

ORDER SHEET
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI

Constitutional Petition No. D-8116 of 2018
(Hafeez-ur-Rehman Alam versus National Industrial Relation Commission & others)

Date	Order with signature of Judge
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Before:

Mr. Justice Adnan-ul-Karim Memon
Mr. Justice Muhammad Jaffer Raza

Date of hearing and order: 17.9.2026

Mr. Muhammad Nishat Warsi, Advocate for the petitioner
Ms. Wajiha Mehdi, Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Sajid Basheer, Advocate for respondents No.3 and 4

ORDER

Adnan-ul-Karim Memon, J. Petitioner has filed this Constitutional Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, with the following prayer: -

- i) *Call for comments from the respondents;*
- ii) *Declare that the learned Full Bench, NIRC, cannot substitute its findings in place of the findings of the learned Single Bench, without discussing the evidence on record;*
- iii) *Declare that the learned Single Bench has rightly considered the petitioner as a 'WORKMAN' and the substitution of findings by the learned Full Bench on the point is not in accordance with the evidence as well as settled principles of law;*
- iv) *Set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Full Bench, NIRC, dated 27.09.2018;*
- v) *Suspend the operation of the impugned order pending final disposal of this petition as per attached application;*

2. The petitioner states that he was appointed in Respondent No.3 Bank as an Assistant on 15.10.1991 and was subsequently re-designated/promoted as Officer Grade-III. During his service, he worked in various departments, particularly Computer Operations, and developed and installed software for the Bank. He claims to have performed his duties diligently and without any disciplinary complaint. The petitioner submits that while posted at Galla Mandi Branch, Vehari, the Branch Manager, in the presence of police officials, threatened and pressured him to accept responsibility for fraud involving Rs.720,000/- withdrawn from certain inactive accounts. According to the petitioner, two statements on oath were forcibly obtained from him at gunpoint. Thereafter, a show-cause notice dated 20.08.2009 was issued alleging misappropriation of Rs.720,000/-, involvement in fraudulent activities and violation of prescribed procedures, which he denied through his reply dated 06.10.2009.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the contents of the show-cause notice itself indicated that the Branch Manager had dealt with the account holder and obtained documents regarding the withdrawal, while the relevant transactions were carried out through IDs of other bank officials. An inquiry was subsequently initiated through notice dated 19.09.2009. He alleges that only one witness was examined, no proper opportunity of cross-examination or defence was afforded, and neither the inquiry proceedings nor inquiry report was supplied to him. Despite this, he was dismissed from service vide order dated 31.12.2009. The counsel further alleges that the Branch Manager had also subjected him and his family to threats and had taken Defence Saving Certificates, cash and gold ornaments from him. He asserts that the same Manager was himself proceeded against in relation to alleged misconduct involving Rs.3.5 million and was dismissed from service, which, according to the petitioner, supports his claim that he was falsely implicated. The counsel maintains that although designated as Assistant Manager/Officer Grade-III, he was performing manual and clerical duties, including operating and maintaining computers and ATM systems, preparing records and reports, and had no power to appoint, dismiss, recommend leave or supervise employees. He therefore claims that he fell within the definition of “workman” under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. He added that after his dismissal, the petitioner sought the inquiry record and personal hearing, but received no response and thereafter filed a grievance petition before the Labour Court. The matter was subsequently transferred to the NIRC, Karachi Bench, where it was registered as Case No. 4B(355)/2014-K. The learned Single Member, NIRC, vide order dated 11.04.2017, set aside the dismissal order dated 31.12.2009 and directed the Bank to reinstate the petitioner with back benefits. He submitted that the respondent Bank preferred an appeal before the Full Bench, NIRC. The counsel alleges that the Bank failed to produce material evidence, including the cross-examination of its witness. However, the Full Bench, vide impugned order dated 27.09.2018, took a contrary view regarding his status as a “workman” and interfered with the order of the learned Single Member. The counsel contends that the Full Bench failed to properly consider the evidence regarding the nature of his duties and substituted its findings without assigning adequate reasons. He therefore invokes the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court and seeks setting aside of the impugned order dated 27.09.2018 and restoration of the order of the learned Single Member, NIRC, along with consequential relief. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions has relied upon the cases of *Al-Iblagh Limited Lahore v. The Copyright Board Karachi* (1985 SCMR 758), *National Bank of Pakistan v. Anwar Shah* (2015 SCMR 434), *United Bank Limited versus Jamil Ahmed* (2024 PLC 50), *National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court No.5, Faisalabad* (1993 SCMR 672), *Muhammad Naeem v. General Tyer and Rubber Company of Pakistan* (2020 PLC 108), *General*

