IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI

Ist Appeal No.164 of 2025

[Muhammad Shahid & another v. Hunain Shaikh]

PRESENT:

Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan

Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito

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Appellants Through Ms. Faiza Pathan, Advocate.

Date of hearing 05.05.2026

Date of Decision 05.05.2026

O R D E R

ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN, J: Through this First Appeal the appellants have challenged the judgment dated 11.09.2025 and decree dated 15.09.2025 passed by the learned Vth Additional District Judge, Karachi South, in Summary Suit No.133/2024 whereby the trial court decreed the suit for recovery of Rs.900,000/- in favor of the respondent/Plaintiff.

2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are that the respondent filed a summary suit under Order XXXVII Rules 1 & 2 CPC for the recovery of Rs.900,000/- based on three dishonored cheques. Record reflects that the appellants were served through multiple modes, and their counsel filed a Vakalatnama on 26.09.2024. However, the Appellants failed to file an application for leave to defend within the statutory period. Consequently, they were debarred from defending the suit on 16.12.2024. A subsequent application for recalling the order of debarring was dismissed by the trial court on 07.07.2025, leading to the passing of the ex-parte judgment and decree now under challenge.

3. Learned counsel for the appellants argues that the impugned judgment is a nullity as it was passed without proper service of summons in the prescribed form. It was further contended that the trial court erred in applying joint liability, asserting that the cheques were issued only by one appellant. Learned counsel while referring to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, contends that the parties were engaged in bona fide settlement discussions. Counsel maintained that the Appellants only became aware of the formal execution proceedings upon receipt of a notice dated 08.12.2025, and argues that procedural technicalities should not prevent a decision on merits.

4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the material available on record with her assistance. The record reflects that the impugned judgment was announced on 11.09.2025, whereas the instant appeal was filed on 15.12.2025, clearly beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The grounds urged in the application for condonation of delay are vague, general in nature, and unsupported by any cogent material. Mere assertions regarding settlement efforts or unavoidable circumstances do not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is a settled principle that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality but a substantive rule, which creates a valuable and vested right in favour of the decree-holder. The conduct of the appellants further demonstrates negligence, inasmuch as they failed to file an application for leave to defend within the statutory period despite having knowledge of the proceedings. Having failed to act with due diligence at the trial stage, the appellants cannot now be permitted to circumvent the statutory bar of limitation on the basis of vague and unsubstantiated pleas of out-of-court negotiations.

5. Even otherwise, on merits, the appellants have failed to point out any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment. It is an admitted position that the cheques issued by the appellants were dishonoured, thereby attracting liability not only under Section 489-F P.P.C., but also giving rise to a valid cause for civil recovery. The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly fastened liability upon the appellants.

6. Insofar as the contention of the counsel that only one of the appellants had signed the cheques is concerned, the same does not absolve the other from liability. The record reflects that the transaction in question arose out of joint business dealings between the parties; therefore, the suit was rightly maintainable against both defendants jointly and severally. In these circumstances, the plea raised by the appellants is misconceived and does not merit acceptance.

7. In view of the foregoing, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed, as the appellants have failed to establish “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the present First Appeal, being time-barred, is also dismissed in limine. Even otherwise, on merits, no illegality or perversity is discernible in the impugned judgment and decree. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. No order as to costs.

JUDGE

Naveed PA