IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

H.C.A. No.136 of 2004

[ M/s. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., v. General Produce and Fibres Ltd. ]

(Arising out of Suit No.1583/1998)

H.C.A. No.137 of 2004

[ M/s. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., v. Quinn Corporation ]

(Arising out of Suit No.731 /1998)

H.C.A. No.138 of 2004

[ M/s. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., v. Retsen Ltd. ]

(Arising out of Suit No.275 /1999)

H.C.A. No.192 of 2004

[ M/s. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., v. Conti Cotton S.A.]

(Arising out of Suit No.343 /2000)

H.C.A. No.446 of 2003

[ General Impex Corporation (Pvt) Ltd., v. Stahel Hong Kong Limited

(Arising out of J.M. No.20/1991)

PRESENT:

            Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan

                                      Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito       

*****

Mr. Rashid Anwar, Advocate for the Appellants in HCA Nos.136, 137, 138 & 192 of 2004.

Mr. Ghulam Murtaza, Advocate for the Appellant in HCA No.446 of 2003.

Syed Aminuddin Fakir, Advocate for the Respondents in HCA No.136 & 138 of 2004.

Mr. Jam Zeeshan, Advocate for the Respondent in HCA No.137 of 2004

None present for the Respondent in HCA No.446 of 2003 & HCA No.192 of 2004.

Date of hearing :       :       27.08.2026, 02.09.2026, 08.09.2026 & 17.09.2026

Date of Judgment     :        28.09.2026

JUDGMENT

ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN J; By this common judgment, we intend to decide High Court Appeals Nos.136, 137, 138 and 192 of 2004, together with High Court Appeal No.446 of 2003. Since all these appeals emanate from interconnected proceedings initiated under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, and raise common questions of law and fact relating to the filing and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards rendered under the Rules of the Liverpool Cotton Association (“LCA”), they are being decided together.

2.         The essential facts giving rise to these appeals are that the appellants, namely, M/s Trading Corporation of Pakistan (“TCP”), appellant in HCAs Nos.136 to 138 and 192 of 2004, and M/s General Impex Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. (“GIC”), appellant in HCA No.446 of 2003, entered into separate international commercial contracts for the sale and purchase of raw cotton bales with the respective foreign respondents, namely, General Produce and Fibres Ltd. (HCA No.136 of 2004), Quinn Corporation (HCA No.137 of 2004), Retsen Ltd. (HCA No.138 of 2004), Conti Cotton S.A. (HCA No.192 of 2004), and M/s Stahel Hong Kong Limited (HCA No.446 of 2003). The contracts were governed by the Rules and Regulations of the LCA and contained arbitration clauses providing for resolution of disputes through arbitration under the LCA Rules. Disputes subsequently arose between the parties on account of alleged breaches of their respective contractual obligations, including non-shipment of the contracted cotton, restrictions imposed by the Government on its export, and issues concerning the timely establishment of Letters of Credit (“L/Cs”). Pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the respective contracts, the disputes were referred to arbitration before the LCA at Liverpool, United Kingdom. The arbitral proceedings, followed in certain cases by appeals before the Technical Appeal Committees of the LCA, culminated in awards in favour of the respective foreign respondents, granting them damages along with interest and costs. The foreign respondents thereafter initiated proceedings on the Original Side of this Court under Section 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, seeking enforcement of the foreign arbitral awards and decrees in terms thereof. The appellants contested those proceedings by filing objections to the enforcement of the awards. The learned Single Judges, however, rejected the objections raised by the appellants, directed enforcement of the respective foreign arbitral awards and passed decrees in terms thereof, vide judgment dated 05.03.2004, which is the subject matter of HCAs Nos.136 to 138 and 192 of 2004, and order dated 12.12.2002, which is the subject matter of HCA No.446 of 2003. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decisions, the appellants have preferred the present High Court Appeals under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.

