

## IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH KARACHI

### C.P. No. S-985 of 2020

[Muhammad Irfan versus Zahid Hussain & others]

Plaintiff : Muhammad Irfan, through Ishrat Ghazali,  
Advocate.

Defendant No.1 : Zahid Hussain through Atif Shujaat M.  
Beg, Advocate.

Defendants 2&3 : Nemo.

Date of hearing : 30-03-2021

Date of Decision : 26-04-2021

### JUDGMENT

Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry J. - The Petitioner/tenant assails concurrent findings of fact delivered against him by the VII Rent Controller Karachi (South) in Rent Case No. 682/2013 vide order dated 12-02-2020, and then by the II Additional District Judge, Karachi (South) in FRA No. 81/2020 vide judgment dated 10-12-2020, whereby the Petitioner has been ejected from shop No. 5, ground floor, Maqbool Terrace, Mansfield Street, Saddar, Karachi (demised premises) on the ground of default in payment of rent and personal need.

2. The rent of the demised premises was Rs.2000/- per month. Per the landlord, rent used to be paid by the Petitioner quarterly in advance against receipt, but then the Petitioner defaulted in payment of rent from July 2012 to June 2013 amounting to Rs. 24,000/-. The rent case was filed in July 2013. The personal need asserted was that the demised premises was required by the landlord's son, Rehan Zahid, for expanding his fast-food business which he was carrying on in the adjacent shop.

3. The Petitioner/tenant was running a broast shop in the demised premises. It was his case that he had obtained the demised

premises by paying a substantial *pugri* to the previous tenant of the demised premises; that he never committed default and paid the rent regularly to the landlord/Respondent up till August 2013, but the landlord did not issue receipts; that when he tendered rent for the month of September 2013, the landlord refused to accept the same, and thus rent was sent via postal money-order dated 25-09-2013 which too was refused by the landlord, and thereafter the rent was being deposited in Court. To rebut the claim of personal need, the Petitioner/tenant contended that the landlord/Respondent was in possession of other vacant shops on the ground floor which could serve the need of his son, and thus the personal need asserted was not *bonafide*.

4. Earlier, the Rent Controller had passed an order under section 16(2) SRPO, 1979 against the Petitioner/tenant on the ground that the rent deposited by him in Court was beyond the time-line stipulated in the tentative rent order. That finding was appealed by the Petitioner/tenant with success, and the constitution petition filed by the landlord against the appellate order was also dismissed by a common judgment dated 20-06-2018 passed in C.P. No. S-1486/2015 to C.P. No. S-1488/2015. However, those proceedings are not relevant to the instant petition inasmuch as those were in respect of rent for March, May and June 2014, i.e. rent subsequent to the rent case.

5. Heard the learned counsel and perused the record.

6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/tenant submitted that both the Courts below did not appreciate that the landlord had admitted on cross-examination that: *"It is correct to suggest that the opponent has not committed default from 1987 to 2013 till the institution/presentation of instant Rent Case"*. However, in appraising the evidence both the Courts below had in fact dealt with that statement of the landlord by observing that the same could not be read in isolation when the landlord had also stated on cross-examination that : *"It is incorrect to suggest that opponent paid me rent till August, 2013"*.

7. To demonstrate that rent receipts were always issued, the landlord/Respondent had produced copies of rent receipts issued over the years prior to default. No objection was raised to the production of such receipts. There was also no suggestion by the Petitioner that the rent receipts were fabricated. In fact, on cross-examination he conceded as follows:

*“It is correct to suggest that I have not produce document to suggest that the payment of rent for July 2012 to June 2013. The rent receipts for the above period are with my counsel”.*

However, the Petitioner/tenant never produced in evidence the receipts acknowledged above. In filing FRA, the Petitioner tried to set-up a different case by contending that rent receipts were issued by the landlord at his convenience. The Petitioner then relied on a receipt for the month of December 2012, oddly dated 10-02-2012. Since that receipt was never produced in evidence and was contrary to the case set-up before the Rent Controller, the appellate Court had rightly rejected that new ground urged by the Petitioner.

8. Apart from a bald statement that he did not commit default, no evidence was brought by the Petitioner to demonstrate payment of rent for July 2012 to June 2013. The postal money-order sent by the Petitioner on 25-09-2013 was admittedly rent only for September 2013, and was sent after the rent case had been filed, and thus of no help to the Petitioner/tenant.

9. The Petitioner/tenant had alleged that he had paid *pugri* of the demised premises to the previous tenant of the demised premises. But even assuming that to be the case, nothing turns on it when there was no evidence to show that such *pugri* or any part thereof was paid to the Respondent/landlord.

10. As regards the ground of personal need, learned counsel for the Petitioner/tenant submitted that it was admitted by the landlord that he was in possession of 8/9 shops on the ground floor, and thus it was established that the alleged personal need was not *bonafide*. In

fact, what the landlord had deposed was that he was using those 8/9 shops for running his existing business of bakery and fast food. There was no evidence to show that any of those 8/9 shops were lying unused. Hence, it was plausible that the landlord's son, who was already carrying on business in the adjacent shop, required the demised premises to expand his business.

11. In view of the foregoing, the Petitioner has not been able to point out any mis-reading or non-reading of evidence by the Courts below nor any perversity in the findings so given so as to give cause to interfere in writ jurisdiction. Resultantly, the petition is dismissed.

**JUDGE**

Karachi  
Dated: 26-04-2021