IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI

High Court Appeal No.299 of 2023

[ Old Ravian’s Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., v. Abdul Sattar ]

PRESENT:

Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan

Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito

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Appellant Through Mr. M. Ramzan Tabassum, Advocate.

Respondent Through Mr. M. Farooque Hashim, Advocate.

Syed Hussain Shah, AAG Sindh.

Date of hearing 27.04.2026

Date of Decision 27.04.2026

O R D E R

ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN, J: Through this High Court Appeal, the Appellant, Old Ravian’s Co-operative Housing Society, has assailed the order dated 07.08.2023, passed in Execution Application No.30 of 2021, whereby the learned Single Judge of this court dismissed the application [CMA No.2099/2022] and objections raised by the appellant/judgment-debtor and granted the Execution Application filed by respondent/decree-holder.

2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that an Arbitration Award was passed by the Court of Registrar’s Nominee, Karachi, in A.B.N. Case No.60 of 2016 in favour of the respondent on 04.03.2017. The appellant assailed the said Award through Appeal No.14 of 2017 before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Sindh Camp at Karachi, which was dismissed on 11.04.2018. Thereafter, a Revision Application preferred before the Minister for Industries, Commerce and Cooperatives, Government of Sindh, Karachi, also met the same fate and was dismissed on 19.11.2019. Upon exhaustion of the aforesaid remedies, the respondent instituted the subject Execution Application in the year 2021. The appellant/judgment-debtor filed objections thereto, primarily on the grounds of limitation, absence of a formal execution certificate, and lack of territorial jurisdiction in view of the enactment of the Sindh Co-operative Societies Act, 2020. The learned Single Judge, however, found such objections to be misconceived and dismissed the same, while allowing the execution application, which has led to the filing of the present appeal.

3. The learned counsel for the Appellant vehemently argues that the Execution Application was time-barred under Article 181 of the Limitation Act. He contends that a delay of approximately 17 months exists because the period of limitation should be calculated from the original date of the Award in 2017. It was further contended that the learned Single Judge failed to address this mandatory point of law. Counsel also argues that the High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction because the Sindh Co-operative Societies Act, 2020, read with subsequent amendments to the Sindh Civil Courts Act, mandates that disputes regarding Co-operative Societies be heard by newly established Special Courts. Counsel further argues that the Execution Application was filed without the mandatory Section 59’s Certificate from the Registrar, rendering the proceedings incompetent from their inception. Finally, it was submitted that the failure of the Court to consider the pendency of C.P. No. D-3515 of 2022 resulted in a miscarriage of justice, necessitating the setting aside of the impugned order.

4. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent while supporting the impugned order has contended that the Award attained finality upon dismissal of the Revision on 19.11.2019, and the execution filed in August 2021 was within limitation. It was further argued that the respondent exercised due diligence in seeking the execution certificate, and any administrative delay cannot prejudice the decree-holder. On jurisdiction, it was contended that the Sindh Co-operative Societies Act, 2020 is not retrospective and does not divest vested rights, and that the Special Courts under the said law are not meant for execution proceedings. Lastly, the filing of Constitution Petition No.D-3515 of 2022 was termed as a counter-blast to delay execution, and dismissal of the appeal with costs was prayed for.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and, with their assistance, have perused the material available on record. Upon consideration, we find that the principal grievance of the appellant on the question of limitation is legally untenable and rests on a selective appreciation of the relevant timeline.

It is an admitted position that the Arbitration Award was rendered on 04.03.2017; however, the appellant availed the statutory remedies by filing an appeal and thereafter a revision. It is a settled principle of law, embodied in the doctrine of merger, that once a superior forum entertains a challenge and renders a decision, the original order merges into the order of the superior forum. In the present case, the Revision Application was dismissed on 19.11.2019, and it is from this date that the Award attained finality and became enforceable. Accordingly, the Execution Application instituted in August, 2021 falls well within the prescribed period of limitation of three years under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and the objection raised by the appellant in this regard is devoid of substance.

6. As regards the challenge to territorial jurisdiction and the applicability of the Sindh Co-operative Societies Act, 2020, we find that the conclusions drawn by the learned Single Judge are well-founded and call for no interference. The rights of the respondent stood vested and crystallized upon the passing of the Award, which attained finality in 2019, and such accrued rights cannot be divested by a subsequent enactment in the absence of express legislative intent to give it retrospective effect. Furthermore, the Special Courts established under the 2020 Act are primarily intended for the trial of offences and not for the execution of civil awards. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any provision in the said law which expressly or impliedly ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of execution of a pre-existing award. Similarly, the objection regarding the absence of a certificate under Section 59 is devoid of merit. The record reflects that the respondent had exercised due diligence in applying for the same, and any administrative transition arising out of the repeal of the earlier statute cannot be allowed to operate to the detriment of the decree-holder, nor can it be invoked by the judgment-debtor as a means to defeat or delay the lawful execution of the decree.

7. Insofar as the objection pertaining to the filing of Constitution Petition No.D-3515 of 2022 by the appellant is concerned, the same appears to be a belated “counter-blast,” having been instituted after a lapse of approximately 30 months from the date the arbitral proceedings attained finality. In our considered view, the said petition does not constitute a bona fide legal challenge, but rather reflects a contumacious attempt to obstruct and frustrate the lawful execution of the Award.

8. In view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that the objections raised by the appellant are purely technical in nature and devoid of any substantive legal basis. The appellant has remained unsuccessful at every forum, including before the Registrar, the Minister for Industries, and the learned Single Judge, yet persists in litigation with the apparent object of frustrating the execution proceedings.

9. It is a settled principle that courts must firmly discourage frivolous and dilatory tactics which undermine the sanctity of final adjudications. Protracted and repetitive litigation not only burdens the judicial system but also erodes public confidence in the enforceability of lawful decrees and awards. The present case exemplifies how technical objections, bereft of substantive merit, are employed to delay the course of justice. This Court, therefore, reiterates that execution proceedings are not to be treated as a fresh round of litigation, but as a mechanism to enforce rights that have already been finally determined and crystallized. Although this is a fit case for imposition of exemplary costs upon the appellant, however, taking a lenient view, we refrain from imposing the same.

10. In view of the above and for the foregoing reasons, we find no illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned order so as to warrant interference by this Court; consequently, the instant High Court Appeal is dismissed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Execution Application No.30 of 2021 on 07.08.2023 is maintained.

JUDGE

Naveed PA