3.         Mr. Rashid Anwar, learned counsel appearing for TCP in HCAs Nos.136, 137, 138 and 192 of 2004, vehemently contended that the awards in question do not fall within the definition of a “foreign award” under Section 2(1) of the Arbitration (Protocol & Convention) Act, 1937 (“the 1937 Act”), as the requirements stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof are cumulative and must each be independently satisfied. His principal submission was that clause (a), which requires the award to have been made pursuant to an arbitration agreement to which the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, 1923 applies, is not fulfilled, since Pakistan neither ratified nor acceded to the Protocol and, therefore, the threshold requirement for applicability of the 1937 Act is absent. He further argued that clause (b) is likewise not satisfied, as no notification has been produced declaring both Pakistan and the United Kingdom to be Powers to which the Convention applies, nor has the existence of reciprocal arrangements between the two countries been established. According to learned counsel, the notification dated 08.01.1938 does not cure these deficiencies, since Pakistan is not named therein as a Power party to the Convention, whereas Section 2(2), subsequently inserted through the 1962 amendment, merely deems pre-Partition notifications issued by the Government of India to have been issued by the Government of Pakistan and neither alters their substantive contents nor deems Pakistan to have ratified or acceded to the Protocol or Convention, much less dispenses with the statutory requirement of reciprocity. Reliance in this regard was placed upon Yangtze (London) Ltd. v. Barlas Brothers (PLD 1961 SC 573), wherein, according to learned counsel, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that Pakistan did not automatically succeed, upon independence, to British India’s treaty rights and obligations under the Protocol and Convention. It was, therefore, submitted that the subsequent insertion of Section 2(2) could neither cure the independent deficiency under clause (a) nor establish the reciprocity contemplated by clause (b), with the result that the awards were not capable of recognition or enforcement under the 1937 Act.

On merits, learned counsel contended that the learned Single Judge failed to exercise the requisite judicial scrutiny while examining the enforceability of the awards under Section 7 of the 1937 Act. He submitted that the foreign buyers, including Quinn Corporation, had themselves committed fundamental breaches of the underlying contracts by failing to open unrestricted and operative Letters of Credit at least fifteen days prior to shipment, resulting in delays ranging from 67 days to approximately nine months. It was further argued that the prohibition on the export of raw cotton imposed by the Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Commerce Circular dated 10.01.1994 constituted a force majeure event beyond TCP’s control, thereby relieving it of liability for non-delivery. Learned counsel further maintained that TCP, being a State-owned enterprise, ought not to be burdened with awards which, according to him, permitted defaulting foreign buyers to benefit from their own contractual breaches at the expense of the public exchequer, and that enforcement in such circumstances would offend considerations of equity and public policy. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act does not bar or otherwise exclude the maintainability of an intra-court appeal under Section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon Virgoz Oils and Fats PTE, Limited v. Faisal Exports (Pvt.) Limited (PLD 2026 Sindh 75), Brother Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others (PLD 1996 SC 543), Justice Qazi Faez Isa & others v. the President of Pakistan and others (PLD 2021 SC 1), and Federation of Pakistan and others v. Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan and others (Civil Appeal No.314 of 1988).

4.         Mr. Ghulam Murtaza, learned counsel representing GIC in HCA No.446 of 2003, while adopting the arguments advanced on behalf of TCP, submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in rejecting the Appellant’s objections without appreciating that the foreign award was fundamentally flawed and unenforceable under Pakistani law. He contended that GIC was denied a fair and meaningful opportunity of presenting its case before the foreign arbitrators, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel further submitted that the foreign arbitrators and the Technical Appeal Committee ignored the express terms of Contracts Nos.112, 113 and 115 concerning delay in establishment of Letters of Credit and preliminary quality inspections at Karachi, which, according to him, relieved GIC of its shipment obligations. He further pointed out that the Technical Appeal Committee, vide its finding/award dated 15.09.1989, had held that Contracts Nos.101 and 111 stood fulfilled with no financial obligation remaining on either party. According to learned counsel, the arbitral tribunal misread the record and acted perversely in imposing liability upon GIC in respect of fulfilled contracts. He further argued that the award of substantial damages and interest in favour of M/s Stahel Hong Kong Limited was based upon surmise and conjecture and constituted an error apparent on the face of the award which ought to have prevented its enforcement.