Manager, Hotel Intercontinental Lahore v. Bashir A. Malik (PLD 1986 SC 103), Crescent Jute Products Ltd. v. Muhammad Yaqub (PLD 1978 SC 207), Ashfaq Ahmed Abbasi v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (2017 PLC 67), Imtiaz Ali Shah v. Chairman Bank of Punjab (2017 PLC 96), Habib Bank Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (2016 PLC 439), Muhammad Iqbal v. Regional Business Head (2011 PLC 292), Sheikh Zia Akhtar v. Country Manager Coca Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd. (2007 PLC 300), Samiullah Sharif v. Fauji Oil Terminal and Distribution Company Limited, Port Bin Qasim Karachi (2007 PLC 464), Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Fateh Muhammad Shah (2007 PLC 75), Abdul Razzaq v. Ihsan Sons Limited (1992 PLC 424), Pak Telecom Mobile Limited v. Muhammad Atif Bilal (2024 SCMR 719) and National Bank of Pakistan v. The Punjab Labour Court No.7, Gujranwala (NLR 1992 Labour 117).

4. Learned counsel for Respondents Nos.3 and 4 supported the impugned order of the full bench of NIRC and submitted that the Constitutional Petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction, concealment and misstatement of facts, mala fide, and abuse of process. He contended that the Petitioner was a permanent resident of Multan/Vehari, had served there, the disciplinary proceedings were conducted there, and the FIR was also registered at Burewala, Multan; therefore, the matter could not validly be instituted before this Court at Karachi merely because the Respondent-Bank had its Head Office there. Learned counsel further submitted that the Petitioner was an Officer Grade-III and not a “workman”. Relying upon 2015 SCMR 434 and 1993 SCMR 6772, he argued that Grade I, II and III bank officers do not fall within the definition of a workman. He pointed out that the Petitioner himself had repeatedly described himself as Manager IT in his departmental appeal dated 21.01.2010 and during cross-examination before the Labour Court. He argued that the other authorities relied upon by the Petitioner, namely 2013 PLC 243 (PLAT), 2014 PLC 77 (SHC) and 2009 SCMR 320, related to different categories of employees and were therefore distinguishable and irrelevant to the present case.

5. On merits, learned counsel submitted that the Petitioner was dismissed after due disciplinary process for his involvement in fraudulent activities involving approximately Rs.720,000/-. The allegations of pressure, forcible obtaining of signatures, and recovery of valuables were/are denied as false and mala fide. He maintained that show-cause notice and disciplinary proceedings were duly undertaken against the Petitioner and other employees involved in the misconduct, and that the Bank had acted fairly and in accordance with law. Learned counsel further contended that the Petitioner’s own averments established that he was an Officer Grade-III, promoted in 2003, and that his duties were supervisory/technical rather than manual. The operation of computers,

keyboards, or other system equipment could not, according to counsel, bring him within the definition of a workman. He further submitted that the Petitioner's grievance petition was itself invalid as it had been addressed to the President of the Bank instead of the competent appellate authority. He argued that the Full Bench of NIRC had rightly decided the matter on the question of maintainability and was not required to examine the merits once it was found that the Petitioner was not a workman. According to counsel, consent or agreement of the parties could not confer jurisdiction contrary to law. In conclusion, learned counsel submitted that the order of the Full Bench, NIRC, Karachi, was/is lawful and justified. He maintained that the Petitioner, being governed by the relationship of master and servant and having been dismissed after due disciplinary proceedings for fraudulent/misappropriation activities, was/is not entitled to reinstatement through constitutional jurisdiction of this court. He therefore prayed that the Petition be dismissed with special compensatory costs. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the cases of National Bank of Pakistan v. Anwar Shah (2015 SCMR 434), Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Muhammad Shahid Mumtaz (2011 SCMR 1475), Abdul Zahir v. District Manager, United Bank Limited (214 PLC 154), General Manager, Hotel Intercontinental Lahore v. Bashir A. Malik (PLD 1986 SC 103), All Pakistan SRBC Workers' Union v. National Industrial Relations Commission (2015 PLC 210), Waseem Hassan v. M/s Planet Communication (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive (2016 PLC 30), Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Pakistan Tobacco Company, Employees' Union Dacca (PLD 1961 SC 403), Chairman Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. Karachi v. General Secretary, Union Karkunane Brook Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Rawalpindi (PLD 1969 Lahore 717), Muhammad Yaqoob v. Bayer Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (2016 PLC 54), Executive Director Shaigan Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Farooq Ahmed Zubari (2016 PLC 353), M/s International Computers Ltd. v. Rahim Azam Khan (1989 PLC 328), Liaquat Ali v. Globe Textile Mills Ltd. (1989 PLC 332), Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited v. Lt. Col Muhammad Abbas Malik (1999 PLC 273), Mumtaz Hassan Khan v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (1984 PLC 1353), Managing Director, Universal Oil & Vegetable Ghee Mills Limited, Sheikhpura v. Muhammad Khan (1989 PLC 239), I.C.I. Pakistan Manufacturers Ltd. (Polyester Works), Sheikhpura v. Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad (1986 PLC 1133), Sultan Masood Tiwana v. General Manager, Dawood Hercules Chemicals Ltd., Lahore (1975 PLC 556), Khushal Khan v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. (2002 SCMR 943), Pir Nazir Ahmad Shah v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, States and Frontier Regions Division, Islamabad (2002 SCMR 947), Matee ul Hassan v. National Industrial Relations Commission Appellate Bench at Islamabad (2018 PLC Note 30), Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. M. Iqbal Sipra (2007 PLC 398), Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Muhammad Bashir Khan (2006 PLC 39), Raesuddin v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. (1982 PLC 920),

