IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI

H.C.A. No.197 OF 2020

[M/s. Faran Education Society v. KMC & others]

PRESENT:

Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan

Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito

Appellant : Through Ch. A Rasheed, Advocate

Respondent-KMC : Through Shaukat Hussain, Advocate

Official Respondents : Through Ms. Amna Usman, AAG Sindh.

Date of Hearing : 15.10.2026

Date of Decision : 15.10.2026

JUDGMENT

ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN J; Through the instant High Court Appeal, preferred under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, read with Section 15 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1977, the Appellant has called in question the order dated 07.09.2020, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, exercising original civil jurisdiction, in Suit No.1109 of 2020, whereby the suit, along with pending applications, was disposed of at the preliminary stage without adjudication on merits.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the Appellant is a registered educational society, which was allotted Plot No.137, measuring 6,189 square yards, situated in Faran Cooperative Housing Society, Karachi (hereinafter referred to as the "subject plot"), for establishing and running an educational institution. Subsequently, the subject plot, being an amenity plot, was subleased to a private entity, namely, Foundation Public School Limited, which gave rise to litigation culminating in proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan.

3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, vide order dated 10.08.2020, observed that an amenity plot could neither be leased out nor sold to a private commercial school. However, while issuing directions concerning the subject plot, the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressly contemplated its use by the Appellant-Society itself for running a school and directed the administration of Foundation Public School Limited to remove its structures and hand over the plot either to the authorities of Kidney Hill Park or to Faran Education Society for running a school under its own management.

4. According to the Appellant, pursuant to the aforesaid directions, Foundation Public School Limited handed over possession of the subject plot to the Appellant-Society to enable it to establish and operate a school under its own management. However, officials of Respondent No.1, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), allegedly attempted to dispossess the Appellant forcibly under the purported authority of the Supreme Court's directions. Consequently, the Appellant instituted Suit No.1109 of 2020 for declaration, cancellation and permanent injunction, seeking, inter alia, declaration of its lawful entitlement to the subject plot, cancellation of the registered surrender deed dated 08.11.1995 and the subsequent sublease executed in favour of Foundation Public School Limited, and restraint against interference with its possession and operation of the school.

5. When the matter came up before the learned Single Judge on 07.09.2020 upon urgent applications, the suit, along with pending applications, was disposed of in limine, principally on the ground that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had already taken cognizance of the subject matter and, therefore, the Appellant ought to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court for clarification or interpretation of its order. It is this order which has been assailed through the present appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the true import and effect of the Supreme Court's order dated 10.08.2020, which expressly recognized the possibility of the subject plot being handed over to the Appellant-Society for running a school under its own management. According to learned counsel, the Appellant, having resumed possession of the subject plot pursuant to the aforesaid directions, was entitled to seek protection against unlawful interference by KMC. He submits that the suit raised independent questions concerning the Appellant's legal entitlement, possession and alleged threatened dispossession, which required adjudication upon examination of the relevant record. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge, instead of determining whether the relief sought was consistent with the Supreme Court's directions, summarily disposed of the suit, thereby depriving the Appellant of an opportunity to establish its claim in accordance with law. He, therefore, prays that the impugned order be set aside and the suit be restored for decision on merits.

7. Conversely, learned counsel appearing on behalf of KMC, as well as the learned Assistant Attorney General, support the impugned order.

8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the material available on record, particularly the impugned order dated 07.09.2020 and the relevant directions contained in the order dated 10.08.2020 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

9. In view of the controversy involved and the submissions advanced, the principal point requiring determination in the present appeal is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in disposing of the suit at the preliminary stage merely because the Hon'ble Supreme Court had previously issued directions concerning the subject plot, without examining whether the reliefs claimed by the Appellant raised questions requiring independent adjudication in accordance with law.

10. Before addressing the aforesaid point, it is necessary to appreciate the nature and scope of the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. A reading of the order dated 10.08.2020, as reproduced in the impugned order, indicates that the Hon'ble Supreme Court disapproved the use of the amenity plot by a private commercial school. At the same time, the order contemplated two alternatives concerning the handing over of the subject plot, namely, to the authorities of Kidney Hill Park or to Faran Education Society for running a school by the Society itself. Thus, the directions did not, in express terms, altogether exclude the possibility of the Appellant-Society utilizing the subject plot for the educational purpose for which it had originally been allotted.

11. The controversy raised in the suit, however, was not confined merely to the interpretation of the aforesaid directions. The Appellant had also sought declaration of its legal entitlement to the subject plot, cancellation of the registered surrender deed and subsequent sublease, and protection against alleged interference with its possession. These reliefs necessarily involved examination of the relevant documents, the legal effect of the transactions concerning the subject plot, the circumstances in which possession was allegedly restored to the Appellant, and the authority, if any, under which KMC sought to interfere with such possession.