5.         Syed Aminuddin Fakir, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in HCAs Nos.136 and 138 of 2004, namely, M/s General Produce and Fibres Ltd. and Retsen Ltd., supported the impugned judgment and decree and, at the outset, questioned the maintainability of the appeals by contending that Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act expressly bars an appeal from a decree pronounced upon a foreign award except to the extent that such decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award, whereas no such case has been made out by the Appellants. He further submitted that the objection that the awards do not qualify as “foreign awards” under Section 2(1) of the 1937 Act has been raised for the first time in appeal and ought to have been taken at the earliest opportunity. On the principal question concerning Section 2, learned counsel contended that the deficiency identified by the Supreme Court in Yangtze was the absence of the requisite notification by the Government of Pakistan under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 2(1), and that such deficiency stood retrospectively cured by the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962, whereby Section 2(2) was inserted with effect from 15.08.1947, deeming the pre-Partition notifications issued by the Government of India to be notifications issued by the Government of Pakistan. According to learned counsel, the notification dated 08.01.1938, which notified, inter alia, His Britannic Majesty as a Power party to the Convention and British India and the United Kingdom as territories to which the Convention applied, consequently continued to operate for purposes of enforcement in Pakistan.

Learned counsel argued that Yangtze itself recognized that once the notification contemplated by Section 2 had been issued, the national Courts were bound to treat the statutory conditions as fulfilled and could neither go behind such notification to inquire whether reciprocal arrangements in fact existed nor independently examine whether Pakistan had adhered to the Protocol or become a signatory to the Convention. The 1962 amendment, according to learned counsel, therefore manifested the legislative and executive intention to continue the pre-Partition notification and rendered the Protocol and Convention operative in Pakistan for purposes of the 1937 Act. He maintained that this interpretation has consistently been followed in subsequent judgments of the superior Courts, wherein objections based upon Pakistan’s alleged non-ratification of the Protocol or Convention have been rejected. It was further contended that the validity of the 1962 amendment has not been challenged and that full effect must be given to the legal fiction created by Section 2(2). Learned counsel also submitted that the United Kingdom subsequently recognized Pakistan for purposes of reciprocal enforcement through the Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Order, 1984, which, according to him, further reinforced the position regarding reciprocity.

As to the merits, learned counsel argued that the scope of an enforcing Court under Sections 5 and 7 of the 1937 Act is limited and that such Court does not sit in appeal over the foreign award or reassess the evidence and findings of the arbitral tribunal. The contracts in question were expressly governed by the LCA Rules and English law; the Appellants had fully participated in the arbitration, appointed their arbitrators, produced evidence and thereafter availed the appellate remedy before the Technical Appeal Committees. He maintained that the objections concerning delay in opening the Letters of Credit, the export ban and force majeure, alleged misreading of evidence, award of interest, stamping of the awards and public policy either stood considered and rejected in the arbitral proceedings and by the learned Single Judge or fell outside the limited grounds contemplated by Section 7 of the 1937 Act. It was thus submitted that all statutory requirements for enforcement stood satisfied and no ground under Section 7 for refusing enforcement had been established. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon Messrs Yangtze (London) Ltd. v. Messrs Barlas Brothers (Karachi) (PLD 1961 SC 573), Nan Fung Textiles Ltd. v. H. Pir Muhammad Shamasuddin (PLD 1979 Karachi 762), Ralli Brothers & Coney Ltd. v. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. (1987 CLC 83), Man Fung Textiles Ltd. v. Nichimen & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. (1999 YLR 2226), Alfred C. Toepfer International GMBH v. Pakistan Molasses Company and another (2003 CLD 1666), Cogetex S.A. v. Mayfair Spinning Mills Limited (2004 CLD 1023), Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Hassan Ali & Co. Cotton (Pvt.) Limited (2006 CLD 153), and the other authorities referred to by him.

