ORDER SHEET
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI
IInd Appeal No.14 of 2007
Date Order with signature of Judge
Appellant Major Inayatullah through Mr. Ali Sher Habibani, advocate.
Respondent No.1 Major (rtd.) Muhammad Nazir through Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed Memon, advocate.
…..
KHAWAJA NAVEED AHMED, J., This IInd Appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment dated 13.12.2006 and decree dated 23.12.2006, passed by learned VIth Addl. District Judge, Karachi (South) in Civil Appeal No.107/2006. The appellant had also lost the case in the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 05.4.2006 passed by IVth Sr. Civil Judge, Karachi (South) in Civil Suit No.171/2003 (Old No.872/1986).
2. Brief facts of the case are that the present appellant in the original civil jurisdiction of this Court had filed Suit No.872/1986 against respondents Nos.1 & 2. The facts disclosed in the plaint of Suit No.872/1986 are that the appellant is the owner of Plot No.15, measuring 2000 square yards, Khayaban-e-Ittehad, situated in Phase VI, DHA, Karachi, (hereinafter referred to as the "said Property"). The respondent No.1 is an estate broker and carries on his business in Lahore and at Karachi. The respondent No.1 was well known to the appellant being an estate agent. The appellant wanted to sell the said Property and as such he assigned this job to respondent No.1, who had offered his service to sell the said Property. It is the case of the appellant that looking at the past conduct and inducement of the respondent No.1, the appellant had signed the Transfer Affidavit, Letter, specimen signature (without attestation) and undertaking as the appellant at that time was on duty at a far off place. However, the case of the appellant is that he had made it clear to the respondent No.1 that the appellant himself will appear before Administrator of respondent No.2 for verification of his signatures and for receiving the price of the said Property after respondent No.1 finds out an intending purchaser. The appellant had further stated in his Plaint that he had signed all the transfer documents in the month of September, 1985 at Lahore but his signatures were not verified by any authority at Lahore or any one else as are required under the Rules of respondent No.2. The appellant further mentioned in the Plaint that after signing the documents when he did not hear anything from respondent No.1 for a long time he became suspicious and had written a detailed letter on 09.10.1985 to the respondent No.2 informing them that respondent No.1 had fraudulently acquired the documents of the said Property from him and that he should notify all the colonels and authorities above them and Notary Public not to sign any document(s) without the presence of the appellant. The respondent No.2 on 14.10.1986 replied to the appellant that valid documents of the said Property have already been received by them and as such the appellant should seek legal remedy in the Court of law.
3. It is further mentioned in the Plaint that on 03.11.1986 the appellant had given a letter to respondent No.2 for cancellation of all the documents, submitted in respect of the said Property. The appellant had finally come to know that respondent No.1 had applied to respondent No.2 for transfer of the said Property in the name of respondent No.1. Prior to this Suit No.872/1986, the appellant had filed Civil Suit No.1530/1986 in the Court of VIIIth Civil Judge, Karachi (West), which suit was withdrawn by the appellant before filing Suit No.872/1986 in this Court.
4. In Suit No.1530/1986 it is stated that status-quo order was also passed on 06.11.1986 till next date of hearing i.e. 11.11.1986. It is further alleged in the Plaint that service of the said status-quo order was effected on 06.11.1986. It is further stated in the Plaint that the appellant had received a letter from respondent No.2 on 11.11.1986 that respondent No.2 on 05.11.1986 had already transferred the said Property in favour of respondent No.1. Further, the case of the appellant is that the said transfer is fraudulent and collusive and as such he has sought declaration and injunction as follows:-
"a) Declaring that the transfer order/letter dated 5.11.86 issued by the defendant No.2 is illegal void and has no legal effect and the plaintiff's aforesaid plot No.15, Khayaban-e-Ittahad, Phase II, Defence Housing Authority, Karachi, continues to be the property of the plaintiff;
b) Canceling the aforesaid letter of the defendant No.2 calling all the documents purporting to the transfer of the plaintiff's Plot No.15, K hayaban-e-Ittehad, Phase II, Defence Housing Authority, Karachi, and if the said plot has again been transferred by the defendants to any other person/persons the same may also be cancelled and calling all further documents purporting to the subsequent transfer of the plaintiffs abovesaid plot;
b/1) That it be declared that the Agreement to sell dated 14.9.86, receipt for Rs.5,00,000/- transfer affidavit dated 14.9.86, transfer letter, undertaking, authority letter and specimen signatures purported to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant No.1 transferring/selling him the plot of land bearing No.15 situated in Phase VI of Khayaban-e-Ittehad, Defence Housing Authority, Karachi, admeasuring 2,000/- sq. yards were obtained from the plaintiff by the defendant No.1 fraudulently and by misrepresentation and that the same are illegal, made up, forged as to their contents without consideration, void and are liable to be delivered up and cancelled;
b/2) To adjudge all documents/instruments/receipts including the documents/receipts stated above in clause (b/1) in possession of the defendant No.2 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant No.1 creating any right, title or interest in plot No.15, situated in Phase VI of Khayaban-e-Ittehad, Defence Housing Authority, Karachi, admeasuring 2000 square yards are illegal, made up, void, without consideration, forged as to their contents and are liable to be delivered up and cancelled;
b/3) A perpetual injunction restraining the defendant No.1, his heirs/representatives, executors, administrators, attorneys, assigns or any other person or persons claiming through, for, or under him from acting upon the said documents/instruments/receipts mentioned in clause (b/1) above thereby claiming any right title or interest of the plaintiff in plot in suit;
b/4) A mandatory injunction be granted directing the defendant No.2 to deliver to this Hon'ble Court all those instruments/receipt/documents in its possession mentioned in clause (b/1) above purporting to have been executed by the plaintiff effecting in any manner, right, title or interest of the plaintiff in the plot in suit so as to adjudge the same void and cancelled;
c) The defendants be permanently restrained from transferring the suit plot to any other person in any manner of whatsoever nature;
d) Cost of suit;
e) any other relief this Hon'ble Court deems fit under the circumstances of the case."