12. It is well settled that where a civil court is vested with jurisdiction to entertain and determine a dispute involving civil rights, such jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be declined merely because the subject matter has previously been considered by a superior court. Undoubtedly, the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court are binding upon all courts and authorities, and no subordinate court can pass an order inconsistent with or tending to defeat those directions. Nevertheless, the existence of such directions does not, by itself, dispense with the necessity of determining disputed questions of fact and law arising between the parties, provided such determination neither reopens matters conclusively decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court nor travels beyond the scope of its mandate.

13. In the present case, the learned Single Judge appears to have proceeded on the premise that, since the Hon'ble Supreme Court had already taken cognizance of the subject plot, the Appellant's only remedy was to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court for clarification. In our view, this approach does not sufficiently distinguish between a dispute genuinely requiring clarification of the Supreme Court's order and a civil dispute concerning the legal consequences of that order, the subsequent conduct of the parties, and the enforcement or protection of rights claimed thereunder.

14. The Appellant's assertion that possession of the subject plot had been restored to it pursuant to the Supreme Court's directions, and that KMC thereafter threatened to dispossess it, constituted a factual controversy which could not appropriately be resolved without examining the relevant material and affording the parties an opportunity of hearing. Equally, whether the Appellant could claim any subsisting right under the original sublease, notwithstanding the subsequent surrender deed and the transaction in favour of Foundation Public School Limited, was a question requiring consideration in accordance with law. The mere fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had issued directions regarding the subject plot did not automatically establish or extinguish the Appellant's asserted rights beyond what had actually been determined by the Apex Court.

15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the learned Single Judge ought to have examined the nature of the reliefs claimed and determined whether, and to what extent, those reliefs were maintainable and capable of adjudication consistently with the Supreme Court's directions. If any particular relief was found to be inconsistent with or already concluded by those directions, the learned Single Judge could have dealt with such relief accordingly, by assigning reasons. However, disposal of the entire suit at the preliminary stage, without undertaking that exercise, cannot be sustained.

16. It is pertinent to observe that the Appellant's claim of having resumed possession of the subject plot pursuant to the Supreme Court's order is, at this stage, merely an assertion requiring verification. Likewise, the alleged threatened dispossession by KMC and the legal consequences of the registered surrender deed and subsequent sublease remain matters requiring determination. Nothing observed herein shall, therefore, be construed as recognition of the Appellant's title, validation of its possession, or determination of its entitlement to operate a school upon the subject plot. These questions shall remain open for consideration by the competent trial Court, subject always to the binding directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

17. In view of the foregoing discussion, the point formulated above is answered in the negative. We hold that the learned Single Judge was not justified in disposing of the suit in limine merely on account of the earlier proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, without examining the nature of the controversy and the reliefs claimed by the Appellant. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from non-exercise of jurisdiction to the extent that the questions raised in the suit were left unexamined.

18. Before parting with the matter, it is necessary to take note of a subsequent development concerning the forum competent to entertain and adjudicate the suit. At the time when the impugned order dated 07.09.2020 was passed, Suit No.1109 of 2020 was pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court exercising original civil jurisdiction. However, during the pendency of the instant appeal, the Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2025 was enacted, whereby the pecuniary jurisdiction of the civil courts was enhanced and civil suits falling within the amended jurisdictional limits stood transferred from the Original Side of this Court to the competent District Courts. Consequently, although the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the restoration of the suit would necessarily be subject to the amended jurisdictional provisions. Therefore, the matter is required to be placed before the competent trial Court having jurisdiction under the law presently in force, rather than being remitted to the Original Side of this Court.

19. Consequently, the instant High Court Appeal is allowed, and the impugned order dated 07.09.2020, passed by the learned Single Judge in Suit No.1109 of 2020, is hereby set aside. The suit, along with all pending applications, shall stand restored to its original position. However, in view of the subsequent amendment to the jurisdictional provisions governing civil courts, the matter shall be transmitted to the competent District Court at Karachi, having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction, for its assignment to the appropriate trial Court in accordance with law. The concerned office shall ensure transmission of the complete record to the competent Court without unnecessary delay.

20. The learned trial Court shall proceed with the matter afresh, after providing an opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties, and shall examine the maintainability of the suit, the nature and extent of the reliefs claimed, and the respective rights and contentions of the parties, strictly in accordance with law and in conformity with the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is clarified that all questions of fact and law shall remain open for determination by the learned trial Court, and no observation made in this judgment shall prejudice the merits of the controversy or be construed as permitting any action inconsistent with the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

The High Court Appeal stands disposed of in the above terms, with no order as to costs.

JUDGE

Naveed PA