6.         Mr. Jam Zeeshan, learned counsel representing Quinn Corporation in HCA No.137 of 2004, opposed the appeal both on maintainability and merits. He contended that the objection that the award was not a “foreign award” under Section 2(1) of the 1937 Act had been raised for the first time in appeal and involved factual questions which could not now be introduced through fresh material. He further argued that the appeal itself was barred by Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act, which permits an appeal only where the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award, whereas no such case had been made out. On the principal issue under Section 2, learned counsel submitted that the deficiency identified in Yangtze, namely, the absence of the requisite notification by the Government of Pakistan, stood retrospectively cured by the 1962 amendment inserting Section 2(2), whereby pre-Partition notifications issued by the Government of India were deemed to have been issued by the Government of Pakistan. According to him, once such notification was deemed to exist, the Courts could not inquire into Pakistan’s independent ratification of the Protocol or Convention or the actual existence of reciprocal arrangements, and this position had consistently been followed by this Court in subsequent cases. On merits, he submitted that the scope of interference under Section 7 of the 1937 Act was limited; the award had been rendered pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement, after full participation of the Appellant, had attained finality, and no statutory ground for refusing its enforcement had been established. The objections concerning frustration of contract and public policy had also been duly considered and rejected by the learned Single Judge. He, therefore, prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs. In support of his submissions, he relied upon Nan Fung Textiles Ltd. v. H. Pir Muhammad Shamasuddin (PLD 1979 Karachi 762), Ralli Brothers & Coney Ltd. v. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. (1987 CLC 83), Alfred C. Toepfer International GMBH v. Pakistan Molasses Company (2003 CLD 1666), Cogetex S.A. v. Mayfair Spinning Mills Limited (2004 CLD 1023), and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Hassan Ali & Co. Cotton (Pvt.) Limited (2006 CLD 153).

7.         In rebuttal, learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act does not bar an intra-court appeal under Section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, since the impugned judgments finally determined proceedings of a civil nature in exercise of the High Court’s original civil jurisdiction. Relying upon Brother Steel Mills Ltd. v. Mian Ilyas Miraj (PLD 1996 SC 543), he argued that Section 6(2) merely restricts the grounds upon which a decree may be challenged and does not exclude the appellate forum itself. On the question of enforceability, learned counsel maintained that the insertion of Section 2(2) through the 1962 amendment did not cure the deficiencies identified in Yangtze, as the deeming provision merely treats a qualifying pre-Partition notification as having been issued by the Government of Pakistan but neither alters its contents nor inserts Pakistan as a notified Power or constitutes Pakistan’s adherence to the Protocol. He further submitted that such deeming fiction could not establish the governmental satisfaction regarding reciprocity required by Section 2(1), much less create reciprocal obligations on the part of a foreign sovereign. Consequently, according to learned counsel, the Respondents had failed to establish that the statutory conditions necessary for treating the awards as “foreign awards” enforceable under the 1937 Act had been fulfilled.

8.         We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at considerable length, examined the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Single Judges, and perused the record with their assistance. In light of the rival submissions and the issues arising therefrom, the following questions fall for determination in these appeals:

(i)         Whether, notwithstanding Section 6(2) of the Arbitration (Protocol & Convention) Act, 1937, the present intra-court appeals are maintainable under Section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and, if so, to what extent?

(ii)        Whether the objection that the awards do not constitute “foreign awards” under Section 2(1) of the 1937 Act can be raised for the first time in appeal?

(iii)       Whether the requirements of Section 2(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the 1937 Act stand satisfied, particularly in view of Yangtze (London) Ltd. v. Barlas Brothers (PLD 1961 SC 573), the notification dated 08.01.1938 and the subsequent insertion of Section 2(2) through the 1962 amendment?

(iv)       Whether the Courts may inquire into Pakistan’s adherence to the Protocol and Convention or the existence of reciprocal arrangements after the insertion of Section 2(2) of the 1937 Act?

(v)        Whether the objections raised by the Appellants regarding contractual breaches, denial of opportunity, force majeure/frustration, appreciation of evidence, interest and public policy fall within the limited grounds for refusing enforcement prescribed by Section 7 of the 1937 Act and warrant interference with the impugned judgments and decrees?

9.         Before addressing the question concerning the maintainability of the present appeals, we deem it appropriate to first consider Questions Nos.(ii) to (v), which pertain to the substantive issues arising for determination.

