ORDER SHEET

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

 

Criminal Revision Application No. 235 of 2022

DATE

ORDER WITH SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

 

  Present:          Mr. Justice Naimatullah Phulpoto

                                                                                                                            Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito

 

1.      For hearing of main case

2.      For hearing of M.A.No. 12314/2022

 

 

24.10.2023

 

Mr. Muhammad Irfan advocate for the applicant/accused

Mr. Khadim Hussain Addl. P.G

Complainant present in person

-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.

 

Naimatullah Phulpoto, J.-Through this Criminal Revision Application, applicant/accused Mudassir Khan has called in question order dated 20.09.2022 passed by learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No. X, Karachi in Special Case No.180/2020, whereby application under Section 23 of ATA 1997 for transfer of case to regular court moved by the applicant/accused was dismissed, while holding that learned Judge, ATC has jurisdiction in the matter.

2.         Notice of this application was issued to the respondents as well as Prosecutor General Sindh.

3.         Learned advocate for the applicant/accused mainly contended that this is a case of personal dispute between the applicant/accused and the complainant party. Learned counsel for the applicant/accused read out the contents of FIR, 161 Cr.P.C statements of the PWs and other material collected by the I.O during investigation and argued that trial by learned Judge, ATC would be without jurisdiction and order of the trial Court is unsustainable under the law. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the case reported as Muneer Malik and others vs. The State through P.G Sindh (2022 SCMR 1494).

4.         Addl. P.G did not support the orders passed by trial Court and frankly conceded that ATC lacks jurisdiction in the matter because incident was the result of personal dispute between the parties. Complainant who is present in person also submits that appropriate orders may be passed in the matter.

5.         After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have perused the contents of the FIR, 161 Cr.P.C statements of the P.Ws and other material collected during investigation. We have also perused orders passed by trial Court. It appears that occurrence, which resulted due to personal enmity, element of terrorism is missing in this case. Mere fact that such a crime was committed in a gruesome or it was case of indiscriminate firing by itself would not be sufficient to bring the act within the meaning of terrorism or terrorist activities. In the case of Waris Ali and 5 others vs. The State (2017 SCMR 1572), the Apex Court has held as under:

“……… The careful reading of all the relevant provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 would show that the sole and primary object of the same is to curb and eliminate terrorism and terrorist activities and also the groups involved in the same, besides to eliminate the sectarian and factional violence committed with the same object therefore, ordinary crimes due to personal motive or revenge shall not be taken at par with acts of terrorism or terrorist activities, the sole object of which is nothing but to terrorize the society/community and the State as a whole. There is a sky high difference between the crimes of the old category and the new one, for which special law has been enacted.”  

 

6.         In the case of Ghulam Hussain vs. State (PLD 2020 SC 61), it was held by the Apex Court as under:

“For what has been discussed above it is concluded and declared that for an action or threat of action to be accepted as terrorism within the meanings of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 the action must fall in subsection (2) of section 6 of the said Act and the use or threat of such action must be designed to achieve any of the objectives specified in clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 6 of that Act or the use or threat of such action must be to achieve any of the purpose mentioned in clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 of that Act. It is clarified that any action constituting an offence, howsoever grave, shocking, brutal, gruesome or horrifying, does not qualify to be termed as terrorism if it is not committed with the design or purpose specified or mentioned in clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 of the said Act. It is further clarified that the actions specified in subsection (2) of section 6 of that Act do not qualify to be labeled or characterized as terrorism if such actions are taken in furtherance of personal enmity or private vendetta.”   

 

7.         We have come to the conclusion that incident was result of personal enmity and element of terrorism is missing in this case. While respectfully relying upon the above cited judgments, we have no hesitation to hold that Anti-Terrorism Court lacks jurisdiction in the matter, hence impugned order is not sustainable under the law. The same is set aside. Trial Court is directed to transfer the case to the concerned regular Sessions Court for its disposal in accordance with law.

8.         Revision application is allowed in the above terms.

            JUDGE

 

JUDGE

 

Wasim ps