C.P
No. D – 3628 of 2015
Date |
Order with signature of Judge |
1.
For Katcha Peshi.
2.
For hearing of C.M.A No. 10183/2015.
15-10-2015
Mr. Nisar Ahmed Bhanbhro,
advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. T. David
Lawrance, learned Amicus Currie.
Mr. Liaquat Ali Shar,
learned Additional Advocate General a/w Hidayatullah Memon, Returning Officer
Town Committee Hingorja/ Assistant Commissioner, Sobhodero.
Mr. Mian Mumtaz
Rabbani, learned D.A.G.
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
Through instant petition, the petitioner
has impugned the order dated 13.09.2015 passed by the Returning Officer, Town
Committee Hingorja/Assistant Commissioner Sobhodero (respondent No.1), whereby
the nomination form of the petitioner has been dismissed on the ground that the
petitioner is defaulter of SEPCO Electricity dues.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner is neither the defaulter of electricity dues of
SEPCO Authorities nor the impugned order was ever communicated to the
petitioner, who was earlier informed that his nomination has been accepted. Per
learned counsel, on 18.09.2015, when he approached the Returning Officer to
verify the list of validly nominated candidates (Form No.VII), it was learnt that
his name was not mentioned in the list, therefore, he approached the learned
Returning Officer, who informed him that his nomination has been cancelled on
account of default in payment of SEPCO Electricity dues. Learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that the petitioner immediately moved an application for
supplying certified copy of his nomination form and the order thereon however, the
same was not supplied to him in time, therefore, the petitioner could not file
the appeal within specified time which expired on 22.09.2015. Per learned
counsel, since there is no other remedy, therefore, the petitioner has
approached this court for seeking redressal of his grievance as the petitioner has
been deprived his right of franchise by the Returning Officer without any
lawful justification.
3. Notices of instant petition were issued
to respondents, pursuant to which, respondent No.1 Returning Officer Town
Committee Hingorja has shown appearance and filed his comments along with
annexures. Whereas, Mr. T. David Lawrence has volunteered his services to assist
the court on the issue to maintainability of instant petition and the
controversy relating to default in payment of utility bills.
4. Mr. Liaquat Ali Shar, learned
Additional Advocate General has raised objection with regard to maintainability
of instant petition on the ground that instead of availing the remedy provided
by way of filing an appeal against the order passed by the Returning Officer,
the petitioner has approached this court directly under Article 199 of the
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which will render the appellate
forum as redundant and will increase the burden of this court. Mr. T. David
Lawrence has also supported such objection regarding maintainability of the
instant petition and submits that a party cannot be allowed to abandone the
remedy as provided in the statue without any lawful and reasonable
justification. As regards the default in payment of SEPCO Electricity charges,
the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to a decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Rana Muhammad Arshad v/s Additional
Commissioner Revenue, Multan and others reported as 1998 SCMR 1462, wherein according to
the learned counsel even at the stage of leave granting appeal late proceedings
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, a candidate was given an opportunity to make
payment of outstanding amount towards bank dues/loan, hence, submits that if
the petitioner has now paid amount of electricity dues, his default can be
ignored as the defect, if any, will stand cured even at this stage while
hearing instant petition.
5. We have heard the arguments of learned
counsel for parties, learned A.A.G and learned D.A.G, as well as Mr. T. David
Lawrence and perused the record with their assistance and also examined the
relevant rules.
6. Form perusal of record, it appears that
nomination form of the petitioner is otherwise found to be complete in all
respects as there is no other objection raised by the Returning Officer. However,
his nomination has been rejected on the sole ground of default in payment of
electricity bill. The Returning Officer present in court has brought the entire
record, which reflects that electricity bill for the month of September, 2015, has
been issued in the name of Muhammad Ramzan Solangi, who is father of the
petitioner, whereas, an amount of Rs.15,631/- has been shown as arrears in
respect of bill for the month of August, 2015, and the due date for payment of current
bill was 21.09.2015. The petitioner has produced the original paid bill for the
month of September, 2015, which was paid on 17.09.2015 i.e. before the due date
given in the aforesaid bill. Whereas, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that even such bill does not pertain to the petitioner as he is
residing with his father in his house who is not dependent upon the petitioner.
It has further been stated that in terms of Article 63(4) of the Constitution
of Pakistan read with Section 99(t) of the Representation of People Act, 1976,
and Section 36(j) of Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, the nomination paper of a
candidate can be rejected only if he is defaulter in payment of utility charges
for a period of over six months, whereas in the instant case, there is no
default over a period of six months. Returning Officer was also enquired as to
whether the name of petitioner was mentioned in the list affixed in respect of
candidates whose nomination forms were rejected, in response, he has candidly stated
that on the list affixed showing the name of the candidates whose forms were
rejected it could not be mentioned due to inadvertence that such list has been
issued in respect of candidates whose nomination has been rejected.
7. In view of hereinabove facts and
circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that there was some confusions
created on the part of the Returning Officer, which provided the petitioner a
valid ground for approaching this court directly under Article 199 of the
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as it appears that he was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing an appeal before the appellate
authority within the specified time. Moreover, the objection by the Returning
Officer regarding default on the part of the petitioner in respect of electricity
charges is also misconceived in fact as well as law as admittedly the default
is not above the period of six months and the bill is admittedly in the name of
petitioner’s father who is not dependent upon the petitioner, whereas, such
fact has not been disputed by the respondents, learned A.A.G and Returning
Officer.
8. Keeping in view the above facts and
circumstances of the case, we are inclined to entertain this petition and
set-aside the impugned order passed by the Returning Officer, who is directed
to issue VII in respect of petitioner in accordance with law.
9. Instant petition is hereby allowed in
the aforesaid terms along with listed application.
Judge
Judge
Abdul
Salam/P.A