IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, BENCH AT
SUKKUR
Criminal Acquittal Appeal No.S-
39 of 2017
Appellant/Complainant : Muhammad
Sharif Magsi
in person
: The State, through Syed Sardar
Ali Shah
Deputy Prosecution General
Date of hearing : 08.3.2019
Date of decision
: 08.03.2019
JUDGMENT
IRSHAD ALI
SHAH, J.- The appellant/complainant by way of instant
Criminal Acquittal Appeal has impugned judgment dated 28.02.2017, passed by
learned 3rd Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate Sukkur, whereby the
private respondents have been acquitted of the offence outcome of FIR Crime No.12/2016
of P.S Site Area Sukkur.
2. The
facts in brief necessary for disposal of instant criminal acquittal appeal are
that the private respondents after having formed an unlawful and in prosecution
of their common object by using damage to shop of appellant/complainant, take
away therefrom his belongings as are detailed in FIR by making aerial firing to
create harassment, for that they were booked and reported upon by the police
before Court of law for their trial in accordance with law.
3. At trial, the private respondents did
not plead guilty to charge and the prosecution to prove it, examined appellant/complainant
and his witnesses and then closed the side.
4. The private respondents during the
course of their examination u/s 342 Cr.PC denied the
prosecutions’ allegation by pleading innocence by stating that they have been
involved in this case falsely by the appellant/complainant.
5. On evaluation of evidence so produced
by the prosecution, the learned trial Court acquitted the private respondents
of the offence for which they were charged by way of impugned judgment, as
stated above.
6. It is contended by the
appellant/complainant in person that the learned trial Court has recorded the
acquittal of the private respondents without lawful justification. By
contending so, he sought for adequate action against the private respondents.
7. Learned D.P.G for the State by
supporting the impugned judgment has sought for dismissal of the instant
criminal acquittal appeal.
8. I
have considered the above arguments and perused the record.
9. The
FIR of the incident has been lodged with delay of about fourteen days, such
delay has not been explained plausibly, same as such could not be overlooked.
The very case on investigation as per appellant/complainant was recommended by
the police to be cancelled under ‘B’ false class. As per PWs
Rasool Bux and Khalid Hussain, they are witnesses of the appellant/complainant in
few more cases. If it is so, then they appear to be stock witnesses of the
appellant/complainant, who could hardly be relied upon. In these circumstances,
learned trial Court was right to record acquittal of the private respondents by
extending them benefit of doubt with the following observation;
“According to all PWs people of vicinity
called complainant and informed him about the incident but name of the person
who informed complainant has not been disclosed anywhere, as well as none has
come forward to be witness from such vicinity though complainant stated in his
cross-examination that a filing station is situated at the distance of 20 feet
and guards are always present there IO in his cross-examination has also stated
that he has investigated from the shopkeepers of the shops situated in vicinity
of place of incident but he didn’t get any information about the happening of
incident. According to the story of prosecution, complainant’s nephew was
beaten up by all accused but surprisingly no injury or medical report relating
to such incident has been brought on record. There is 14 days inordinate delay
in lodgment of FIR. Additionally there is no recovery from the possession of
accused. Moreover, it is the case of prosecution that the accused have committed
theft of 2 maunds of iron from the shop of
complainant but none has stated about how and on what such heavy quantity of
iron was taken from the place of incident making their escape good.”
10. In case of State and others vs. Abdul Khaliq and others (PLD 2011
SC-554), it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court that;
“The scope of interference in appeal against
acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the
presumption of innocence is
significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence, that an accused
shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty; in other words, the
presumption of innocence is doubled. The courts shall be very slow in
interfering with such an acquittal judgment, unless it is shown to be perverse,
passed in gross violation of law, suffering from the errors of grave misreading
or non-reading of the evidence; such judgments should not be lightly interfered
and heavy burden lies on the prosecution to rebut the presumption of innocence
which the accused has earned and attained on account of his acquittal. Interference
in a judgment of acquittal is rare and the prosecution must show that there are
glaring errors of law and fact committed by the Court in arriving at the
decision, which would result into grave miscarriage of justice; the acquittal
judgment is perfunctory or wholly artificial or a shocking conclusion has been
drawn. Judgment of acquittal should not be interjected until the findings are perverse,
arbitrary, foolish, artificial, speculative and ridiculous.
The Court of appeal should not interfere simply for the reason that on the
reappraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could possibly be arrived
at, the factual conclusions should not be upset, except when palpably perverse,
suffering from serious and material factual
infirmities”.
11. Nothing
has been brought on record by the appellant/complainant which
may suggest that the impugned judgment is arbitrary or cursory to be interfered
with by way of instant Criminal Acquittal Appeal, it is dismissed accordingly.
Judge
ARBROHI