ORDER SHEET IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH BENCH AT SUKKUR

Const. Pett. No.D-111 of 2025

DATE OF HEARING

ORDER WITH SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

Hearing of case

- 1. For orders on CMA No.497 of 2025
- 2. For hearing of main case

01.10.2025

Mr. Abdul Raheem Mahar, Advocate holds brief for Mr. Achar Khan Gabol, Advocate for the petitioner and submits that the latter is busy before another bench of this Court, however he further submits that petitioner has taken away the case file.

The petitioner, through present petition has sought directions for his appointment in the recruitment process allegedly initiated by the respondents in the year 2009. The instant petition, however, has been instituted in the year 2025. It is evident that the petitioner has approached this Court after an extraordinary and unexplained delay. The petitioner remained inactive for more than a decade without furnishing any cogent explanation.

It is a settled principle of law that delay and laches defeat equity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in *Hameed Akhtar Niazi v. Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad* (PLD 1996 SC 1185) has held that a person who sleeps over his rights and approaches the Court after considerable lapse of time cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction. Similarly, in *Khalid Mahmood Wattoo v. Government of Punjab* (1998 SCMR 2280), it was observed that a litigant who remains silent for years is not entitled to extraordinary relief.

In Muhammad Arif v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 SCMR 1189), the august Supreme Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction being discretionary cannot be invoked where the petition suffers from unexplained delay. Likewise, in Muhammad Akram v. Government of Pakistan (2004 SCMR 1879), it was emphasized that stale claims should not be entertained through constitutional petitions as doing so unsettles settled matters and prejudices vested rights of others.

In Asadullah Khan v. State Life Insurance Corporation (2016 SCMR 1736), the Hon'ble Supreme Court further laid down that laches not only manifest negligence on part of a litigant but also operate as a bar on the Court in extending discretionary relief, as such indulgence would encourage indiscipline in service matters and open floodgates of litigation.

Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is manifest that the petitioner neither possess any vested right to appointment nor can he be permitted to agitate a recruitment process of the year 2009 after the lapse of more than a decade. His indolence disentitles him to any relief under Article 199 of the Constitution.

It is equally well-settled that mere participation in a recruitment process or even qualifying tests/interviews does not create an indefeasible right of appointment. The competent authority retains discretion, subject to rules and availability of posts. Hence, the relief sought is misconceived.

In view of the above discussion, we hold that the instant petition is hopelessly barred by laches, devoid of merit, and is accordingly **dismissed.**

JUDGE

JUDGE

M. Ali*