10.       Insofar as Question No.(ii) is concerned, it is not disputed that the objection that the awards do not fall within the definition of a “foreign award” under Section 2(1) of the 1937 Act was not specifically urged before the learned Single Judges and has been raised for the first time in these appeals. Ordinarily, a party cannot be permitted to raise at the appellate stage a new plea which involves investigation into disputed questions of fact or requires additional evidence. However, where an objection raises a pure question of law, arising from the statutory framework and capable of determination on the admitted or undisputed material already available on record, its consideration is not necessarily precluded merely because it was not urged before the Court of first instance. The objection presently raised essentially concerns the interpretation of Section 2 of the 1937 Act, the legal effect of the notification dated 08.01.1938, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Yangtze (London) Ltd. v. Barlas Brothers (PLD 1961 SC 573), and the subsequent insertion of subsection (2) in Section 2 through the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962. These are principally questions of law and do not, in their essential character, require determination of any disputed factual controversy. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to examine the objection on its merits, notwithstanding that it was not specifically raised before the learned Single Judges.

11.       Questions Nos.(iii) and (iv), being interlinked, are taken up together. Section 2(1) of the 1937 Act defines a “foreign award” by reference to the requirements stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. The principal contention of the Appellants is that these requirements are cumulative and have not been satisfied, inasmuch as Pakistan neither ratified nor acceded to the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, 1923, nor was any valid notification issued by the Government of Pakistan declaring the relevant Powers and territories for purposes of clauses (b) and (c). According to the Appellants, the notification dated 08.01.1938 does not cure these deficiencies, as it was issued by the Government of India prior to independence and neither names Pakistan nor establishes the requisite reciprocity between Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

12.       The controversy, however, has to be examined in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Yangtze (London) Ltd. v. Barlas Brothers (PLD 1961 SC 573) and the subsequent legislative development. In Yangtze, the Supreme Court examined the applicability of the 1937 Act after independence and held, in substance, that mere continuance of the Act in Pakistan was insufficient, in the absence of the notification contemplated by Section 2, to establish the conditions necessary for treating an award as a “foreign award”. Significantly, however, the Supreme Court further observed that, had the requisite notification been issued, the national Courts would have been bound to hold that the prescribed conditions stood fulfilled and would not have been entitled to go behind such notification to investigate whether reciprocal arrangements in fact existed in the notified country or whether Pakistan had adhered to the Protocol or become a signatory to the Convention.

13.       It was against this backdrop that the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 was promulgated, whereby subsection (2) was inserted in Section 2 with retrospective effect from 15.08.1947. The said provision expressly declares that a notification issued by the Government of India before 15.08.1947, which was then in force for purposes of enforcement of foreign awards and declared any Power to be a party to the Convention or any territory to be one to which the Convention applied, shall be deemed to be a notification issued by the Central Government for purposes of enforcement of foreign awards in Pakistan.

14.       The object of the amendment is further evident from its preamble, which specifically adverts to the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court and records the necessity of continuing in operation the pre-Partition notifications relating to enforcement of foreign awards. The legislative intent is thus manifest: the deficiency arising from the absence of a corresponding post-independence notification by the Government of Pakistan was sought to be cured retrospectively by giving statutory recognition and continuity to the relevant pre-Partition notifications.

15.       Section 2(2) must, therefore, be given its full legal effect. Once the notification dated 08.01.1938 is, by statutory fiction, deemed to be a notification issued by the Central Government for enforcement of foreign awards in Pakistan, it cannot simultaneously be denied efficacy merely because it was originally issued by the Government of India or because Pakistan, which did not then exist as an independent State, was not expressly named therein. To construe the deeming provision otherwise would substantially defeat the very object for which it was enacted. A statutory fiction must be carried to its logical conclusion within the field and for the purpose for which the legislature has created it.

16.       For the same reason, we are unable to accept the contention that, notwithstanding Section 2(2), the Court must independently determine whether Pakistan separately ratified or acceded to the Protocol or whether reciprocal arrangements in fact existed between Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Such an inquiry would be inconsistent with the principle enunciated in Yangtze itself, wherein the Supreme Court held that once the notification contemplated by Section 2 exists, the national Courts are not to go behind it and independently investigate the existence of reciprocity or Pakistan’s adherence to the Protocol or Convention. The subsequent insertion of Section 2(2), read with the notification dated 08.01.1938, thus supplies the statutory foundation which was found wanting in Yangtze.

