THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

Criminal Accountability Acquittal Appeal No. 34 of 2021

Present: Mr. Justice Naimatullah Phulpoto

Mr. Justice Shamsuddin Abbasi

Appellant : Chairman NAB through Prosecutor General Accountability Islamabad through Mr. Muhammad Anwar Shaheen, Special Prosecutor NAB

Respondent : Nemo

Date of Hearing : 12.04.2023

Date of decision : 12.04.2023

JUDGMENT

NAIMATULLAH PHULPOTO, J.- Respondent/accused namely Tila Muhammad son of Zaid Muhammad Khan, Ex-Senior Auditor/processing officer FBR, Karachi, was tried by learned Judge, Accountability Court No. I, Sindh Karachi in Reference No. 21 of 2018 filed by DG NAB Karachi against respondent and others on the charges of corruption and corrupt practices punishable under Section 10 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and schedule attached thereto. Trial Court after regular trial, vide judgment dated 29.04.2021 came to the conclusion that prosecution has failed to bring home charges against the respondent Tila Muhammad and he was acquitted of the charges.

2. Appellant/Chairman NAB, being dissatisfied with the impugned judgment has filed this Criminal Accountability Acquittal Appeal.

3. We have heard Special Prosecutor NAB and with his assistance perused the evidence available on record. We agree with the findings of the trial Court that no positive evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove that the two refund claims attributed to respondent Tila Muhammad were indeed processed and/or recommended by him. Special Prosecutor NAB has failed to show us glaring errors of law and facts committed by trial Court. Acquittal judgment is neither perverse nor speculative, but it is based upon sound reasons, which require no interference by this court.

4. The scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. In other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled as held in the case of The State v. Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 554). Relevant portion is reproduced as under:-

“From the ratio of all the above pronouncements and those cited by the learned counsel for the parties, it can be deduced that the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence, that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty; in other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled. The courts shall be very slow in interfering with such an acquittal judgment, unless it is shown to be perverse, passed in gross violation of law, suffering from the errors of grave misreading or non-reading of the evidence; such judgments should not be lightly interfered and heavy burden lies on the prosecution to rebut the presumption of innocence which the accused has earned and attained on account of his acquittal. It has been categorically held in a plethora of judgments that interference in a judgment of acquittal is rare and the prosecution must show that there are glaring errors of law and fact committed by the Court in arriving at the decision, which would result into grave miscarriage of justice; the acquittal judgment is perfunctory or wholly artificial or a shocking conclusion has been drawn. Moreover, in number of dictums of this Court, it has been categorically laid down that such judgment should not be interjected until the findings are perverse, arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous (Emphasis supplied). The Court of appeal should not interfere simply for the reason that on the re-appraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could possibly be arrived at, the factual conclusions should not be upset, except when palpably perverse, suffering from serious and material factual infirmities. It is averred in The State v. Muhammad Sharif (1995 SCMR 635) and Muhammad Ijaz Ahmad v. Raja Fahim Afzal and 2 others (1998 SCMR 1281) that the Supreme Court being the final forum would be chary and hesitant to interfere in the findings of the Courts below. It is, therefore, expedient and imperative that the above criteria and the guidelines should be followed in deciding these appeals.”

5. For the above stated reasons, there is no merit in the appeal against acquittal. Finding of the innocence recorded against the respondent/accused by the trial Court are based upon sound reasons which require no interference at all. As such, this Criminal Accountability Acquittal Appeal is without merit and the same is dismissed.

J U D G E

J U D G E