Astam Khan, Ex-Assistant Munshi, FDC Timber Market, Goharabad, Abbottabad v. Forest Department Corporation (2000 PLC 116), Abdul Wahab v. HBL (2013 SCMR 1383), Habib Bank Ltd. v. The State (SBLR 2013 SC 1), Shahid Masood Malik v. Habib Bank Ltd. (2008 SCMR 1151), Shahid Wazir v. Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas and States of Frontier Regions Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad (2006 SCMR 1653), Dawood Ali v. Superintendent of Police (2005 SCMR 948), Muhammad Umar Malik v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. (1995 SCMR 453), Muhammad Yusuf Shah v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1981 SC 224), Shamim Haider Kazmi v. Presiding Officer, IVth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi (2001 SCMR 1270), Habib Bank Limited v. Syed Zia-ul-Hassan Kazmi (1998 SCMR 60), United Bank Limited v. Ahsan Akhtar (1998 SCMR 68), Muhammad Umar Malik v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. (1995 SCMR 953), Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (PLJ 1984 SC 464), Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. PIAC (1994 SCMR 2232), Ijaz H. Rana v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (2008 CLC 18), Zaka Ullah Bajwa v. District Coordination Officer, Gujranwala (2004 PLC (C.S.) 332), United Bank Limited v. Sindh Labour Court No.5, Karachi (2010 PLC 114), Shaukat Ali v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. (2007 SCMR 198), Ghulam Mustafa Channa v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. (2007 PLC 493), Nazir Ahmed Pathan v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. (2008 SCMR 899), Ghulam Mustafa Channa v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. (2008 SCMR 909) and Sultan Hussain v. National Bank of Pakistan (2003 PLC (C.S.) 1247),

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their assistance.

7. The learned Single Bench of the NIRC, after examining the record, first held that the petitioner fell within the definition of “workman,” observing that although he was designated as Officer Grade-III/Assistant Manager-I and had performed duties in various departments, the respondents themselves had admitted that his dismissal was effected under section 15(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, which applies to workmen. The Bench therefore held that the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. On merits, the learned Bench found serious deficiencies in the disciplinary proceedings. It noted that the petitioner’s alleged confessional statements regarding misappropriation of Rs.720,000/- were obtained in the presence of police personnel, and the evidence supported his contention that the statements had been obtained under coercion and pressure. The Bench further observed that the cheques through which the amount was allegedly withdrawn did not bear the petitioner’s signatures, while the concerned account holder had stated that he himself had withdrawn the amount through the three cheques. The Branch Manager had also confirmed that the account holder had received the cheque book

and withdrawn the amount himself. The Bench further noted that no criminal complaint or FIR had been registered against the petitioner regarding the alleged misappropriation. It also found that material witnesses relating to the incident were not examined during the departmental inquiry and that the respondents' own evidence showed the presence of police personnel when the petitioner signed the affidavits. The involvement of the Branch Manager, who had arranged payment to the concerned customer and was himself subsequently dismissed, also raised material doubts regarding the respondents' version of events. Consequently, the learned Bench held that the respondents had failed to establish the alleged misconduct against the petitioner and concluded that he had been falsely and mala fide implicated. The grievance petition was accordingly allowed, the dismissal order dated 31.12.2009 was set aside, and the respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner in service.

8. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Full Bench of NIRC, contending that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that he did not fall within the definition of "workman" under the law and HBL Staff Service Rules, as he was serving as Assistant Manager Grade-III at the relevant time. It was therefore argued that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the matter, which was accordingly liable to be dismissed. The petitioner/ the respondent in Appeal opposed the appeal and submitted that the same was not maintainable and disclosed no valid ground for interference with the judgment dated 11.04.2017 passed by the learned Single Bench of the NIRC. It was objected that the impugned judgment was passed after proper consideration of the facts, evidence and law, whereas the appellants had concealed material facts and relevant portions of the record, including the respondent's evidence and the cross-examination of the appellants' witness. He further submitted that the petitioner/respondent had admittedly been dismissed under Section 15(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, which applies to a "workman"; therefore, the petitioner/respondent was entitled to invoke the remedy available under the law. It was also pointed out that the appellants in appeal themselves had described the petitioner/respondent as a worker in their written statement. Since the appellant Bank's head office and the dismissal order were both at Karachi, the Karachi courts had jurisdiction. It was asserted that the inquiry was merely an eye-wash and no proper opportunity of hearing was afforded to the respondent. The alleged embezzled amount of Rs.720,000/- had already been paid to the client by Branch Manager Ashfaq Ahmed Ashfaq, who had obtained the client's signature on the counterfoil, a fact allegedly established through the appellants' own witness. The respondent, after leaving for Makkah to perform Hajj, was served with the dismissal order upon his return without being afforded a fair opportunity of defence. It was also submitted

that the said Branch Manager was found guilty, repaid the amount, and was subsequently dismissed from service on the same charge.

9. The Full Bench, after hearing the parties and examining the record, found that the petitioner/respondent had himself admitted during cross-examination, as well as in his grievance petition and grievance notice, that he was working as an Officer Grade-III (OG-III) at the time of his dismissal. The Bench therefore held that the respondent did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission as a “worker.” Consequently, the learned Single Member had wrongly assumed jurisdiction over the grievance petition. Accordingly, the Full Bench accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 11.04.2017, and held that there was no need to examine the merits or evidence of the grievance petition. The original grievance petition was directed to be returned to the respondent for presentation before the proper forum, if so advised. No order as to costs was made.

10. On the question of “workman” status, the controlling statutory test is not the mere nomenclature of the post but the nature of the duties and functions actually performed. Section 2(i) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 defines a “workman” as a person employed in an industrial or commercial establishment to perform skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward.

11. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the status of an employee as a workman depends upon the nature of duties actually performed and not merely the designation, nomenclature or officer grade. The Supreme Court reiterated that the employee claiming workman status bears the initial burden of establishing the nature of his duties through oral and documentary evidence. Mere absence of hiring or firing powers does not, by itself, confer the status of a workman. Thus, an employee in officer grade may still fall within the definition of workman if his actual duties are manual or clerical and not mainly managerial, administrative or supervisory.

12. The Supreme Court in the case of *M/s Pak Telecom Vs Muhammad Atif* 2024 SCMR 719 held that in the case of a worker employed in a trans-provincial establishment, an individual grievance relating to termination, removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal is maintainable before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. Section 33 permits a worker to seek enforcement of a right guaranteed or secured to him under any law. Therefore, although the right of reinstatement in the present case arose under Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, the grievance could validly be brought before NIRC under Section 33 of the IRA,

2012. On the second issue, the Supreme Court clarified that the expression “worker/workman” cannot be treated as having one uniform meaning under all labour laws. The person seeking to invoke Section 33 of the IRA, 2012 must first establish that he falls within the definition of “worker/workman” contained in Section 2(xxxiii) of the IRA, 2012, so as to make his grievance maintainable before NIRC. However, where the substantive right claimed arises under another law, such as Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Orders of 1968, the claimant must additionally establish that he satisfies the definition of “workman” contained in that particular law. Thus, the definitions under the two enactments operate according to the nature of the right being enforced. As to the third issue, the Supreme Court held that the initial burden of proof lies upon the person who asserts that he is a workman and seeks relief on that basis. The claimant must produce appropriate oral and documentary evidence establishing the nature of his actual duties and functions and showing that he falls within the statutory definition of a workman under the relevant law. In the present case, although the respondent had asserted that he was not employed in a managerial or administrative capacity and did not possess the power to hire or fire, he had failed to plead or prove that he performed the manual or clerical work required to bring him within the definition of “workman” under Section 2(i) of the Standing Orders of 1968. The Supreme Court therefore held that the burden never shifted to the employer to disprove a status which the respondent himself had failed to establish. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that although NIRC was the competent forum for an individual grievance arising from termination in a trans-provincial establishment, the respondent was required to establish his status as a “worker” under the IRA, 2012 and, for claiming the substantive protection of Standing Order 12(3), also as a “workman” under the Standing Orders of 1968. Since he failed to prove the essential requirements of the latter status, his grievance petition was held not maintainable. The decisions of the NIRC and the Islamabad High Court were consequently set aside, and the grievance petition was dismissed.