5. The respondent No.1 was served and he has taken following legal objections in his written statement:-
1) That the suit is not maintainable as framed under the law.
2) That the plaint does not disclose any cause of action.
3) That the plaintiff has no legal character and locus standi to file this suit against the defendant No.1.
4) That the suit is incompetent under the specific relief act.
5) That the suit is under valued.
6. The respondent No.2 was served but never appeared and as such was made ex-parte on 05.4.1987. The respondent No.1 in his written statement has stated that respondent No.1 is the legal and lawful owner of the said Property. The respondent No.1 has taken the stand that the said Property had been validly transferred in the name of respondent No.1 by respondent No.2 vide Transfer Order bearing No.DHA/I/A-10769 dated 05.11.1996 after completing all the legal formalities.
7. The respondent No.1 had stated that factual position is that the appellant and respondent No.1 had entered into an Agreement of Sale dated 14.9.1986 for sale of the said Property for the total sale consideration amounting to Rs.500,000/-. The appellant after receiving the payment had issued valid receipt and had signed following documents:-
8. The respondent No.1 had further stated that the requisite documents have been duly attested by the competent authority. The Court upon pleadings of the parties had framed the following issues:-
9. The trial Court had decided all the issues in negative and consequently had dismissed the suit. The trial Court has given cogent reasons in support of its order which were challenged by the appellant before the Sessions Court in Civil Appeal No.107/2006. This appeal was heard and decided by learned VIIth Addl. District Judge, Karachi (South), who vide impugned order dated 13.12.2006 was pleased to dismiss the appeal, hence this IInd Appeal.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length and with their assistance have gone through the material available on record.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant had taken the legal objection that findings of the Courts below are based on misreading of evidence, surmises and assumptions. He has further stated that the trial Court has based its findings on erroneous reasoning and incorrect exposition of law by ignoring the material evidence, which was available on record. Learned counsel for the appellant at the outset had taken legal objection stating that the trial Court has not given its findings on each issue separately as required by order XX, Rule 5, CPC and Order 41, Rule 31, CPC. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the cases of ALI MUHAMMAD v. MUHAMMAD HAYAT reported in 1982 SCMR 816 and QAMARUDDIN v. PROVINCE OF SINDH reported in 2002 CLC 825.
In the case of ALI MUHAMMAD surpa the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that:
"The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal preferred against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The matter, therefore, was brought before the Lahore High Court and was taken up by a learned Single Judge of the said Court at Multan. The learned Judge held that the judgment of the trial Court was not properly written because while deciding issues Nos.1-5 he failed to give reasons upon each separate issue and that the learned Additional District Judge, in his appellate judgment, also did not attend to these issues in a legal and proper manner. Attention in this connection was drawn to the provisions of Order XX rule 5 of the CPC, which provided that "in suits in which issues have been famed, the Court shall state its findings or decision, with the reasons therefore, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit" and it was observed that the trial Judge was bound to give reasons for his decision on each separate issue and the disposal of issues Nos.1-5 by simply observing that "all these issues have no substantive force in view of findings given under issues No.6" was not a proper decision in accordance with law. He, therefore, accepted the revision petition, set aside the impugned judgments and decrees of the trial Court and that of the learned Additional District Judge and remanded the case to the trial Court for rewriting the judgment after hearing the parties with the direction that the trial Court should decide the case within two months. This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the foresaid judgment of the High Court.
2…………..
3. We do not agree. The learned trial Court had disregarded the mandatory provisions of Order XX, rule 5 CPC and, therefore, had acted in exercise of his jurisdiction with material irregularity. The High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction was competent to make such order in the case as it thought fit."
In the case of QAMARUDDIN surpa a learned single Judge of this Court has followed the guideline laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of ALI MUHAMMAD v. MUHAMMAD HAYAT reported in 1982 SCMR 816, the relevant portion whereof has been quoted herein above.
12. The second objection of learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court has wrongly placed the burden of proof upon the appellant. Learned counsel has vehemently argued that in this case the burden of proof was not on the appellant as he had denied the transaction/execution of sale agreement. He has further stated that where execution of the agreement is denied by a party the burden of proof shifts on the person who asserts it or it shifts on the person who is beneficiary of the documents. He states that Article 17(2) of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 has not been complied with. In support of his arguments he has placed reliance on judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of SHAKIL AHMAD V. HAMID HASSAN reported in PLD 1968 Karachi 365. The relevant portion of which is reproduced herein below:-
"6. Now with regard to the execution of the promissory note, the learned District Judge has misapprehended the evidence when he has said that the plaintiff's version did not amount to a denial of the defendant's version that the pronote was already type written and was presented to him at the Arambagh Police Station where he was called by the SHO."
It has further been observed in the same Judgment that:-
"The further circumstance is that the defendant having taken a disclaimer with regard to the alleged balance of the claim of the plaintiff and having taken in writing acknowledgement of full settlement did not move his little finger in the matter so as to suggest that he had executed promissory note under pressure."
The learned Division Bench in this Judgment has further observed as under:-
"……. The learned District Judge committed an error of law by placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving consideration in the first instance."
Yet, on another place, in the same Judgment, the learned Division Bench has observed that:-
"……... With respect to the learned District Judge this approach was wrong. There was a presumption in law with regard to the receipt of consideration by the defendant."
This case law, cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellant in fact supports the case of the Respondent.
13. It is next argued by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the learned trial Court as well as appellate Court have not appreciated the fact that financial documents must be attested by the two witnesses. In this case the documents have been attested by one Imtiaz, brother of respondent No.1, who is the interested witness while the other witness had disowned the documents. He has placed reliance on the case of MUHAMMAD YAQOOB V. NASEER HUSSAIN reported in PLD 1995 Lahore 395. In this authority the Court has observed as under:-
"…………. Moreover, the document creating financial liability as per Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order has to be attested by the two witnesses.
