IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH BENCH AT SUKKUR

 

Cr.Acquittal Appeal No.S-227of 2019.

 

For hearing of main case.

 

 

                     

Present:

                                                                        Mr. Justice Zulfiqar Ali Sangi.

 

 

 

Appellants:                              AltafHussainJunejothrough Mr.Saeed Ahmed Bhatt, Advocate.

 

 

Respondent:                            Muhammad Yaseen&another

                                                Imran Mubeen Khan,A.P.Gfor the State.

 

 

Date of hearing:             17.01.2020 .        

Date of decision:             17.01.2020

 

J U D G M E N T

 

 

ZULFIQAR ALI SANGI,J:-             AppellantAltafHussainassailed the judgment dated28.10.2019 passedbylearnedIInd Civil judge and JM Gambatin Criminal Cases No.30/2019  arising out of FIR No.53/2019 offence under section 489-F, registered at Police station Gambat.Wherebythe respondent No:1 Muhammad Yaseen was acquitted after the trial.

 

2.                  Precisely, the prosecution case was that complainant deals with the business of grain and fertilizer, the accused was purchasing the fertilizer and seeds,etc from him. On 25-01-2019 complainant along with witnesses was available at his shop, where Muhammad Yaseen came and asked for fertilizer on credit basis, on such complainant demanded from him the cheques of Rs: 10,50,000/-for which accused issued the cheques detail given in the FIR for 04-04-2019 and took the fertilizer, such agreement was also reduced in the writing. According to the complainant said cheques on presentation were dishonored and Bank issued such a memo for which complainant time to time approached the accused but all in vain and then complainant registered the FIR.

 

3.                  After the usual investigation, the police submitted challanagainst the appellantbefore the competent Court of law. The learned trial Court completed all legal formalities and framedcharge against the appellant/accused at Ex.02, to which hepleaded not guilty and claimed trial, such pleawas obtained at Ex.03.

 

4.                  To prove its case, the prosecution examined PW-1 H.C Muhammad Ali Narejo the author of the FIR at Ex. 04. He produced FIR at Ex. 5, Original Cheque at Ex. 6, Original bank return memo at Ex.7 and attested copies of relevant entries at Ex. 8. PW-2Topan Mal was examined at Ex.9.PW-03Zahid Ali Mangi the mashir of the case was examined at Ex.10, who produceda photostate copy of his CNIC at Ex.11, Original mashirnama of inspection of the place of incident at Ex. 12, Original mashirnama of production of original cheque and cheque return memo to I.O at Ex 13.  P.W-04AltafHussain (Complainant) was examined at Ex.14. He produced the original agreement of accused to the complainant at Ex.15. P.W-5 Muharram Ali Dahri the investigation officer was examined at Ex.16. He produced photocopies of relevant entries at Ex. 17.P.W-6SyedNaseer Ali Shah bank manager at Ex.18. He produced an attested carbon copy of a letter of I.O regarding the investigation of cheque and cheque return memo at Ex.19. Bank statement of the account holder/accused at Ex.20, copy of his CNIC at Ex. 21 and thereafter the prosecution closed its side vide statement at Ex. 22.

5.                  After completion of prosecution evidence, learned trial court recorded statement of the appellantin terms of section 342 Cr.P.C at 23, wherein hedenied the prosecution case andclaimed hisinnocence and stated that he has falsely been implicated by the complainant and further stated that complainant had abducted his father Nazar Muhammad and snatched alleged cheque from the father of accused and further stated that on 5-4-2019 the accused was not present at his house and the accused was serving in duty at P.P Khursheed Shah. He professed innocence. However neither heexaminedhimself under section 342 (2) Cr.P.Con oath nor led evidence in hisdefence.

 

6.                  Thelearned trialCourt after hearing the Counsel for the parties and considering the evidence passed impugned judgment had acquitted the accused which has been assailed through instant appeal.

7.                Learned counsel for the appellant contended that learned trial court passed the judgment in violation of law; that evidence produced by the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused but trial court acquitted the accused on flimsy grounds; that signature on the cheque has not been denied by the accused; that complainant and his witnesses fully supported the case and the evidence of complainant was corroborated by the evidence of bank manager; that no major contradiction is available in the evidence of prosecution witness; that judgment passed by the trial court is not bassed on cogent reasons. Lastly, he prayed that the appeal may be admitted for hearing and notices may be issued against the accused and after hearing both the parties convict the accused.

 

8.                Conversely, learned D.P.G, while controverting the contentions of learned Counsel for the appellant submitted thatthere is civil dispute between the parties and the business transaction which is admitted by the appellant in his evidence; that major contradictions are available in the evidence which makes the entire case as doubtful; that learned trial court has properly appreciated the evidence and then passed the acquittal judgment; lastly hesupported the judgment passed by the trial court and prays that appeal may be dismissed. 

9.      I have heard learned Counsel for the appellant, learned A.P.G for the State and have examined the record carefully with their able assistance.