13. However, in the present case, it appears that during cross-examination, the Bank’s witness admitted that he had not produced any documentary evidence regarding the Petitioner’s job description, his authority to appoint employees, issue show-cause notices, terminate employees, or exercise supervision over subordinate staff. He also admitted that the cheques relied upon by the Bank did not bear the Petitioner’s signatures. The witness conceded that various witnesses to the alleged incident, including Rashid Rafiq, Irshad Ahmed and Syed Akhtar, were not examined during the inquiry. He further admitted that the amount allegedly misappropriated was subsequently arranged and paid to the affected persons and that Manager Ashfaq Ahmed was also involved in the matter and was

ultimately dismissed from service. Thus, the cross-examination prima facie established the nature of the Petitioner's actual duties and the absence of documentary evidence showing that he exercised managerial or disciplinary powers.

14. The Single Bench, while accepting the grievance petition, appears to have attached substantial weight to the fact that the Bank proceeded against the petitioner under section 15(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance and to the nature of his alleged duties; the petitioner's contention that he had no power to appoint, dismiss or recommend leave was a relevant evidentiary circumstance. Accordingly, when the Full Bench of the NIRC considered the petitioner's own admissions in his grievance proceedings/cross-examination that he was serving as Officer Grade-III (OG-III) at the time of dismissal, it was legally entitled to determine the threshold question of jurisdiction before entering into the merits of the alleged misconduct. The Full Bench's conclusion that, once the petitioner failed to establish that, notwithstanding his OG-III status, he was performing the duties of a workman, the NIRC lacked jurisdiction, is not consistent with the binding principles of law.

15. We are of the view that the learned Single Bench of the NIRC had rightly assumed jurisdiction after examining the nature of the duties performed by the Petitioner. Significantly, the Bank's own witness, during cross-examination, admitted that no documentary material had been produced to establish that the Petitioner possessed any authority to appoint or dismiss employees, issue show-cause notices, recommend leave, or exercise supervisory or managerial control over subordinate staff. The witness further admitted that the cheques relating to the alleged withdrawal did not bear the Petitioner's signatures and that material witnesses of the alleged incident had not been examined during the departmental inquiry. These admissions constituted material evidence which could not be brushed aside while determining the actual nature of the Petitioner's duties and his status under the applicable labour law. The learned Single Bench, therefore, was justified in considering the evidence available on record, including the admissions of the Bank's own witness, the nature of the duties performed by the Petitioner, and the absence of any material demonstrating that he was exercising managerial, administrative or supervisory powers. The mere designation of the Petitioner as Officer Grade-III could not, by itself, conclusively determine his status when the actual nature of his functions was required to be examined. The finding of the learned Single Bench that the Petitioner was a "workman" was thus based upon the evidence available on record and could not lawfully be displaced merely on the basis of his designation or grade.

16. The learned Full Bench, while reversing the well-reasoned findings of the learned Single Bench, principally relied upon the Petitioner's admission that he was serving as Officer Grade-III and, on that basis alone, concluded that he was not a "workman". In doing so, the Full Bench failed to properly consider the material admissions made by the Bank's own witness during cross-examination concerning the absence of managerial or disciplinary powers and the actual nature of the Petitioner's duties. The Full Bench also failed to adequately discuss and appreciate the evidence which had been relied upon by the learned Single Bench in reaching its conclusion. Such an approach was not consistent with the settled principle that the status of an employee is to be determined from the nature of the duties actually performed and not merely from the nomenclature of the post.

17. We, therefore, find that the learned Single Bench had correctly appreciated the evidence and law while determining the Petitioner's status as a "workman", whereas the learned Full Bench fell in error in reversing that finding merely based on the Petitioner's designation as Officer Grade-III, without properly examining the material evidence and, particularly, the admissions of the Bank's own witness. The case laws cited by learned counsel for the respondent / HBL are of no help to him in view of the above circumstances of the case as well as the latest law on the subject issue and the admission of the witness of the respondent-Bank in cross-examination.

18. The impugned order dated 27.09.2018 passed by the Full Bench, NIRC, consequently cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. The order dated 11.04.2017 passed by the learned Single Bench, NIRC, having been rendered after consideration of the evidence on record, is restored.

19. Consequently, the Petitioner shall be entitled to the relief granted by the learned Single Bench, subject to its lawful execution.

20. The petition stands disposed of in the above terms.

JUDGE

JUDGE