policy must, however, be considered in the light of Section 7 of the Stamp Act, 1899, read with its definition of a sea policy. The absence of a conventional formal policy does not, in every case, necessarily exclude consideration of written documents collectively constituting the contract, provided the statutory requirements are satisfied. The learned Single Judge relied upon Tricamji v. Verji Kanji (AIR 1923 Bombay 142) and Ahmed Shah v. Grindlay & Co. (AIR 1944 Sind 98) in this context. Nevertheless, the question whether the correspondence satisfies the statutory requirements is distinct from the question whether it establishes the precise contractual terms, including the extent of cover, the effective date and the conditions governing recovery. Even assuming, in favour of Respondent No.1, that the correspondence constituted a binding contract for war risk insurance, its entitlement to the decretal amount must independently be established.

10.       Turning to the nature of the occurrence, the evidence of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, read with the detention certificate dated 13.09.1965 (Ex-78/4), sufficiently establishes that the vessel was taken into custody by the Indian authorities at Bombay on 07.09.1965 during the hostilities between Pakistan and India. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, justified in rejecting the suggestion that the occurrence was wholly unconnected with the prevailing war. However, the mere characterization of the occurrence as seizure rather than impounding does not, by itself, determine whether the assured became entitled to recover the entire insured value. The legal consequences of such seizure must be determined by reference to the applicable insurance conditions and the nature and duration of the deprivation suffered.

11.       In this regard, the Institute War and Strikes Clauses (Hulls-Time) placed before us identify capture, seizure, arrest, restraint and detainment among the insured perils. Their detention provision also contemplates deprivation of the free disposal of the vessel for a continuous period of twelve months, or such shorter period as may be agreed, for the purpose of deeming the assured to have been deprived of possession without likelihood of recovery. However, the copy supplied bears the date 01.10.1983, whereas the insurance transaction in question occurred in September 1965. In the absence of proof that these particular clauses, or materially corresponding provisions, formed part of the contract then in force, their twelve-month requirement cannot automatically be applied to the present dispute. Equally, the general reference in the correspondence to Institute War and Strike Clauses cannot dispense with the necessity of identifying the terms actually incorporated into the contract. The learned Single Judge was required to examine the contractual conditions governing total loss and abandonment rather than determine the matter principally by reference to the ordinary meaning of seizure and abandonment.

12.       The question of abandonment also required consideration of the subsequent conduct of the original plaintiff. The notice dated 25.09.1965 was admittedly rejected by the Appellant. The subsequent notice dated 09.03.1966, the correspondence seeking release of the vessel, the continued assertion of ownership and the evidence concerning its eventual release and subsequent disposition were relevant circumstances for determining whether the original plaintiff had sustained a constructive total loss and whether its notice of abandonment remained legally effective. While steps taken to protect or preserve an insured vessel do not necessarily amount to waiver of abandonment, such conduct cannot be disregarded altogether. The learned Single Judge treated the subsequent notice as a mere continuation of the earlier abandonment and proceeded on the premise that, upon issuance of the first notice, responsibility for recovering the vessel had shifted to the Appellant. This conclusion assumes the very matter requiring determination, namely, whether the original plaintiff had acquired an enforceable right to abandon the vessel and claim payment for total loss under the applicable insurance conditions. A unilateral notice of abandonment does not, without satisfaction of the contractual and legal requirements, conclusively establish either a total loss or transfer of ownership to the insurer.

13.       Significantly, while deciding Issue No.7, the learned Single Judge expressly observed that no evidence was available on record to establish the actual value of the vessel. Notwithstanding this finding, the suit was decreed for Rs.35,00,000/- principally on the basis of the Appellant's letter dated 02.12.1965 confirming the amount of war risk cover. In our view, this approach does not adequately distinguish between the sum insured and the amount recoverable upon proof of an insured loss. The earlier Marine Hull Policy contained a Dual Valuation Clause specifying Rs.15,00,000/- for actual or constructive total loss. Whether that valuation governed the additional war risk cover depended upon the contractual terms, including the extent to which the original policy conditions were incorporated or modified by subsequent correspondence. The figure of Rs.15,00,000/- could not automatically be substituted for the later war risk cover of Rs.35,00,000/-; conversely, the latter figure could not automatically be treated as the amount payable for total loss without determining the nature of the insurance, the applicable valuation provisions and the loss established by the evidence. The learned Single Judge did not undertake this necessary exercise.

14.       The distinction is material because marine insurance is ordinarily a contract of indemnity, subject to the consequences of an agreed valuation and the particular terms of the policy. Where a valued policy governs, the agreed value may determine the measure of indemnity for a total loss, subject to the applicable law and contractual conditions. In an unvalued policy, the recoverable amount requires determination in accordance with the governing principles of indemnity. Accordingly, the absence of independent evidence of market value may not, in every case, defeat a claim under a valid valued policy. Nevertheless, before awarding the entire insured sum, the Court must determine whether the contract was valued or unvalued for the particular risk and whether the occurrence constituted an actual or constructive total loss within its terms. The impugned judgment does not satisfactorily resolve these questions.

15.       As regards the Appellant's contention that liability, if any, rested with the Federal Government under the War Risk Insurance Ordinance, 1965, the learned Single Judge recorded that no application under the statutory scheme or policy issued pursuant thereto had been established. The evidence also did not establish that the Appellant had issued the disputed cover in its capacity as an agent of the Federal Government. In these circumstances, the mere promulgation of the Ordinance cannot, without proof of the statutory basis of the particular insurance arrangement, justify shifting contractual liability to Respondents No.2 and 3. The dismissal of the suit against those Respondents, therefore, does not call for interference merely on the basis of the Appellant's assertion of governmental agency.

16.       Having examined the matter in its entirety, we find that the learned Single Judge proceeded from the establishment of war risk cover and the factum of seizure directly to the conclusion that Respondent No.1 was entitled to recover Rs.35,00,000/- as total loss. The intervening questions concerning the contractual conditions governing total loss, the legal effectiveness of abandonment, the consequences of subsequent recovery and dealings with the vessel, and the applicable measure of indemnity were not satisfactorily determined. These were not peripheral considerations but essential elements of the claim. The burden of establishing entitlement to the relief claimed rested upon the plaintiff, and the existence of correspondence confirming insurance cover did not dispense with that burden. The findings supporting the decree are, therefore, insufficient to sustain the monetary liability imposed upon the Appellant.

17.       The suit having remained pending since 1966 and having already undergone one round of appellate remand, we do not consider it appropriate to prolong the litigation by directing a further trial merely to afford an additional opportunity to establish matters which were required to be proved in the original proceedings. The controversy must be determined on the evidence already brought on record. On the material examined, Respondent No.1 has not established its entitlement to recover the entire sum of Rs.35,00,000/- as compensation for total loss under the applicable contractual terms. The impugned judgment and decree, therefore, cannot be sustained.

18.       Consequently, the instant appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 10.08.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge in Suit No.77 of 1966, insofar as they decree the suit against the Appellant, are set aside, and the suit against the Appellant is dismissed. The dismissal of the suit against Respondents No.2 and 3 shall remain undisturbed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.

19.       The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms, along with all pending applications, if any.

 

                                                                                                            JUDGE

JUDGE

Naveed PA