10.    It is well settled by now that the scope of appeal against acquittal is very narrow and there is a double presumption of innocence and that the Courts generally do not interfere with the same unless they find the reasoning in the impugned judgment to be perverse, arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous as was held by the Supreme Court in the cases of State Versus Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011 SC 554), Honourable Supreme Court has held as under:-

From the ratio of all the above pronouncements and those cited by the learned counsel for the parties, it can be deduced that the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence, that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty; in other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled. The courts shall be very slow in interfering with such an acquittal judgment, unless it is shown to be perverse, passed in gross violation of law, suffering from the errors of grave misreading or non-reading of the evidence; such judgments should not be lightly interfered and heavy burden lies on the prosecution to rebut the presumption of innocence which the accused has earned and attained on account of his acquittal. It has been categorically held in a plethora of judgments that interference in a judgment of acquittal is rare and the prosecution must show that there are glaring errors of law and fact committed by the Court in arriving at the decision, which would result into grave miscarriage of justice; the acquittal judgment is perfunctory or wholly artificial or a shocking conclusion has been drawn. Moreover, in number of dictums of this Court, it has been categorically laid down that such judgment should not be interjected until the findings are perverse, arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous (Emphasis supplied). The Court of appeal should not interfere simply for the reason that on the re-appraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could possibly be arrived at, the factual conclusions should not be upset, except when palpably perverse, suffering from serious and material factual infirmities. It is averred in The State v. Muhammad Sharif (1995 SCMR 635) and Muhammad Ijaz Ahmad v. Raja FahimAfzal and 2 others (1998 SCMR 1281) that the Supreme Court being the final forum would be chary and hesitant to interfere in the findings of the Courts below. It is, therefore, expedient and imperative that the above criteria and the guidelines should be followed in deciding these appeals.

 

 

 

11.    According to the complainant the offence was committed by the accused on 25-01-2019 but the complainant lodged the FIR on 04-06-2019, such delay in the registration of FIR has not been explained by the complainant properly. The approach after the dishonor of cheque to the accused was not established by the complainant from the evidence as no PW deposed a single word that on what date and what time complainant approached the accused and informed him about the dishonor of the cheque and demanded his amount.

12.    On scrutiny of the evidence produced by the prosecution, I found that all witnesses are contradictory to each other on material points. The approach to the oath commissioner and the stamp vendor is doubtfull as the complainant deposed before the trial court that he alongwith Topan Das, Anwar Ali Mangi and accused went to the stamp vendor Zia-u-ddinAbbasi for executing agreement thereafter they went to the oath commissioner Mr. Manik Ali Pitafi whereas the PW-2 deposed in the evidence that agreement was made before the stamp vendor Raja Abbasi, approach to the bank for encashment is also contradictory and non-supportive.

13.    The important evidence was the vouchers and the credit register and the details of the fertilizer taken by the accused were not been produced before the trial court to establish that the accused taken such fertilizer from the shop of the complainant and the cheques were issued by him for re-payment of such amount.

14.    The version given in the FIR and the evidence of complainant is also contradictory to the application moved by the complainant himself to the Additional IG Sukkur Region Sukkur against the accused for action on the same cheques in which complainant narrated some other business of flour Mill and stated that accused and his brother namely Muhammad Rafique were on business terms with him he not disclosed the business of Fertilizer, True copy of the said application is available at page 41 and is submitted by the appellant.

 

15.    A perusal of section 489-F, P.P.C. reveals that the provision will be attracted if all three conditions are fulfilled and proved by the prosecution: (i) issuance of cheque; (ii) such issuance was with dishonest intention; (iii) the purpose of issuance of cheques should be:(a) to repay a loan; or (b) to fulfill an obligation (which in wide term inter alia applicable to lawful agreements, contracts, services, promises by which one bound or an act which binds person to some performance). (iv) on presentation, the chequesare dishonored. However, a valid defence can be taken by the accused, if he proves that:(i) he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheques would be honoured, and (ii) that the bank was at fault in dishonoring the cheque. S. 489-F is therefore reproducedas under:-

S. 489-F: Dishonestly issuing a cheque: Whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine, or with both, unless he can establish, for which the burden of proof shall rest on him, that he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheque would be honoured and that the bank was at fault in not honouring the cheque.

 

16.    The complainant had taken two different pleas about his amount alleged against the accused, he not produced any proof about the said transaction of Fertilizer even not produced thevouchers or credit register,etc and his FIR and application as discussed above are given different versionsabout the business and set of accused. Complainant also not proved the agreement by not producing the important witnesses who were the author of the said agreement, oath commissioner who attested the said agreement and the person who identified the accused before the oath commissioner.

17.    Based on the above discussion, I have found that the acquittal of the respondent does not suffer from any illegality to call for interference by this court with the impugned judgment. Based on the law concerning an appeal against acquittal and the fact that the learned trial Judge has advanced valid and cogent reasons for passing a finding of acquittal in favor of the respondent and I see no legal justification to disturb the same as such the appeal against the acquittal of the respondent is dismissed in Limini.

 

18.    These are the reasons formy short order dated: 17-01-2020 announced in court.

                                                                   JUDGE