"(2) Unless otherwise provided in any law relating to the enforcement of Hudood or any other special law.—
(a) in matters pertaining to financial or future obligations, if reduced to writing, the instrument shall be attested by two men, or one man and two women, so that one may remind the other, if necessary, and evidence shall be led accordingly."
While according to Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, to prove the execution, two attesting witnesses at least have to be called by the party relying on it."
He has further stated that attesting witness Muhammad Sardar had filed his affidavit-in-evidence but he was never produced in Court and as such the document has not been proved. He has relied upon the case of ANWAR BEGUM v. MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE reported in 1991 MLD 1182. This is a rent matter and the head notes (b) and (d) are reproduced as under:-
"(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)
…Art. 133…Statement in Court not challenged in cross-examination would be deemed to be correct.
(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)
…Art. 72… Proof of documents… No reliance could be placed on document not proved in accordance with law."
14. Learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that receipt of sale consideration has been denied by the appellant. Any agreement without consideration is void. In support of his contention he has relied upon the case of RASHEEDA BEGUM v. MUHAMMAD YOUSAF reported in 2002 SCMR 1089. Head notes (c), (f), (g) and (i) of this authority are reproduced hereunder:-
"(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)
…Arts. 17(2)(a)& 79…Agreement to sell…Attestation by witnesses…Proof of execution… Agreement to sell involving future obligations, if reduced to writing and executed after coming into force of Qanun-e-shahdat, 1984, is required by Art. 17(2)(a) of Qanun-e-Shahdat, 1984 to be attested by two male or one male and two female witnesses, as the case may be—Such agreement has to be proved in accordance with the provisions of Art. 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984.
(f) Evidence Act (I of 1872)
S. 68—Qanun-e-Shahdat (10 of 1984)……………. If agreement to sell has been reduced into writing and attested by witnesses, then its execution must be proved in accordance with provisions of S.68 of Evidence Act, 1872, notwithstanding the fact that the same applied only to document required by law to be attested………………..
(g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)
…S.12…Evidence Act (I of 1877), S 68…Suit for specific performance…Agreement to sell attested by two witnesses…Execution, proof of…Non-examination of attesting witnesses…Effect…Execution of agreement had not been proved within contemplation of S.68 of Evidence Act, 1872…Bald statement of petitioner writer, who had allegedly scribed the agreement to sell, was not enough to prove its execution.
(i) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)
…S.12…Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 17(2)(a) & 79…Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell…Plaintiff examined only one attesting witness…Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that agreement to sell had not been proved in accordance with Art. 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984…Validity…Agreement to sell having been attested by two witnesses and executed after promulgation of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 ought to have been proved in accordance with Art. 79 thereof…Evidence on record consisted of only one attesting witnesses…Payment of earnest money had not been proved…Evidence produced by plaintiff did not meet the requirement of Art. 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984."
He has stated that for typing the agreement stamp paper was purchased on 14.9.1986, undertaking was signed on 14.10.1986 while the attestation was made on 14.9.1986.
15. Regarding concurrent findings by the Courts below, the learned advocate for the appellant has vehemently argued at length that this Court is fully competent to set aside the concurrent findings. In support of this point, he has relied upon the case of IFTIKHAR v. KHADIM HUSSAIN (PLD 2002 SC 607), RABIA BIBI v. ALAM BIBI (PLD 1987 AJ&K 79), MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, BANNU v. MUNAWAR KHAN (PLD 1982 Peshawar 61) and ALAMDAR HUSSAIN V. NAZIR HUSSAIN (2004 SCMR 595).
16. In the case of IFTIKHAR (PLD 2002 SC 607), cited by the learned Counsel it has been observed by the Honourable Supreme Court that:-
"4……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. We are conscious of the fact that concurrent findings are not sacrosanct and can be reversed when such findings are based on insufficient evidence, misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material evidence, erroneous assumption of facts, patent errors of law or consideration of inadmissible evidence or something so outrageous or so gross as to shock the very basis of justice."
Next, the learned Counsel for the appellant cited the case of RABIA BIBI (PLD 1987 AJ&K 79). In this case, the Honourable Court has observed as under:-
"12. An appeal in the High Court, as contemplated by section 100 CPC is only contempt if the decision appealed against is contrary to law or some usage having the force of law or some material issue on this point has not been determined or the Court trying the suit has committed substantial error or procedural defect which has caused error or defect in the decision of the suit on merits.
13. The objection taken up by the learned counsel for the respondent precisely is that the adverse possession is a question of fact and when both the lower Courts after appraisal of the evidence in accordance with law found that the possession of the appellant over the suit land is not adverse, the High Court is not competent to reopen it. This objection must have been weighty if the appraisal of the evidence brought on the file would have been conducted in accordance with law. But whenever and wherever the High Court finds that the lower Court, while determining the question of fact has ignored some evidence or misread it, it becomes its duty to examine the question in the light of the evidence in its true perspective and determine it as required by law.
14. The finding of fact arrived at by the lower Court on the question of fact is biding on the High Court if the Judge, after having attended to it, has conducted its examination critically and formed his view about the point at issue but when the Judge, without making any reference to the evidence, forms an opinion or misreads it and arrives at a wrong decision, it will not be a finding which can have a binding on the High Court."
Then, the learned Counsel for the appellant cited the case of MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, BANNU (PLD 1982 Peshawar 61). In this case, a learned Division Bench of Peshawar High Court has observed as under:-
"6. The law is now well settled that where the concurrent findings of the two Courts below on any question are in utter disregard of the mandatory provisions of the law or Rules, the High Court would not only have the powers but would be duty bound to disturb those findings when the matter is brought before it for adjudication in second appeal."
The other authority cited by the learned Counsel on the point that this Court is fully competent to set aside the concurrent findings is the case of ALAMDAR HUSSAIN (2004 SCMR 595) wherein a Full Bench of Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under:-
"14. Having examined all aspects of the matter, we find that no exception could be taken to the conclusions reached by the Honourable High Court which had persuaded the learned Judge in Chamber to set aside the concurrent judgments of the two subordinate Courts. Needless to mention here that there was no absolute rule that the concurrent judgments of the subordinate Court could never be interfered with by the High Court even if the said judgments were found to be based on gross misreading, non-reading or misconception of the evidence available on record. Laying down such a law would have the effect of setting the provisions of section 100 and section 115 of CPC at naught."