17.       This interpretation also finds support from the subsequent decisions of this Court relied upon by learned counsel for the Respondents, including Nan Fung Textiles Ltd. v. H. Pir Muhammad Shamasuddin (PLD 1979 Karachi 762), Ralli Brothers & Coney Ltd. v. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. (1987 CLC 83), Man Fung Textiles Ltd. v. Nichimen & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. (1999 YLR 2226), Alfred C. Toepfer International GMBH v. Pakistan Molasses Company and another (2003 CLD 1666), Cogetex S.A. v. Mayfair Spinning Mills Limited (2004 CLD 1023), and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Hassan Ali & Co. Cotton (Pvt.) Limited (2006 CLD 153), wherein substantially similar objections concerning Pakistan’s non-ratification of the Protocol or Convention and the efficacy of the pre-Partition notifications following the 1962 amendment were considered and repelled.

18.       We, therefore, answer Questions Nos.(iii) and (iv) by holding that the deficiency identified in Yangtze stood cured, for purposes of the 1937 Act, by the retrospective insertion of Section 2(2). Consequently, the qualifying pre-Partition notification dated 08.01.1938 is, by operation of law, to be treated as a notification issued by the Central Government for enforcement of foreign awards in Pakistan. Once the notification is accorded the statutory effect mandated by Section 2(2), the Court cannot embark upon an independent inquiry into Pakistan’s adherence to the Protocol or Convention or the actual existence of reciprocal arrangements with the notified Power. The contention that the awards in question do not constitute “foreign awards” within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the 1937 Act is, accordingly, without merit.

19.       With regard to Question No.(v), we now turn to the objections raised by the Appellants concerning the underlying merits and enforceability of the awards. Section 7 of the 1937 Act prescribes limited grounds upon which enforcement of a foreign award may be declined. The Court seized of enforcement proceedings does not sit in appeal over the arbitral tribunal and, therefore, cannot reassess the evidence, reappraise the findings of the arbitrators, or reconsider the merits of the underlying contractual dispute merely because the party resisting enforcement seeks a different conclusion.

20.       The objections relating to the alleged delay in opening the Letters of Credit, responsibility for breach of the contracts, the effect of the Government’s prohibition on the export of cotton, and the pleas of force majeure and frustration essentially pertain to the merits of the contractual disputes between the parties. These matters were placed before and considered by the arbitral tribunals and thereafter, where applicable, by the Technical Appeal Committees of the LCA. The Appellants participated in the arbitral proceedings, presented their respective cases and availed themselves of the appellate mechanism available under the agreed arbitral regime. In such circumstances, the enforcement proceedings cannot be converted into another round of adjudication on the merits of the disputes unless the objections are shown to fall within one or more of the specific grounds contemplated by Section 7 of the 1937 Act.

21.       Insofar as GIC’s objection that it was denied a fair and meaningful opportunity of presenting its case is concerned, such an objection, if established, may undoubtedly be relevant within the framework of Section 7. However, a mere assertion of denial of opportunity is not sufficient. The record reflects that GIC participated in the arbitral proceedings and thereafter pursued the remedy available before the Technical Appeal Committee. Its grievance that the arbitrators or the Technical Appeal Committee failed to give due weight to particular contractual clauses or reached an erroneous conclusion upon the material before them pertains essentially to the manner in which the case and evidence were appreciated, rather than to denial of an opportunity to present its case. No material has been pointed out demonstrating that GIC was deprived of notice of the proceedings or prevented from presenting its case before the arbitral forum. The objection founded upon denial of a fair opportunity, therefore, does not furnish a ground for refusing enforcement.

22.       The objection concerning the award of interest also does not advance the case of the Appellants. The mere fact that an arbitral award includes interest does not constitute a ground for refusal of enforcement under Section 7. The award of interest formed part of the relief granted under the arbitral regime agreed upon by the parties, and no material has been shown to establish that such award was beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration or otherwise attracted any of the statutory grounds for refusal of enforcement. The enforcing Court cannot reassess the quantum or propriety of interest merely on the ground that the Appellants consider it excessive or unwarranted.