17. Learned counsel for the appellant in the end has argued that this Court be pleased to set aside the judgment and decree of both the Courts below and cancel the documents of respondent No.1 in respect of ownership of the said Property.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued at length on the competence of this Court to set aside the concurrent findings, limitation, not giving findings by the Court below on each issue, shifting of burden of proof, requirement of attestation of two witnesses of a document as contemplated in Article 17 of Qanun-e-Shahdat and cited cases mentioned and quoted herein above on the maintainability of II Appeal. According to him, if both the attesting witnesses of a document has died the stamp vendor and inscribe should have been examined to prove the due execution of the agreement. The learned Counsel has vehemently argued that sale agreement has not been proved and no reliance can be placed on a document which has not been proved according to law. He has submitted that authenticity of document of "sale agreement" is doubtful as it's execution has been denied by the appellant, two attesting witnesses have not been examined and stamp paper for agreement was purchased on 14-9-1986 while the stamp paper for undertaking was purchased on 14-10-1986 but both the documents have been attested on 14-9-1986. The learned Counsel states that there are only two attesting witnesses while the Sessions Judge has observed that there are three attesting witnesses. The learned Counsel has further argued that in the present case receipt of sale consideration is denied and it has not been proved, therefore, the alleged sale agreement is void, being without consideration. He quoted law that any sale agreement without sale consideration is void. It has been argued that how the Defence Housing Authority has transferred the plot in question to the Respondent No.1. The learned Counsel attacked the evidence of Brig. (R) Ghulam Abbas and submitted that the lower Court has not read the evidence of this witness as a whole as required by Article 133 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. He submitted that reading evidence in segregation to the cross-examination is unlawful. He emphasized on the reply of witness Brig (R) Ghulam Abbas when a specific question was put to him, which reads as follows:-
"Question: Did the plaintiff Maj. (R) Inayatullah appeared before you, to sign the documents?
Answer: I do not remember."
The learned Counsel submitted that in such circumstances the attestation is not proved. The learned Counsel further submitted that signatures were obtained on the blank document, therefore, such document cannot be enforceable. In a nutshell, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has argued that this Court is competent to set aside the concurrent findings of both the Courts below and hold that no valid sale transaction has taken place in respect of the property in question and the Respondent No.2 was in collusion with the Respondent No.1. The prayer is that both the judgments of Courts below be set aside and the ownership of the plot be restored to the appellant by cancelling the sale transaction in this respect.
19. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 Mr. Mushtaq A. Memon, has vehemently opposed the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant. He has at the very outset stated that this appeal is time barred by limitation and has been filed after 118 days of the judgment and as such is liable to be dismissed on the sole ground of its being time barred. He has taken this Court through court file to show the copy of judgment filed alongwith the appeal. The judgment appears at page 51 of the Court file, which is dated 13.12.2006. The last page of the judgment i.e. page 61 of the Court file shows that copy was applied on 19.12.2006, copy was ready on 08.1.2007, copy was collected on 13.1.2007 and appeal was filed on 10.4.2007. Learned advocate states that 18 days of December, 31 days of January, 28 days of February, 31 days of March and ten days of April make a total of 118 days. According to Article 156 of the Limitation Act, second appeal can be filed within 90 days of the judgment. Learned counsel says that if 26 days, which have been consumed in obtaining the copy, are deducted from 118 days still appeal has been filed after 92 days. The appeal is to be filed within 90 days and explanation for delay of each day has to be given. In support of his contention he has relied upon the case of LAL KHAN v. IFTIKHAR AHMED (PLD 2004 SC 894), relevant portion is at page 895, which is reproduced herein below:-
"5. We have heard the learned counsel for both the sides and have also gone through the impugned judgment carefully, whereby the delay has been condoned by the learned High Court. In this behalf it is to be noted that according to the mandate of section 100, appeal before the High Court is competent against every decree passed in appeal. The plain reading of this section does not provide that appeal would also be competent before the High Court against the order of the Civil Judge. Admittedly under Article 156 of the 1st Schedule of the Limitation Act, 90 days time has been prescribed for filing of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court except in the case covered by Articles 151/153 and the time of 90 days shall run from the date of order appealed from. Thus it can safely be concluded that when an order of the District Judge has to be appealed against appeal is to be submitted within 90 days, notwithstanding the fact as to whether procedure laid down under Order XLI Rule 2 CPC for preferring the R.S.A. has been followed or not. It is to be noted that this Rule 2 is applicable only within the jurisdiction of the High Court. Undoubtedly, a copy of the judgment of the Court of first instance (trial Court) is required to be accompanied with the memo. of R.S.A. but the time in obtaining such certified copy shall not be excluded under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, because provisions of this section indicates that the time in obtaining certified copy shall be excluded in respect of the judgment complained of. Admittedly, while submitting R.S.A. the judgment of the Civil Judge/trial Court is not complained of as the appeal is filed against the judgment of District Judge. In this context, reference may be made to the case of Kala v. Allah Dad PLD 1977 Lah. 376 and Amir Hussain Shah v. Umra 1998 SCMR 800.
6. Thus for the above reasons, it is held that the time spent in obtaining certified copy of the judgment complained of before the High Court has to be excluded under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and if any delay is occurred beyond the period of 90 days in filing of R.S.A., for the reason that certified copy of the order/decree was not ready, that shall be condonable subject to the provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act and the conclusion drawn by the learned High Court in condoning the delay in the instant case is not tenable in the eye of law.
7. It would also not be out of context to note that in the instant case certified copy of the judgment of the District Judge against which appeal was filed before the High Court, was obtained quite within time. Similarly application for obtaining certified copy of the judgment/decree of the Civil Judge dated 24th January, 1978 was submitted on 10th June, 1978, which was supplied on 1st July, 1978 and as per the requirement of law last date for filing of appeal before the High Court was 11th September, 1978, but the respondent did not file appeal, despite of having in their possession two necessary documents, therefore, examining the matter from this angle as well, it can safely be concluded that delay in filing of R.S.A. before the High Court was intentional and not for the reasons beyond the control of the respondent."
20. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has relied upon the case of MUHAMMAD SHARIF v. CANTONMENT BOARD (1994 MLD 2442), relevant portion is at page 2450, which is reproduced herein below:-
"24. In the present case, as already observed, there has been misreading of record and misconstruction of the true legal position. The limitation in this case started running on the decision of the first appeal by the learned District Judge on 11.3.1960. The time spent by the respondent in obtaining copy of the judgment of the District Judge was 12 days while for obtaining copy of the judgment of the Civil Court, only one day was spent. The copying days thus come to 13 days. Even if we allow the respondent, the benefit of sections 5 and 14 and condoned the period of 167 days during which the review application remained pending yet the respondent should have filed the appeal within 90 days (limitation) + 167 days plus 13 days = 270 days. The appeal which was filed after 309 days was, clearly barred by time and should have been dismissed as such."
21. Replying to the other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has argued that the trial Court has given findings separately on each issue as provided under Order XX, Rule 5, CPC. As far as the appellate Court is concerned, it is governed by Order 41, Rule 31, CPC. He has relied upon the case of UMAR DIN v. GHAZANFAR ALI (1991 SCMR 1816). In the case of UMAR DIN supra a Division Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"2. The main contention of the petitioner is that the learned Additional District Judge while accepting the appeal of the respondents did not record separate findings on each issue and for that reason he had not delivered a proper judgment.
3. We have seen the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge and find no merit in the contention. It is true that the learned District Judge has not discussed each issue separately but he has given his findings on all the points that were raised before him. Therefore, it cannot be said that the judgment recorded by him is not a proper one."
22. Regarding the contention of the appellant in respect of financial documents to be attested by two witnesses learned counsel for respondent No.1 has argued that sale agreement is not a financial document. In support of this contention, he has produced P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, Third Edition, Volume 2, D-I, 2005 at page 1831, wherein the word 'financial document' has been defined as under:-
"Financial document. Any document that can be used like money to make purchase, such as a bill of exchange or cheque (investment)"
23. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has relied upon the case of MUHAMMED SHARIF v. MST. SARDARAN BIBI (2002 MLD 1002). The facts of this case were also more or less similar to the facts of the case in hand and on the point that one witness had attested the sale agreement, the Court has observed as under:-
"6. Contrarily examination of evidence of petitioner as D.W.2 and that of Muhammed Siddique appearing as D.W.1 being the attesting witness of Ex. P.1/1 is consistent, coherent, reasonable and confident inspiring D.W.1, categorically stated that he was the attesting witness of Exh.P.1/1 which was duly thumb-marked by respondent No.1 who also received the consideration amount and that the possession of the suit property was duly handed over to the petitioner on payment of the sale consideration and that the petitioner deposited the P.D.A dues as well. In the case of “Abdul Wali Khan through Legal Heirs and others v. Muhammed Saleh” (1998 SCMR 760), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to hold that: --
“even one marginal witness was enough to prove execution of agreement to sell if his statement was confidence-inspiring and production of two marginal witnesses thereof was not necessary.”
This Court in the case of “Manzoor Hussain Khan v. Mst. Asia Begum and 21 others (1990 CLC 1014) held that under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order of 1984, agreement to sell was not required to be attested by witnesses and that provisions of Article 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order cannot be applied to the agreement to sell. In view thereof, production of two marginal witnesses or the scribe in the present case was not necessary.
7. The learned Additional District Judge failed to consider the effect of statement of P.W.1/respondent No.1 and also misread the evidence of D.W.1 and D.W.2. Further more the learned Additional District Judge also misinterpreted the law by rejecting Exh.P.1/1 for non-production of two attesting witnesses of Exh.P.1/1 and holding that production of only one attesting witness i.e. D.W.1 was insufficient to prove the said “Iqrarnama”. In the present case under Article 78 of Qanu-e-Shahadat Order, petitioner adequately proved execution of Exh.P.1/1 by respondent o.1 and transfer of the suit property to him by her upon receipt of sale consideration. The record of F.D.A. also proves the transaction, transfer, handing over of possession by respondent No.1 to the petitioner."
24. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 next has relied upon the case of MUHAMMAD SHAIQ HUSSAIN V. SAMIR MANZOOR KHOKHAR (2003 CLC 1652) wherein a learned single Judge of Lahore High Court on Order XX Rule 5 CPC has observed as under:-
"17. The objection that the learned trial Court had disposed of Issues Nos.5, 6 and 12 together which had prejudiced the trial is also devoid of force, as the said issues were inter-connected and their disposal as such did not cause any prejudice to the petitioner.
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22. The principles of administration of justice particularly with reference to the Islamic Jurisprudence have now come to be well-settled that all procedures are basically meant for advancement of substantial justice. Law has never favoured the making of a fetish of a technicality. I am fortified in holding this view by the rule of law laid down in the case of Messrs Bisvil Spinners (Pvt.) Ltd. V. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance4, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 96 wherein the following principle has been reaffirmed: --
“If a piece of evidence is otherwise relevant and pertinent for the decision of an issue, it is untenable argument that notwithstanding the fact that it is genuine and otherwise reliable, it should not be made use of because in the process employed for the collection of the material, an irregularity or for that matter an illegality was committed.”
25. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has also relied upon the case of ABDUL SATTAR V. BASHIR AHMED (2004 CLC 370) wherein a learned single Judge of this High Court on Order XX Rule 5 CPC has observed as under:-
"The contention that the trial Court as well as Appellate Court failed to consider each issue separately, therefore, the impugned judgments are liable to be set aside is misconceived. It is well-settled that were certain issues are inextricably linked with each other and those were considered together, such consideration was not at all violative of the mandate contained in Order II, rule 5, CPC. In this context reference can be made to the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in case of Azizullah Khan and others v. Gul Muhammed Khan and others reported in 2000 SCMR 1647.