23.       Similarly, the plea of public policy does not provide a basis for reopening the merits of the awards. The mere fact that TCP is a State-owned enterprise and that enforcement of the awards may result in a financial liability ultimately borne by the public exchequer does not, by itself, render their enforcement contrary to the law or public policy of Pakistan. The learned Single Judge duly considered the objections relating to frustration and public policy and found no ground for refusing enforcement, and nothing has been shown before us which would justify a different conclusion within the limited parameters of Section 7.

24.       We, therefore, answer Question No.(v) in the negative and hold that the objections raised by the Appellants concerning the alleged contractual breaches, opening of the Letters of Credit, force majeure/frustration, appreciation of evidence, denial of opportunity, award of interest and public policy either pertain to the merits of the underlying disputes or have not been shown to satisfy any of the statutory grounds for refusing enforcement under Section 7 of the 1937 Act. Consequently, no case for interference with the impugned judgments and decrees on these grounds has been made out.

25.       Having answered the substantive questions raised by the Appellants, we now turn to the preliminary objection advanced by the Respondents regarding the maintainability of the present intra-court appeals in view of Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act.

26.       There is no dispute that the impugned judgments and decrees were rendered by the learned Single Judges while exercising the original civil jurisdiction of this Court. Section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 ordinarily provides an intra-court appeal against a decree or final order passed by a Single Judge in exercise of such jurisdiction. However, the right conferred by the Law Reforms Ordinance has to be considered alongside the specific restriction contained in Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act, which provides that upon pronouncement of judgment a decree shall follow and “no appeal shall lie from such decree except in so far as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award.”

27.       The 1937 Act is a special enactment governing recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, and Section 6(2) specifically regulates the appellate remedy against a decree passed thereunder. The provision does not merely prescribe the forum of appeal; rather, it expressly limits the circumstances in which an appeal may be maintained against such decree. The general right of intra-court appeal under Section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 cannot, therefore, be construed so as to render ineffective the express restriction contained in the special enactment.

28.       The reliance placed by learned counsel for the Appellants upon Brother Steel Mills Ltd. v. Mian Ilyas Miraj (PLD 1996 SC 543) establishes that jurisdiction exercised by a High Court under a special statute may nevertheless retain the character of original civil jurisdiction. That proposition, however, does not by itself answer the distinct question whether the special statute has expressly restricted the right of appeal from a decree passed in exercise of such jurisdiction. Section 6(2) specifically does so. Thus, even though the proceedings before the learned Single Judges were in exercise of original civil jurisdiction, the appellate remedy against the decrees passed therein remains subject to the limitation expressly imposed by Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act.

29.       We accordingly hold that an intra-court appeal against a decree passed under the 1937 Act can be entertained only within the parameters expressly preserved by Section 6(2), namely, where and to the extent that the decree is alleged to be in excess of or not in accordance with the award. In the present cases, the Appellants do not contend that the impugned decrees grant anything beyond the respective awards or fail to conform thereto; rather, their challenge is directed against the enforceability and merits of the awards themselves. Such challenge does not fall within the limited appellate window preserved by Section 6(2).

30.       Accordingly, Question No.(i) is answered by holding that the present appeals, insofar as they seek to challenge the enforceability or merits of the respective awards rather than asserting that the decrees are in excess of or not in accordance with such awards, fall outside the limited scope of appeal preserved by Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act. Even otherwise, as already held while answering Questions Nos.(ii) to (v), the substantive objections raised by the Appellants are devoid of merit and furnish no ground for interference with the impugned judgments and decrees.

31.       For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the awards in question qualify as “foreign awards” within the meaning of Section 2 of the 1937 Act and that none of the objections raised by the Appellants establishes any ground for refusal of enforcement under Section 7 thereof. Furthermore, the challenge raised in these appeals does not fall within the limited scope of appeal permissible under Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act. Consequently, the instant High Court Appeals are dismissed, along with all pending applications, with no order as to costs. The impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Single Judges are accordingly maintained.

JUDGE

JUDGE

Naveed PA