It is incumbent upon a party seeking relief under revisional jurisdiction to show that the impugned judgments are contrary to law and facts. Nothing has been pointed out from which it could be said or deduced that the impugned judgments are perverse, arbitrary or contrary to law and facts. The right of a party cannot be vanished merely on technicalities. Apart from this there are concurrent findings of two Courts below. The concurrent findings of facts arrived at by two Courts below could not be interfered or disturbed without strong reasons merely on the ground that on reappraisal of evidence different view is possible. In this context I am fortified by the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in case of Anwar Zaman and 5 others v. Bahadur Sher and others reported in 2000 SCMR 431."
26. On the point of concurrent findings of the two Courts below, Mr. Mushtaq A. Memon, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1, has relied upon the case of MUHAMMAD FEROZE V. MUHAMMAD JAMAAT ALI (2006 SCMR 1304), wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“ 12. It is well-settled that concurrent findings of fact by two Courts below cannot be disturbed by High Court in second civil appeal, much less in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under section 115, CPC unless the two Courts below, while recording the findings of fact have exercised jurisdiction not vested n them or failed to exercise jurisdiction so conferred. Scope of interference with concurrent findings of fact by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is very limited. While examining legality of judgment and decree in exercise of its powers under section 115, CPC, High Court cannot upset finding of fact, however, erroneous such finding is, on reappraisal of evidence, and take a different view of evidence. Such finding of act can only be interfered with by High Court if the Courts below had either misread evidence on record or while assessing or evaluating the evidence had omitted from consideration some important piece of evidence, which had direct bearing on issues involved in the case. Such findings would also be open to interference where approach of the Courts below was perverse.
13. Reverting to the third submission of the learned counsel for petitioners, suffice it to observe that it is well-entrenched principle of law that ordinarily High Court would not sit in appeal over the concurrent judgment of the trial Court and appeal Court in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Scope and purview of revision, even though comparable with the powers of appellate Court is not synonymous with appellate forum in the strict sense of the terms, as observed hereinabove. Jurisdiction of High Court is limited and restricted to the cases where two Courts below have misread the evidence or excluded from consideration a material piece of evidence having bearing on the facts of a case; where impugned judgments suffer from error of jurisdiction or are based on extraneous considerations; the judgments of the forums below have violated settled principles of law for appreciation of evidence and lastly where the Court below while dealing with a particular case have recorded reasons, which can be considered as perverse and whimsical. Grievance of the learned counsel essentially is that in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction Lahore High Court did not discuss the evidence of the parties in details and confined to the observation that the Courts below had examined oral as well as documentary evidence while concluding that respondent had proved his case whereas the petitioner had not been able to substantiate the oral sale recorded vide Mutation No.51. In law, settled legal position is that the High court would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless such findings fall within the exceptional clauses illustrated hereinabove. Natural corollary that emerges in the facts and circumstances of a case would be that in such eventuality High Court is not obliged to reappraise the evidence for recording judgment of approval. Position would, however be otherwise if the High Court proceeds to set aside concurrent findings of the two Courts below or accepts or rejects the appellate Court judgment. Even in regular second appeal, jurisdiction of the High Court is limited to the extent of interference on a question of law and not on facts. This being well-recognized proposition of law, we do not find any legal infirmity in the judgment of the High Court, which is neither slipshod nor arbitrary. In the present case, no substantial error or defect in the procedure adopted by the trial Court has been shown to have been committed nor has such procedure produced any error or defect in the ultimate decision of the suit on merits. Indeed concurrent findings of fact can be interfered with by the High Court in a civil revision only on the grounds envisaged by aw in clauses (a) to (c) of section 115(1), CPC 1908. We are fortified in this view by the precedents reported as Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Hameed 2000 SCMR 314 and Azizullah v. Gul Muhammad Khan 2000 SCMR 1647.”
27. Mr. Mushtaq A. Memon, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1, has also relied upon the case of MUHAMMAD KHAN V. RASUL BIBI (2003 PLD SC 676). In the cited case, Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“16. Lastly, learned counsel was seriously critical of the fact that inadequacy of evidence would not be a ground for disturbing concurrent findings of fact and the learned Judge in Chambers exceeded his authority in the matter of re-appraisal of evidence while sitting in second appeal against the judgments of the Court below. He cited Fazal Rahman v. Amir Haider (1986 SCMR 1814), expressing the view that High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings arrived at by two Courts below even if it disagrees with that finding on its own view of evidence. It was held that, in law High Court could not disturb findings of fact even if erroneous, however, gross and inexcusable the error may be except on strong legal ground which may be held to tantamount to interference on a question of law. There can be no cavil with the proposition laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case, it will depend on the facts of each case as to whether the two Courts below recording concurrent findings of fact had lawfully arrived at the conclusion and whether the judgment did not suffer from misreading of evidence or exclusion of material piece of evidence on record or perverse or contrary to the record. This rule was also laid down in Muhammad Anwar v. Muhammad Siddiq Hashim (PLD 1992 SC 838) and reiterated in Sultan Ahmed v. Naeem Raza (1996 SCMR 1729) as well as Sirbland v. Allah Loke (1996 SCMR 575), in the minority judgment of Ajmal Mian, J(as His Lordships then was). The ratio of the precedents emerging in the facts and circumstances appears to be that ordinarily concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below could not be interfered with by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction in the second appeal however erroneous that finding may be, unless such finding has been arrived at by the Courts below either by misreading of evidence on record, by ignoring a material piece of evidence on record or through perverse appreciation of evidence. The case in hand squarely falls within the exception clause, inasmuch as, the High Courts below suffered from acute misreading of evidence and exclusion of material available on the record, resulting in gross miscarriage of justice.”
28. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1, Mr. Mushtaq A. Memon, has relied upon another case of MUHAMMAD ANWAR V. MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ HASHIM (PLD 1992 SC 838). In this case, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“There cannot be any cavil with the proposition of law enunciated in the above reports that the concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below after careful and elaborate consideration cannot be disturbed either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court. However, at the same time it is also well-settled proposition of law that if the concurrent finding is based on misreading of evidence or founded without taking into consideration, material pieces of evidence on record or is perverse of contrary to record, it is liable to be disturbed by the forum superior to the Courts which recorded such a concurrent finding.”
29. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1, Mr. Mushtaq A. Memon, on the similar point of concurrent findings of the courts below, has also relied upon case of QAMARUN NISHAN V. MUHAMMAD UMER (1996 CLC 1019). In this case, a learned single Judge of this Court has observed as under:-
“The second appeal is permissible under section 100 CPC, when; (i) the decision is contrary to law; (ii) the decision is contrary to usage having the force of law; (iii) there has been failure of the Courts below to determine some material issue of law and (iv) there has been failure to determine material issue of usage having force of law. The appellants’ learned counsel has not been able to point out any ground whereby his appeal could fall within the mischief of section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. Nothing has been shown as to how the decision given by the Courts below is contrary to law or any usage having force of law or there has been failure of Courts below to determine issue of law or issue of usage. The Courts below have properly appreciated evidence on record and no illegality warranting interference has been pointed out in this second appeal. Consequently, appeal has no merits, which is hereby dismissed.”
30. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 on the similar point of concurrent findings of the courts below, has also relied upon case of MASROOR ALI KHAN V. SAFRAZ AHMED (2004 YLR 1928). In this case, a learned single Judge of Lahore High Court has observed as under:-
“ 10. It is settled law that the second appeal lies on the grounds mentioned in section 100 CPC and not on questions of fact. The learned counsel has not been able to show that how this second appeal falls within any of the grounds mentioned in section 100 of CPC. No error of law has been committed by both the Courts below, while rendering the concurrent findings of facts.”
31. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 has also relied upon the case of IMAM DIN V. ABDUL HABIB KHAN (1988 CLC 224) wherein a learned single Judge of Lahore High Court on concurrent findings arrived by the courts below has observed as under:-
"………….. Turning to question of legal necessity, it is sufficient to say that concurrent findings arrived at by the Courts below, clearly appears to be findings of fact and are not open to re-examination in second appeal. Even otherwise, examination of the evidence, as stated above does not prove that there was any legal necessity for the impugned sale."
32. In another authority relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 in the case of FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN V. JAMALUDDIN (1996 SCMR 727), a Full Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court had not even condoned the delay in the part of the government. In this case the Federation of Pakistan was appellant in Civil Appeal No.361 of 1993. In this case, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that the appeal is stated to be barred by 36 days and no good reason has been given by the appellants for condonation of delay. The ground taken in their application for condonation of delay is of routine type namely that "the matter remained in circulation for permission to file petition for leave to appeal before this Hon'ble Court" and that the time was consumed in office routine which was beyond the control of the appellants. Such a plea has never been accepted by this court as a valid ground for condonation of delay. The Honourable Supreme Court in this cited case has relied upon 1989 SCMR 37 wherein it was held that:-
"The time said to have been spent during which the various authorities were examining the matter with a view to decide whether an appeal should or should not be filed cannot be excused. This Court has repeatedly laid down that so far as the limitation is concerned, the Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant. In fact, the Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases and its resources are much larger than those possessed by ordinary litigants. If in spite of these facilities the Government cannot comply with the requirement of the law of limitation, then it is for it to take steps to have that law changed."
33. The Honourable Supreme Court further observed that "it is also settled law that the litigant seeking condonation of delay must explain the delay of each day. The excuse that the matter got delayed because of its having remained under examination at different departmental levels is not a proper and satisfactory explanation for the delay of 36 days. The appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed on the ground of being limitation-barred."
34. Apart from the above case law, the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 has also cited following authorities on the point of limitation:-
35. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record and case law cited. The learned Counsel for the appellant has assailed the concurrent findings of the two Courts below on the ground that the learned trial Court has violated the provisions of Order XX rule 5 CPC and has not given findings issues-wise. I have gone through the judgments of two Courts below. The learned IV Senior Civil Judge, Karachi (South) has observed in his judgment that issues No.1 to 6 are interconnected and are based on same piece of evidence. The learned trial Judge had discussed issues No.1 to 6 together in detail and in concluding paragraph, he has observed as under:-
“I have considered the oral as well as written arguments submitted by learned advocate for the parties and have gone through the evidence on record carefully. The plaintiff in his evidence has himself admitted that his signatures on all the documents are genuine but he has alleged that he signed those blank documents and handed over the original documents to defendant No.1 in good faith whereas on the other hand he had written letter to defendant No.2 for supply of duplicate documents on the ground that original file was lost which goes to prove that it is impossible to believe that that a man having a good post in the army and earlier experience of sale and purchase of properties would have delivered all the original documents as well as required documents for the transfer of plot without receiving any sale consideration. Moreover the witness of the plaintiff Ghulam Abbas who is an independent witness has specifically deposed that he had counter signed the documents in presence of plaintiff but later on the witness has deposed that he does not remember whether Major Inayatullah ever signed the document before him but it is a natural fact that a person who attest any document can not remember each and every person who appears before him and even the plaintiff was appeared before him in the year 1986 and the evidence of the present witness was recorded in the year 1999 after about 13 years of its attestation therefore he replied the said question in a straight forward manner and even otherwise an attestation is to be done only in presence of concerned party and this fact has been deposed by the witness therefore it is imaginary that the plaintiff left the blank signed papers of his valuable property with defendant no.1 but all the documents produced by the defendant no.1 in his evidence shows that these were properly typed and the signature of the plaintiff are available on reserved places therefore it can not be said that these documents have been manipulated and as such the plaintiff has failed to point out any collusive ness or fraud committed by defendants and transfer of plot in favour of defendant No.1 seems to have been effected legally and after completing all the legal formalities as admitted by the plaintiff in his cross-examination that in 1985 when he signed the property documents in question the said documents were the only requirement of defendant No.2 regarding transfer of open plot. Further more from the perusal of evidence and documents it reveals that stay order was passed by VIII Civil Judge Karachi West in Suit No.1530/86 on 6-11-1986 whereas the transfer of suit plot was effected by defendant No.2 on 5-11-86 before passing stay order in the suit before the allegation of the plaintiff that the defendant No.2 aided and assisted the defendant No.1 in committing fraud and transferring the plot in dispute in favour of defendant No.1 despite service of order of status quo passed in Suit No.1530/86 by VIII Civil Judge Karachi West is false and baseless. Furthermore the plaintiff has also admitted that at the time of handing over the documents to defendant No.1 Mr. Asghar Chhata, partner of defendant No.1 and his relation Saadullah were present at the relevant time but the plaintiff has failed to examine any one of the witnesses to prove his versions that he had signed the blank documents which goes to prove that the plaintiff was also not confident that the witnesses as mentioned by him will favour to him and support his case while the defendant No.1 has examined one of the attesting witnesses of agreement Imtiaz Ahmed who has supported the case of defendant No.1 and the learned advocate for the plaintiff has failed to shatter his evidence while two attesting witnesses Ghulam Raza and Mirza have expired and as such it has become clear that value of suit property has enhanced for which the plaintiff was not in imagine therefore he has turned his mind either to take further sale consideration from defendant No.1 or to take property back otherwise he had himself signed all the transfer documents and appeared before the concerned authorities and received sale consideration amount from the defendant No.1. Hence issues No.1 to 4 are answered in negative while issues No.5 and 6 are answered in affirmative.”
36. Regarding issues No.7 and 8, the learned trial Judge has held that the burden to prove the issues is upon the defendants. Even otherwise, issue No.7 is regarding valuation of the property and issue No.8 is regarding maintainability of the suit. Both these issues were raised by the defendants and as such the trial Judge has rightly held that the burden to prove was upon the defendants. According to the learned trial Judge the defendants failed to discharge his burden and had not led evidence on this issue. Even otherwise, issues No.7 and 8 are legal and technical and in my view the trial Court has rightly answered the same in negative. Issue No.9 is in respect of cause of action and the learned trial Judge has observed that after execution of sale agreement and transfer of the plot in favour of defendant No.1 by the defendant No.2 no cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff to file the suit. The learned counsel for the appellant raised a legal objection that the trial Court has not dealt with the issue in accordance with Order XX rule 5 CPC. In view of the above, the contention of the learned counsel has no force and is baseless.
37. Furthermore, the learned Appellate Court while deciding the appeal has also framed one point, which is reproduced hereunder:-
“Whether the respondent No.2 transferred the plot in question to respondent No.1 after payment of sale consideration by respondent No.1 to the appellant and execution of all the required legal documents by the appellant in favour of respondent No.1 by the appellant?”
38. The learned Appellate Judge has answered this point in affirmative in favour of respondent for the simple reason that through evidence the plaintiff/appellant has miserably failed to prove his allegation against the respondent/defendant so much so the main witness of plaintiff Brig (R) Ghulam Abbas in his evidence has affirmed having seen page No.59, which is Exhibit 5/59, and had admitted that this page was counter signed by him. The witness of plaintiff further affirmed that the appellant/plaintiff did appear before him. He further affirmed that pages 70 and 79, Exhibit 5/19, were issued from his office. Brig (R) Ghulam Abbas in his evidence has stated that he does not remember whether Major Inayatullah ever signed the documents before him but he never complained to him that these documents have been forged. The learned Appellate Court while dismissing the Appeal has observed as under:-
“The upshot of above discussion is that in view of this Court the impugned Judgment and decree dated 5-4-2006 are speaking, based upon the evidence of the parties and documentary evidence as such this Court sees no valid and legal reason to interfere in it by any way. This appeal has no merits at all and accordingly it is dismissed with no order as to cost.”
39. Now, I revert to the second contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the appeal is not barred by limitation. In view of the above discussion and law quoted/relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1, this II Appeal is time-barred by at least two days even if the time is reckoned from the date of decree and period for obtaining copies is excluded from the period provided for filing the appeal. Admittedly, no application for condonation of delay has been made and no explanation has been given for the delay caused in filing the appeal. I, in the interest of justice, could have suo-moto condoned the delay in filing this II Appeal had there been a good case on merits in favour of the appellant. I have no hesitation to say that even on merits the view taken by the learned judges in the trial Court as well as District Court is not shown to have suffered from any legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Regarding the argument in respect of disturbing the concurrent findings of the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court, this Court is aware of its competency to do so provided the judgments of the Courts below fall within the parameters mentioned in the case laws discussed above on this subject. The Judgments of the Courts below are neither based on misreading of evidence nor are fanciful.
40. Regarding attestation of sale agreement by two witnesses, it is clear from the law quoted above that the sale agreement is not a financial document and as such provisions of Article 17(2) of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, are not attracted in this case.
In view of the above discussion, this II Appeal is dismissed on the point of limitation as well as on merits.
Judge
1982 SCMR 816
ALI MUHAMMED v. MUHAMMED HAYYAT & others
1991 SCMR 1816
UMAR DIN v. GHAZANFAR ALI and others
2002 MLD 1002
MUHAMMED SHARIF v. MST. SARDARAN BIBI and others
2004 CLC 370
ABDUL SATTAR v. BASHIR AHMED and others
2003 CLC 1652
MUHAMMED SHAIQ HUSSAIN v. SAMIR MANZOOR KHOKHAR
2004 YLR 1928 Lahore, Nawab Masroor Ali Khan V. Sarfraz Ahmed
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1996 C L C 1019 Kar. Mst. Qamarun Nishan & 10 Ors V. Ch. Muhammad Umer
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2006 SCMR 1304, Muhammad Feroze & Ors. V. Muhammad Jammat Ali.
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P L D 2003 S.C 676, Muhammad Khan V. Mst. Rasul Bibi.
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PLD 1992 S.C.838 Muhammad Anwar V Muhammad Siddiq Hashim.
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